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It is probable that the 1991 Gulf War might have had a much different 
outcome if Saddam Hussein had possessed a small nuclear arsenal, or if he 
had decided to use his chemical weapons. The Defense Department's Bottom- 
up Review conducted in 1993 identified the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) in the hands of regional adversaries, such as Iraq, as the 
nation's number one security threat.  President Clinton echoes this theme in 
many public speeches, and in his September 1993 address to the UN General 
Assembly he vowed to give WMD proliferation a higher profile. Under his 
leadership a two-pronged approach to this problem has developed. 
On the one side, the Clinton administration vigorously advocates 
traditional nonproliferation measures.   U.S. leadership was instrumental in 
securing the extension of the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty in 
May 1995. The United States is moving forward with negotiations for the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-off. The 
administration is also promoting the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
Biological Weapons Convention.  Under U.S. leadership, classical diplomatic 
approaches to WMD nonproliferation are enjoying broader international 
support than ever before. 
On the other side, the Department of Defense launched its Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) in December 1993, under the leadership 
of former Secretary of Defense Aspin. Counterproliferation provides military 
options to counter the acquisition and use of WMD by regional adversaries. 
Its supporters claim that these additional response options will strengthen and 
enhance the nonproliferation options.  Key Defense officials have been careful 
to stress that counterproliferation will in no way replace nonproliferation, but 
that its purpose is to provide usable options when nonproliferation fails. 
Pursuit of both paths appears to some analysts to pose a conflict of 
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interests.  Many proponents of traditional diplomatic nonproliferation efforts 
fear that the coercive element of counterproliferation, especially the threat to 
use military force, will undermine the international cooperation and 
consensus upon which nonproliferation depends for its success. They also 
criticize counterproliferation as a short-term solution to the WMD 
proliferation problem because it does not directly confront the long-term need 
to deal with the security concerns that may lead regional adversaries to acquire 
WMD in the first place. Finally, they fear that counterproliferation will 
undermine the traditional U.S. leadership which has been so vital to 
negotiating, implementing, and improving the various nonproliferation 
treaties and agreements. 
This research is the first comprehensive comparison of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime with the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.   It 
consists of three important and interlocking parts. The first is a detailed 
analysis of the component treaties and agreements which make up the 
regime, with particular focus on how counterproliferation could either 
undermine or enhance them. In the second part, the five elements of the CPI 
are studied in detail, considering the prospects for each, the progress made to 
date on implementing them, and the limitations which are already becoming 
apparent. The most important of the three parts is the third one, which 
examines the broad spectrum of tensions which counterproliferation evokes. 
This thesis sorts and analyzes these tensions by using three theoretical 
models. The models are helpful for grouping the tensions into three 
categories: bureaucratic, intergovernmental, and state-societal. The models 
are also useful to characterize each tension and to determine the impact each 
is likely to have on U.S. policy. A "bureaucratic politics" model explains state 
policy as the output of the competition between bureaucratic organizations 
within a government. It shows that many of the tensions created by 
counterproliferation are the result of such competition.  A "rational actor" 
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model shows that policy may be shaped by executive decisions based on 
rational cost-risk-benefit calculus of security needs. This model points out 
that many of the tensions counterproliferation has created between the U.S. 
and its allies are the result of legitimate differences in the enduring security 
concerns of each state. A "state-societal" model shows that policy may also be 
shaped by public and expert opinion. It illustrates how both government 
bureaucracies and executives must sort through the vast array of opinion, and 
how both must occasionally respond to it by reshaping policy. 
Bureaucratic tensions between government departments and agencies, 
such as between Defense and State, and between Defense and the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency became evident from the start. These 
agencies have often distrusted each other's motives in the past, so this tension 
is not unexpected.  Counterproliferation also created tensions between various 
branches of the Defense Department, such as between commanders and the 
intelligence community over the adequacy of intelligence support for specific 
counterproliferation missions. 
Tensions between the United States and its allies also are apparent. 
Only the United Kingdom and France seem to be fully supportive. Both have 
already begun to adapt their strategic thought to address the 
counterproliferation issue. Although NATO has embraced the concept by 
conducting its own threat assessment, and launching its own comprehensive 
study, it appears to be interested only in the defensive aspects of 
counterproliferation.  Japan and South Korea have been conspicuously quiet 
about counterproliferation, although it seems clear that they will not support 
policies likely to antagonize North Korea. Their is talk of developing theater 
ballistic missile defenses with Japan, but little progress is yet apparent. The 
Russian General Staff was briefed by U.S. Defense Department officials and 
agreed only to present their views in future discussions. 
The most constant and vociferous tensions are seen in the steady 
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stream of criticism from the nongovernment organizations (NGO) 
community. Much of this criticism is "noise," with few implications for U.S. 
policy. Examples include concerns raised by individual analysts from 
developing countries, as well as organizations such as Greenpeace 
International, who imply that counterproliferation discriminates against 
developing countries, and that it is a thinly disguised attempt to retarget U.S. 
nuclear weapons against the Third World.  Others complain that 
counterproliferation violates principles of international law and order, and 
will undermine the United Nations.  While these concerns are interesting 
and have strong moral appeal, many of these analysts look at 
counterproliferation in isolation from the rest of U.S. policy.  They infer from 
its declaratory counterproliferation policy that the United States will 
somehow abandon its longstanding commitment to reinvigorate the United 
Nations, uphold the rule of law, and strengthen nonproliferation efforts. 
NGO criticisms must be carefully considered in the context of the U.S. 
national interest to see if there is any substance that may ultimately affect 
security policy. Occasionally NGOs succeed in raising issues which the U.S. 
government is reluctant to address, such as the tension counterproliferation 
creates over the possibility that U.S. nuclear weapons will be used. This 
tension as it turns out may be a healthy one, which if kept deliberately 
ambiguous by the government, and if kept in the public light by the NGOs, 
could serve counterproliferation and nonproliferation as well.  Such 
ambiguity may cause regional adversaries trying to acquire WMD to reassess 
the costs and risks inherent in seeking to acquire such weapons, versus the 
perceived benefits of having them. It may also cause states interested in 
stopping WMD proliferation to work harder for consensus, for fear that the 
United States may resort to unilateral military means if progress is not 
achieved. 
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The following anchor points for counterproliferation policy emerged 
from a comparison of six pairs of arguments and counterarguments over key 
counterproliferation issues: 
* The CPI is a proper response to the number one U.S. security threat. 
The developing allied consensus over the nature of the threat, particularly in 
NATO, helps to legitimize the CPI as an appropriate response. 
* Nonproliferation needs a forceful back-up. The military options 
provided by counterproliferation add back-up capabilities of prevention, 
preemption, deterrence, and defense, which will make the diplomatic 
approaches of the nonproliferation regime more effective than before, and 
which will raise the stakes for regional adversaries who might strive to cheat 
on their obligations. 
* U.S. leadership in counterproliferation is consistent with its past 
leadership in nonproliferation. Fears that counterproliferation would 
undermine future nonproliferation consensus were absent from the recently 
concluded Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension 
Conference.  This is a useful indicator that counterproliferation, if judiciously 
managed, may have a minimal impact on the nonproliferation regime. 
* The CPI updates U.S. nuclear deterrence to the current threat. 
Although key Defense Department officials responsible for 
counterproliferation policy currently claim that it does not portend the first 
use of U.S. nuclear weapons, the possibility that they may be used in a 
preemptive manner can not be ruled out. The threat of first use is implicit in 
the longstanding U.S. nuclear weapons strategy of maintaining that option, 
which formed the linchpin of NATO's "flexible response" strategy for many 
years. 
* The CPI's preventive and preemptive options can provide additional 
protection for U.S. citizens, forces, and territory. They are clearly the 
initiative's strong suit, and will likely provide an impetus for regional 
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adversaries intent on acquiring or threatening to use WMD to reassess the 
benefits of doing so. 
* The CPI targets the handful of regional adversaries likely to attempt 
to acquire or threaten use of WMD, not the broader international consensus of 
the nonproliferation regime. States that are not pursuing the acquisition of 
WMD, or who already have WMD, but do not demonstrate adversarial 
behavior, have nothing to fear from U.S. counterproliferation policy. 
The following research findines should be considered in developing 
counterproliferation policy: 
* The nonproliferation regime is healthy. The United States has 
earned a mandate to lead out in the new direction of counterproliferation by 
virtue of its proven record as an honest manager of the nonproliferation 
regime. 
* The CPI is not a "fix-all" solution. It has two inherent risks that will 
ultimately delineate the limitations of counterproliferation policy: 
overconfidence in high-tech solutions, and the possible inadequacy of 
intelligence support. 
* Intergovernmental (bureaucratic) tensions are fading. The National 
Security Council has clear authority over all WMD proliferation issues. This 
minimizes bureaucratic infighting. 
* Alliance tensions are manageable, and other intergovernmental 
tensions are inconsequential. The CPI is consistent with NATO's defensive 
mission especially since its focus is on U.S. and Western/G7 security interests. 
Criticism of counterproliferation from countries outside the sphere of U.S. 
friends and allies is of little import to U.S. security policy. 
* The tensions raised by NGOs must be filtered. NGOs occasionally 
identify tensions which must be considered in the development of U.S. 
security policy. They are not, however, responsible for U.S. security policy, 
and much of what they say has little bearing on policy making. 
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The following policy recommendations should guide the ongoing 
development of U.S. counterproliferation policy: 
* Counterproliferation policy must stress operational aims. A strong 
and credible policy should allow the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) 
to fight with little fear that a potential foe could successfully resort to WMD. 
* Keep options for prevention and first use of U.S. nuclear weapons 
ambiguous. This ambiguity will serve U.S. policy well, as previously 
mentioned. 
* Give nonproliferation center stage whenever possible. The linkage 
between nonproliferation and counterproliferation must model the "carrot 
and stick" approach. The advantages and benefits of nonproliferation should 
be showcased as the desirable outcome. 
* The abundant historical record of previous counterproliferation 
planning and action must be rediscovered. It is not too late to rediscover the 
history behind U.S. counterproliferation, which goes back to the Second 
World War, and to use it to illustrate that the CPI is not a radical departure 
from the U.S. record. 
* Counterproliferation should be developed into a three-fold policy 
involving strategies of prevention, deterrence, and defense^ A preventive 
strategy with deliberate ambiguity with regard to first use of U.S. nuclear 
weapons and unilateral U.S. action must be the core strategy of 
counterproliferation policy. It must also have a credible approach to deterring 
the use of WMD, as well as to deter their acquisition in the first place. Finally, 
it must have an effective defensive strategy to provide real protection to U.S., 
allied, or coalition forces, as well as populations and territory, from the effects 
of WMD. 
* A "watch list" of suspect states should be publicly established and kept 
as short as possible.   Such a list would be a clear indicator of U.S. resolve and 
leadership in counterproliferation and would serve as a warning notice. 
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* The President and Cabinet must use counterprolif eration 
terminology and reclaim ownership of the policy in future speeches and 
documents. The policy at present appears to be the domain of Defense 
Department officials below cabinet rank. This is inappropriate for national 
policy. 
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I. AN INITIATIVE WITH INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS 
In December 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) which promised new military 
capabilities to effectively deal with adversaries armed with weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). The five point plan called for the creation of the new 
mission by the president, procurement of new technologies, development of 
new war fighting doctrines, improvement of intelligence capabilities, and 
greater cooperation with allies.i Aspin said that the initiative would 
complement existing nonproliferation efforts which depend upon treaties, 
diplomacy, and other cooperative efforts to keep states from acquiring WMD. 
He also stressed that counterproliferation would have a secondary role to 
nonproliferation, and would be used only in the few cases where 
nonproliferation efforts failed. 
Aspin's announcement raised several key questions. First is the 
question of whether counterproliferation is compatible with nonproliferation. 
Some nonproliferation experts questioned whether a counterproliferation 
policy based on military capabilities would undermine rather than enhance 
traditional nonproliferation measures based upon cooperation, consensus, 
and denial.2 A related question is whether the two can be pursued 
1 Les Aspin, 'The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative Created," prepared 
remarks to the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security 
and Arms Control, Washington, 7 December 1993, Defense Issues, vol. 8, no. 68 
(undated), 2. 
2 See Harald Müller, "Counterproliferation and the Nonproliferation 
Regime:  A View From Germany," in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller, eds., 
International Perspectives on Counterproliferation. Working Paper No. 99 
(Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), 
25-27. Müller states that counterproliferation is inevitably linked to WMD 
nonproliferation regimes but also charges that "counterproliferation came into life 
without any tangible notion of what it would mean for the nonproliferation 
simultaneously.  Pursuing both the CPI and the nonproliferation regime may 
cause inevitable tensions. The more vigorously the CPI is pursued, the harder 
it may be to cultivate support for international treaties and policy 
arrangements that help to curb WMD proliferation. While its supporters 
claim that counterproliferation complements and reinforces traditional 
nonproliferation measures and treaties, its detractors argue that the use of 
military means to enact counterproliferation may undermine future support 
for an enhanced nonproliferation regime.3 This thesis assesses the 
compatibility of counterproliferation with the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. 
Few would argue with the need for better defenses against nuclear, 
chemical, and biological effects.   Many would advocate the improvement of 
intelligence capabilities, especially if information about proliferation could be 
regimes." He is also critical of the tendency of U.S. policy to dismiss international 
law and organizations for the sake of U.S. security interests. See also David Fischer, 
"Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?" p. 17, in the same volume. 
Fischer states that counterproliferation is at best only a short-term or mid-term 
solution, and that in the long-term the security concerns and political issues which 
motivate states to proliferate must be addressed through cooperative means. 
3 For an assessment of how counterproliferation might support an enhanced 
nonproliferation regime, see Nuclear Proliferation:  Confronting the New 
Challenges, the Report of an Independent Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 9. This report calls for a stricter nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, along with the development and deployment of the 
means to deter use and protect against the risks of WMD. It lists 
counterproliferation as one of seven elements of a revitalized effort against 
proliferation which also includes regional strategies, improved security assurances, 
a stronger IAEA, strong export controls, sensible use of fissile materials, and further 
nuclear arms reduction.  For an opposing view see Benjamin Sanders, 
"Counterproliferation: How Does It Play on the International Stage?" in Reiss and 
Müller, International Perspectives on Counterproliferation. 6-9. Sanders concludes 
that counterproliferation is impractical, and that it would not remove the incentive 
of states to acquire or use WMD. He also states that because it is based on U.S. 
security interests, it is likely to be an ineffective tool of international relations, and 
will likely harm the entire nonproliferation system. 
shared with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (to trigger 
challenge inspections) and with the United Nations Security Council (for 
sanctions). But counterproliferation efforts designed to neutralize, disable, or 
destroy weapons of mass destruction, or the facilities which produce them, 
have caused strong tensions between U.S. Government agencies and 
departments, on the one hand, and between the United States and foreign 
governments, non-government organizations, and non-official policy 
analysts, on the other. It remains to be seen just how the balance will be 
struck if the CPI is to develop into a coherent national policy. 
The CPI is one plausible response to a serious national security 
problem. It may be in competition with solutions previously advocated. 
Viewed through the "lens" of bureaucratic politics, it might be viewed as an 
attempt by the Department of Defense to wrestle away other agencies' 
responsibilities for curbing proliferation.4 Even if one embraces the Defense 
Department's position that the CPI does not supplant or replace the traditional 
nonproliferation regime, there remains the implication that the 
nonproliferation efforts of other departments have failed, and that Defense is 
devising policy to make up for the failure. This perception could generate 
interagency conflict, particularly if the president and key members of his 
administration do not convey a cohesive vision of how the CPI can enhance 
the regime. Aside from the potential for bureaucratic infighting, such conflict 
could develop on either of two regime axes.   First, because the CPI is often 
viewed as a unilateral, or sometimes a coalitional response, it may compete 
with other U.S. and potential coalitional policy responses. Second, it may 
4 Such an attempt would be explained by Graham Allison's Model IE, which 
explains the role of bureaucratic politics in government decision-making.  See 
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 4-7 in which he 
describes three models to explain how governments make decisions (Model I - 
rational actor, Model II - organizational context, and Model in - bureaucratic 
politics). 
contradict multinational cooperative measures. 
This research examines the CPI's compatibility with the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime by characterizing the components of the 
nonproliferation regime, identifying the tensions the initiative has created in 
the governmental and academic realms, and suggesting how these tensions 
might be mitigated. This introductory chapter lays out the arguments and 
counterarguments which frame this question, as well as the sources, 
methodology, and organization of the remaining chapters. Finally, this study 
provides a list of specific research findings and draws several implications for 
improving the coherence and effectiveness of U.S. counterproliferation policy. 
A. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STAKES ITS TURF 
Aspin's 1993 announcement evidently caused confusion at the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State Department. This 
confusion ranged from a misunderstanding as to which department or agency 
actually controlled key portions of nonproliferation policy, down to a struggle 
over the differences in the meaning of the terms "counterproliferation" and 
"nonproliferation."  Although the CPI is clearly linked to WMD proliferation 
- the top threat identified in the Defense Bottom-up Review5 - it appeared to 
some observers to be a Defense Department attempt to grab the proliferation 
issue from ACDA's stewardship.6 The Clinton White House gave little 
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Bottom-up Review, unclassified briefing 
slides (1 September 1993), p. 2. 
6 See Zachary S. Davis, with Mitchell Reiss, consultant, U.S. Counterpro- 
liferation Doctrine: Issue for Congress. CRS Report for Congress 94-734 ENR 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 21 September 1994), 6. He describes an 
intergovernmental debate over whether counterproliferation would be expansive 
and eventually absorb nonproliferation, or whether it would be limited to 
improving the uniquely military aspects of nonproliferation policy. 
visible support to Aspin's initiative.  Daniel Poneman of the National Security 
Council finally dispatched a memo in February 1994 clarifying the terms, and 
more importantly attempting to clarify nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation responsibilities.    This memo defines 
counterproliferation as: 
the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. 
efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, 
export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular 
responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected 
should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass 
destruction or missiles."? 
In the same memo, nonproliferation was defined as: 
the use of the full range of political, economic and military tools to 
prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect our 
interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass 
destruction or missiles, should that be necessary. Nonproliferation 
tools include:  intelligence, global nonproliferation norms and 
agreements, diplomacy, export controls, security assurances, defenses 
and the application of military force.» 
This memorandum clearly indicates that counterproliferation is a 
Department of Defense responsibility.  The memo does not, however, clarify 
departmental ownership of nonproliferation activities, traditionally the 
purview of State and ACDA, nor does it suggest a conduit by which the 
Defense Department can develop policy or engage in counterproliferation 
activities without disrupting or undermining other aspects of 
7  Daniel Poneman, National Security Council Memorandum dated 18 
February 1994 for Robert Galluci, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, 




The lack of presidential involvement in this issue to date is of no little 
consequence, It affects the debate both within and outside the administration. 
President Clinton has yet to refer publicly to the CPI or even use the term 
"counterproliferation" in a major speech.   There appears to be no clear vision 
from the White House of what the Department of Defense's mandate or 
mission under the CPI ought to be. This seems odd when one considers that 
the CPI is touted to be the nation's leading military response to its number one 
military threat.   In fact, the February 1995 National Security Strategy uses the 
term only in a title for a subsection under the broader topic of "Combating the 
Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles." The 
subsection is devoted almost entirely to explanations of how the United States 
supports the nonproliferation  regime.  It is devoid of counterproliferation 
terminology, strategy, policy, or interagency cooperation, except in the broadest 
of platitudes, such as the notion that "the United States will retain the capacity 
to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the 
gains."io The emphasis is on the intelligence and defensive aspects of 
counterproliferation. 
The only reference to offensive tactical capabilities is the statement that 
9 The mechanism for coordinating all U.S. government nonproliferation 
activities including counterproliferation was developed by the interagency study 
mandated by Congress in the Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Authorization Act which was 
chaired by then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch. The responsibilities and 
missions of each agency and the coordinating committees and working groups 
under the authority of the National Security Council are laid out clearly in Deutch's 
Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs 
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1994), 7-19. This report is called the 
Deutch Report. 
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 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 1995), 14. 
"we are placing a high priority on improving our ability to locate, identify and 
disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and storage 
facilities for such weapons, and their delivery systems."!! There is no 
mention as to whether the policy will entail the use of conventional or 
nuclear weapons to achieve this end.  This lack of a coherent vision only 
serves to further the confusion, although recent statements by Dr. Ashton 
Carter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 
indicate an effort to provide more clarity. It seems as though officials above 
Dr. Carter's level are satisfied with the "lef s study it" approach, and are 
therefore comfortable with remaining publicly non-committal on 
counterproliferation for the present. 
B. FRAMING THE DEBATE: COUNTERPROLIFERATION ARGUMENTS 
AND COUNTERARGUMENTS 
The following arguments and counterarguments characterize the 
tensions which the CPI potentially creates.   These issues must be considered 
and addressed if the CPI is to be transformed into a coherent policy. Where 
one comes down on these issues admittedly depends upon one's own 
perspective on the issues surrounding future nuclear proliferation.  Those 
responsible for U.S. or NATO security policy, such as the Secretary of Defense's 
staff, are likely to view them differently from those which are ardently 
committed to nuclear disarmament, environmentalism, or diplomacy, such 
as the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute, Greenpeace International, or even 
the U.S. State Department. Although there has been little public interest in 
counterproliferation, public perception surrounding these arguments could 
play a key role in shaping future policy. This research will address (and where 
possible, reconcile) the arguments in order to make recommendations for the 
formulation of counterproliferation policy. 
11 Ibid, 15. 
The six issue pairs which follow comprise the core issues which define 
the counterproliferation debate. They are best understood by analyzing the 
claims or promises of each side. Framing these issues in this way helps 
describe the scope and intensity of the debate, and highlights both the 
potential and the limitations of a counterproliferation policy.  These issues 
will be anchor points for future counterproliferation policy. 
1. The Justification for the CPI: 
Argument: With the end of the Cold War, there is an increased threat 
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The bipolar world system has 
dissolved. Instability and the rise of organized crime in the former Soviet 
republics and Eastern Europe have raised the possibility that nuclear weapons 
or fissile material could be highjacked or diverted.   Balance of power theory 
suggests that some countries may perceive a need to acquire WMD to balance 
against the United States or against a regional adversary. The diffusion of 
technology may also have shifted the cost/benefit calculus for some states 
such that WMD, and particularly nuclear weapons, are now a more cost- 
effective means of defense.12 The handful of countries likely to develop 
nuclear weapons, while admittedly a much smaller list than at any time since 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated, are decidedly 
hostile toward the interests of the United States and its allies.13 The new 
12 Peter R. Lavoy assesses possible proliferation motivations in "Nuclear 
Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin 
Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle:  Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What 
Results (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1993), 192-205. 
13 Although the list of such countries is short, it is nearly always in a state of 
flux as states continually recalculate their interest in nuclear weapons. It should 
include those regional adversaries that have a sufficient scientific and industrial 
capability as well as those that are highly motivated to acquire these weapons by any 
means. It should exclude the large number of states which have the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons but have refrained from doing so. Decisions for inclusion 
on this list are admittedly subjective. I recommend keeping the list as short as 
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threat was driven home by post-Gulf War revelations about the Iraqi program 
as well as lingering questions about the former Soviet arsenal.14 Another 
wake-up call is framed in the statement attributed to the Indian Army chief of 
staff that the key lesson from the Gulf War is to "never fight the United States 
without nuclear weapons."^ There is a strong fear within the Defense 
Department that another hostile threshold state will succeed where Iraq failed. 
Counterargument:  The Department of Defense is finding new missions 
in a world devoid of a major adversary in order to protect its share of the 
federal budget. There has long been a nuclear weapons proliferation problem. 
In March 1963, President Kennedy predicted that as many as twenty five states 
would have nuclear weapons by the 1970s.i6 Fears of the "nth country 
scenario" and an endlessly spiraling nuclear arms race captured the minds of 
planners. But these gloomy predictions did not pan out. The end of the Cold 
War appears to have ended the threat of nuclear annihilation, reversed 
vertical proliferation, ended nuclear proliferation in the southern 
possible, but making it public. Put the world on notice that the suspect states are 
being watched. If in doubt, do not add a state to the list until more evidence justifies 
a revaluation. The list should include Iraq, and North Korea. I would not add a 
country, unless I was willing to publicly justify this selection. 
14 Joseph Pilat, "A Counterproliferation Primer" (Los Alamos, New Mexico: 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1994), 3. 
15 Cited by Lewis A. Dunn, "New Nuclear Threats to U.S. Security," (as 
quoted from Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 
"National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," 
speech before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January 1992) in Robert D. 
Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1993), 41. 
16 Peter R. Lavoy, "Learning and the Evolution of Cooperation in U.S. and 
Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities,"  in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. 
Tetlock, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1991), 754, as quoted in The New York Times (23 March 1963). 
hemisphere, removed three countries from the list of threshold nuclear states, 
and enabled the UN and IAEA to dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapons 
program.i7 The accession of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to the NPT has 
laid to rest the fears that new nuclear states might arise from the former 
Soviet Union.18 United States nuclear deterrence and military might is 
unquestioned.  The Department of Defense therefore should not look for 
controversial new missions which might undermine the existing regime and 
further complicate diplomatic nonproliferation processes.  A new program 
like the CPI also competes with the expectation of a "peace dividend" from 
defense cutbacks which should be used to improve social welfare, increase 
foreign aid, or reduce the budget deficit. 
2. Enforcing the Nonproliferation Regime: 
Argument:  The nonproliferation regime needs teeth to reinforce 
nonproliferation. Although Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa probably 
developed nuclear weapons after the NPT entered into force, none of them 
were ever a military threat to the United States or its key allies.19 The next 
generation of potential proliferators has a long history of hostile rhetoric, if 
not hostile intent toward the United States and the West. Unlike the first 
generation of post NPT proliferators, the next may be inclined to acquire 
nuclear weapons behind the veil of the NPT, just as North Korea and Iraq 
have tried to do.  The combination of potentially hostile intent and the 
17 David Fischer, "Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?" in 
Reiss and Müller, International Perspectives On Counterproliferation, 15. 
18
 Ibid, 15. I use this point to illustrate the optimistic view that the NPT is 
approaching universality.  Although Ukraine has signed the NPT, the jury is still 
out on implementing the terms of the treaty and dismantling the remainder of the 
Ukrainian nuclear stockpile. 
19
 Except that India and Pakistan continue to threaten each other during the 
period in the mid and late 1980s when Pakistan was considered a close U.S. ally. 
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illegality of their actions sets this next generation apart from the last. The new 
cases of proliferation are worse than the old ones from the U.S. perspective, 
and the United States must continue to be able to deter the use and threatened 
use of nuclear weapons.20 The CPI offers the United States and its allies 
additional options for dealing with this threat. 
Counterargument:   The counterproliferation initiative represents a 
fundamental departure from the spirit of trust, cooperation, and mutual 
respect between sovereign states that has been essential to the success of the 
nonproliferation regime. The CPI is a unilateral approach with the potential 
to upstage and replace diplomacy.21 It risks solving problems by other than 
peaceful means. Instead of presuming innocence as under the existing 
nonproliferation regime, counterproliferation implies guilt, or at least 
suspicion, as "determined by intentions, assessments of technical capabilities, 
and other intelligence indicators."22 The United States must take the lead by 
showing the greatest restraint because of the significant risks inherent in 
20 Strategic Planning International, Inc., "Counterproliferation:  Deterring 
Emerging Nuclear Actors," Compendium of Proceedings of the Strategic Options 
Assessments Conference held at U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE, 7-8 July 
1993,24. 
21 See Leonard Spector, "Neo-Nonproliferation," Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 
(Spring 1995), 66-85. Spector warns that parts of the U.S. strategic community have 
turned away from the traditional concept of nonproliferation at a time when its 
efforts are increasingly successful.  He calls this shift "neo-nonproliferation," and 
describes three sub-groups: the hardline "inevitablist" camp who believe that 
proliferation is inevitable for some states, the proponents of counterproliferation, 
and the "refocused arms controllers," a group which have refocused their efforts 
vis-a-vis Israel, India, and Pakistan from pressuring these states into renouncing 
nuclear weapons to reducing the risks that might lead to nuclear war or accidents. 
22 Avner Cohen, 'The Lessons of Osirak and the American 
Counterproliferation Debate," in Reiss and Müller, International Perspectives On 
Counterproliferation, 77. Counterproliferation is considered when it is apparent, or 
suspected, that nonproliferation efforts are failing. 
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attacking nuclear weapons and facilities. Such risks include retaliatory use of 
nuclear weapons or the accidental detonation of a primitively designed 
weapon, either of which could lead to escalation. A somewhat less serious 
concern is the risk of radioactive contamination in the event that a weapon is 
damaged or detonates with a low order nuclear yield (incomplete detonation 
of the fissile material).  The United States has tolerated proliferation in the 
past by Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa without so much as even 
threatening the use of military force. The only consequences of proliferation 
for these states was the imposition of sanctions in the form of export controls 
on nuclear technology, and in the case of Pakistan, a cut-off of military and 
economic aid. The rhetoric of the allegedly hostile future nuclear states which 
the CPI targets may be intended only to bolster their own prestige or to 
improve their bargaining positions. As in the past, the mere acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is not a casus belli. 
3. United States Leadership in Nonprolif eration: 
Argument: United States leadership in counterproliferation is proper 
and consistent in view of past U.S. leadership in nonproliferation efforts. 
The United States has been the undisputed leader in both multilateral and 
unilateral nonproliferation efforts.   U.S. multilateral initiatives included the 
ill-fated Baruch Plan, President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" plan, the 
IAEA Statute, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), cosponsorship of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the NPT. U.S. unilateral efforts have also been 
significant. The United States is also a strong proponent of the ongoing 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations and the Fissile Material Cut-off. 
The 1991 Nunn-Lugar amendment to the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty Support Act is a primary example. This program has provided more 
than $1.2 billion to establish verifiable safeguards over the former Soviet 
arsenal, to employ former Soviet nuclear scientists in peaceful endeavors, and 
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to assist in defense conversion.23 Another example is the Framework 
Agreement concluded with North Korea in October 1994, whereby North 
Korea froze its nuclear program, and agreed to negotiate the dismantling of its 
plutonium producing reactors and reprocessing facility in exchange for light 
water reactors.  Both of these initiatives were begun without the consensus of 
the world community, though they have since received broad support and are 
viewed as strengthening the regime. The CPI is another unilateral attempt to 
develop further options in the interest of strengthening non-proliferation. 
Counterargument:  United States leadership would be better «tilispH tn 
strengthen the efficacy of the existing nonproliferation regime than to pursue 
new initiatives of questionable and unproven value.  Not all U.S.-sponsored 
unilateral initiatives support the regime.  The announcement of the CPI just 
before the first of the four preparatory conferences which led up to the NPT 
Review and Extension Conference was ill-timed. It could have been 
manipulated by developing states, particularly those hostile to U.S. interests, 
to influence other developing states away from indefinite extension. 
4. The CPI and U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: 
Argument: Counterproliferation is a set of logical, non-provocative 
options which are consistent with the longstanding U.S. doctrine of deterring 
the use of nuclear weapons. The CPI gives U.S. deterrence new credibility and 
flexibility in view of the evolving military threat. U.S. allies support the CPI 
and are actively engaged in studying coherent policies, and in developing 
improved military capabilities. In 1994, The United States was actively 
discussing elements of the CPI with NATO, Russia, and Japan, and is 
23 Thomas B. Cochrane, "U.S. Assistance to Improve Physical Security and 
Accounting of Fissile Materials in Russia," prepared remarks at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (31 January 1995), 5. For a detailed explanation 
of Nunn-Lugar activities see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union. OTA-ISS-605 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), 23-24. 
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optimistic about future multilateral cooperation.24 The CPI is a declaratory 
framework which provides coherent logic and focus to existing and 
developing military activities. 
Counterargument:  Counterproliferation is a departure from Cold War 
nuclear deterrence and coercive diplomacy, and is unworkable because 
proliferating states or other groups will have different motivations for 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Principles of Cold War nuclear deterrence, such 
as the idea of mutually assured destruction, may have little bearing on these 
states. Future nuclear weapons states may not aim their weapons at the 
United States. Notions of deterrence serve not only to justify the retention of 
a United States nuclear arsenal, but the development of exotic conventional 
weapons as well. Non-state groups, such as terrorist organizations, may be the 
most likely to use or threaten the use a nuclear weapon, and may be 
undeterrable. 
5. The Lessons of the Gulf War: 
Argument: The CPI is preventive in nature. It applies the lessons of the Gulf 
War in order to prevent the possibility that U.S. and allied forces will face a 
nuclear threat on the battlefield. It provides additional options when the 
nonproliferation regime fails, and must not be viewed or presented as a green 
light for preventive or preemptive military strikes.25 Ashton Carter, its 
leading advocate, claims that the CPI does not focus on such action, but "on 
the danger that weapons of mass destruction will be used against U.S. citizens, 
24 Mitchell Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Counterproliferation Policy, "Counterproliferation:  An Update on Progress in 
Washington and Prospects at NATO," unclassified briefing presented at the NATO 
Defense Planning Symposium, Oberammergau, Germany (18 January 1995), 18-19. 
25 I use the term "preemption" to indicate military action taken to keep an 
enemy from attacking with WMD which he may already possess. By contrast, 
"prevention" is that action taken to stop an enemy from acquiring WMD. Osiraq 
was therefore a preventive strike, not a preemptive attack. 
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forces, or allies in the course of a regional conflict/^ The long United States 
history of military conflict affirms his position, in that the United States does 
not normally engage in "bolt from the blue" military operations such as 
preemptive military strikes. Even the 1986 retaliatory air strike on Libya was 
conducted only after repeated U.S. warnings to Colonel Gaddahfi that his 
ongoing sponsorship of terrorism would be punished.   In Carter's view, 
preemptive action would be taken only at the outbreak of hostilities as a 
means of ensuring that WMD would not be used against U.S. or allied 
populations, territories, or forces.  The CPI is preventive, not preemptive, 
with the focus on preventing and deterring battlefield WMD scenarios. 
Counterargument: The CPI has the potential for  "mission creep" whirh 
can be used to justify preemptive military action against countries of the 
United States7 choosine, which will not change motivations for acquiring 
nuclear weapons. It sets the stage for preemptive use of force.   Based upon its 
close call with Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the United States will use 
Israel's 1981 strike on the Iraqi Osiraq reactor as a justification for its own 
future preventive strikes. Although such action can set back a fledgling 
nuclear program, and in the case of Israel's strike bought valuable time which 
probably enabled the U.S.-led coalition to fight without the threat of nuclear 
weapons, it can not prevent a determined state from trying again. As with 
Iraq, it may drive a state to try even harder on its next attempt. The fact that 
Iraq's program after Osiraq became more sophisticated, pursued duplicate 
paths, was dispersed to redundant facilities, and became much more secretive 
is clear evidence of an even greater Iraqi determination to acquire nuclear 
weapons. 
26 Carter, Ashton B., Record Statement before the Committee on Armed 
Services, United States Senate (28 April 1994), 4. 
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6. A Handful of Rogues: 
Argument:  Credible military solutions to nuclear proliferation will 
help persuade states inclined to shirk their NPT obligations to honor them in 
both letter and spirit. It puts potential NPT violators on notice that the United 
States and its allies can counter their nuclear weapons capabilities. Effective 
counterproliferation solutions also reduce the military utility of these 
weapons.27 According to Lewis Dunn, such threats will "help shape new 
nuclear powers' perceptions of the usability of nuclear weapons, and to accept 
the decades-old taboo."28 The United States has long relied upon credible 
demonstrations of military capability to make its deterrent strategies 
believable to potential enemies. The CPI is consistent with this tradition, and 
will be a strong persuasive tool when needed. 
Counterargument:  The CPI is a discriminatory initiative designed to 
bully uncompliant Third World countries.   It is designed to safeguard United 
States capabilities to assert hegemonic influence in areas distant from its own 
borders and shores.   In an era in which the United States depends increasingly 
on Third World cooperation for a broad range of treaties and agreements such 
as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs, and the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, the CPI is 
inappropriate and poorly timed.  It will undermine Third World willingness 
to cooperate with the United States in more essential global endeavors. 
27 Aspin, 3. In the 7 December 1993 speech, Aspin identified this as one of 
three important ways that the CPI complements nonproliferation.  The other two 
were the promotion of consensus on the gravity of the threat, and reducing the 
vulnerability of "the neighbors of those holding these weapons, further reducing 
the motive to acquire them in self-defense." 
28 Dunn, "New Threats to U.S. Security," in Blackwill and Carnesale, New 
Nuclear Nations, 44. This argument is also consistently made by Defense 
Department officials, including Ashton Carter and Mitchell Wallerstein. 
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C SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
This research draws primarily from current sources including U.S. 
Government documents and scholarly analyses. All sources are unclassified. 
For the purpose of this research I have neither sought nor been allowed access 
to classified sources. I also conducted interviews with some twenty U.S. 
Government officials on a non-attribution basis.  These interviews were 
useful for shaping my understanding of the tensions and cooperation that are 
emerging as a result of the CPI. 
The theoretical prism through which I view the CPI is similar to 
Graham Allison's decision-making models presented in his classic work, 
Essence of Decision.29 I have considered the CPI through the lenses of two of 
Allison's models. Allison's Model III, or bureaucratic politics model, asserts 
that states form policy as an output of bureaucratic competition within a 
state's government. In this process, executive decision's and cost/benefit 
analysis matter little. I also used Allison's Model I, or rational actor model, 
which says that states form policy by executive decision based on analysis of 
costs and risks versus benefits. This model downplays the influence of 
bureaucratic processes. I also considered the CPI from an angle which Allison 
did not address, a state-society model, in which policies are formed as a result 
of public and expert opinion. I have used these three lenses to sort the 
various tensions as products of one of these three government processes.  By 
sorting tensions as the products of one of these processes, I can characterize 
the tensions which the CPI has created between departments and agencies of 
the U.S. government, between the U.S. Government and other states, and 
between the U.S. Government and non-government organizations (NGOs), 
and predict the relative impact each tension will have on the actual shaping of 
a counterproliferation policy. 
29 Allison, 4-7. 
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D. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter Two answers the question "what is the nonproliferation 
regime?"  This is an important question since it consists of a number of 
component treaties and agreements each of which was negotiated for a 
different aspect of preventing nuclear proliferation, and each of which is 
affected somewhat differently by the CPI. Additionally, the efficacy of some 
components has eroded over time, or is of questionable or limited future 
value. Each component is characterized by (1) its role and function within the 
regime, (2) the nature of the agreement or treaty, (3) the degree to which it is 
legally binding or has created norms of expected behavior, (4) its effectiveness 
and stability, and (5) its future viability and vulnerability. The ways in which 
the CPI can strengthen and undermine each component are also considered. 
The third chapter examines the counterproliferation initiative.  It 
focuses primarily on the policy statements and speeches of key Defense 
Department officials, and upon the critical analyses of various academics, non- 
government organizations, and other government officials.   The intellectual 
and policy history of the CPI is also presented as useful background to 
understanding the initiative. Each element of the CPI is then characterized in 
terms of its policy implications and the tensions it creates. The potential of 
each element to enhance or undermine the nonproliferation regime is also 
analyzed. 
The fourth chapter answers the question, "what are the tensions created 
by the CPI?" Three categories of tensions are examined: (1) interagency, (2) 
intergovernmental, and (3) state-societal (U.S. government to 
nongovernment organizations). 
1. Interagency tensions. These are primarily tensions between 
the Department of Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
State Department, and National Security Council. Allison's Model III which 
conceptualizes the workings of governments as competing bureaucratic 
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organizations is used to help characterize these tensions and to suggest ways 
in which they might be mitigated. 
2. Intergovernmental tensions. These are the tensions created 
between the U.S. government and the following entities: NATO, Japan, other 
friendly governments, and the rest of the world. Allison's Model I which 
conceptualizes the workings of governments as unitary rational actors is used 
to characterize these tensions and to suggest ways in which they might be 
alleviated, or in some cases dismissed altogether. 
3. State-societal tensions. This will include tensions and 
objections raised by the international community of policy analysts. The angle 
Allison did not address, the linkage of how public opinion shapes the national 
interest and policy, is used to characterize these tensions, and to suggest 
solutions. I selected this process over Allison's Model III (bureaucratic politics 
model) because Model III explains the effects of bureaucracy within a single 
organization, not between diverse organizations, such as between the U.S. 
government and the various NGOs. 
The final chapter reexamines the promises and claims of both sides of 
the six argument pairs introduced earlier in this chapter.   Research findings 
are used to refine each of the six issues into "anchor points" for 
counterproliferation policy. A summary of the ways in which the CPI might 
strengthen or undermine the nonproliferation regime is also included.  The 
chapter also summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the CPI, and 
suggests ways to refine it to avoid ambiguity, strengthen multilateral support, 
and ease the various tensions which it currently causes. Finally, it will 
provide recommendations for the evolving counterproliferation policy which 
still must be developed. 
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II. CHARACTERIZING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
The regime includes the following five components:  (1) the Statute of 
the IAEA, (2) the NPT, (3) the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones defined by the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America) and the Treaty of Rarotonga (South 
Pacific), (4) export controls specified by the Zangger Committee and the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and (5) the promises of the nuclear weapons 
states collectively known as positive and negative security assurances.30 
These components collectively obligate states to follow treaties, contracts, and 
gentlemen's agreements in both the letter and spirit. Ashton Carter claims 
that the CPI "builds on and reinforces non-proliferation norms and 
agreements that are the foundation of U.S. and international efforts to combat 
proliferation."3i A thorough study of the regime as a whole and of each 
component will reveal whether or not this is true. 
The regime is one of the most successful multi-national diplomatic 
ventures ever achieved.   It has some significant problems, but the fact that 
only four states (each with special security problems) appear to have crossed 
the nuclear threshold since the treaty entered into force is a strong testimony 
30 For a scholarly consensus of the regime components see Kathleen C. 
Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation (Boulder, Colorado:  Westview, 
1993), 1-2; Zachary S. Davis, "The Realist Nuclear Regime," in eds., Zachary S. Davis 
and Benjamin Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 
1993), 88-91, and Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: 
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1990) 293-304. George Bunn has presented a similar consensus in his briefing 
"Controlling Proliferation:  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its Renewal" 
(lecture notes dated 22 Feb 1994). 
31
 Carter, 6. 
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to the success of the regime, not of its failure.32 One of the four, South Africa, 
has now dismantled its weapons, reversed its program, and converted some of 
its weapons technologies to peaceful uses. Even in the cases of the two 
obvious failures, North Korea and Iraq, the regime has partially redeemed 
itself. In the case of North Korea, it is constructive to recall Ambassador 
Robert Galluci's insight that "the only reason we know there is an anomaly in 
North Korea is because of an ad hoc (IAEA) inspection carried out at a declared 
facility."33 In the Iraqi case, IAEA inspections carried out under the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) are the tool by which most of the 
Iraqi WMD program has been exposed and dismantled. Although the regime 
is vulnerable to deception, the inspections it requires remain a robust tool 
which can be further strengthened by more intrusive procedures and the use 
of so-called "challenge inspections" in which inspectors will have the ability 
to search other than declared facilities. 
One strong criticism of the regime is that it "enshrines discriminatory 
principles and practices" by establishing two categories of states, those which 
have nuclear weapons and those which do not.34 Developing states have 
made claims of discrimination for political leverage, but the only forum in 
which they have been aired with any effect was in the debate over the options 
for the extension of the NPT.  Third World states claiming discrimination 
tried to hold the NPT extension issue hostage in return for greater progress 
from the nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament, or for private 
32 Cohen, 73-74. 
33 Robert L. Gallucci, "Non-proliferation and National Security," Arms 
Control Today, vol. 15, no. 10 (April 1994), 15. 
34 John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew, "Nuclear Proliferation At the 
Crossroads?"  The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System:  Challenges 
And Choices (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 4. 
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concessions. And despite the fact that the NPT has been extended by 
consensus, the regime will continue to be dogged by the perception of "do as I 
say, not as I do," particularly if the nuclear weapons states continue to upgrade 
their arsenals.35 
In counterpoint, it may also be argued that developing states should 
have the greatest interest in preserving the regime indefinitely. Weak states 
must rely heavily upon international regimes "for their survival as viable 
members of the international system."36 Despite the ferocity and moral 
appeal of their rhetoric, these countries depend on a strong, permanent 
regime because they do not have the resources to deal with a world full of 
nuclear armed states. Their support of the regime is not merely a gift to the 
nuclear weapons states, but more realistically an investment in their own 
national security as well.37 Discrimination is a convenient argument to 
bolster their prestige and is also used by some, such as India and Brazil, to 
avoid joining. While many states feel justified to proclaim it in support of 
their national interests, non-proliferation must of necessity rank higher. 
Claims of discrimination have seldom been made by more advanced 
countries capable of building nuclear weapons, but which have foresworn 
them.   But it could be argued that the regime discriminates against them also. 
From a neorealist point of view, possession of nuclear weapons could make 
the survival of these states in a chaotic world system less problematic. The 
fact that these states have found it in their national interest to foreswear 
35
 Simpson and McGrew, 5. 
36 Paulo S. Wrobel, "Counterproliferation:  A View From South America/ 
in Reiss, and Müller, International Perspectives On Counterproliferation. 50. 
37 Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force on 
Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting The Challenges (New 
York:  Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), viii. 
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nuclear weapons for the present, must not be overlooked when considering 
the state of the world system at any given moment.   If one or more of these 
states deemed that its security was threatened, it might reconsider its decision 
making the case that the regime is discriminatory and prejudicial to its 
survival.  Covert proliferation or overt withdrawal from the regime by one or 
more of these "nuclear capable" states would be a far greater problem than the 
current rhetoric of discrimination from the Third World. 
The regime is vulnerable to deception and depends upon its parties to 
be honest citizens within the world community. Inspections certify the 
peaceful use of declared facilities and fissile materials.   But a country which 
desires to cheat can attempt to do so in many ways. At present, inspections 
may only be conducted at declared facilities with the consent of the host 
government. The IAEA, in the interest of strengthening the inspection aspect, 
has reasserted its right to conduct so-called "challenge inspections" wherever 
it wishes, but it remains to be seen if this right will be honored when again 
put to the test. Such inspections, when cued by intelligence from member 
states, may unmask undeclared or hidden nuclear infrastructure. 
The inspection procedures have weaknesses that could be exploited. 
Fissile material diversion could be masked by inaccuracies in calculations of 
the amount produced in enrichment or reprocessing operations. One critic 
alleges that Japan may be "missing" up to seventy kilograms of plutonium, 
based on imprecision inherent in its measuring and estimating techniques 
that could be as high as thirty percent. The possibility of such a diversion 
stretches the glib and overworked aphorism that "no system is perfect" to its 
limit.38 Japan's neighbors can not help but be concerned.^9 
38 Paul L. Leventhal, "The New Nuclear Threat," The Wall Street Tournal 
(8 June 1994). 
39 Ibid. 
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Current intelligence capabilities often lack the means to discern the 
motivations, intentions, and technological progress of proliferating state. It 
remains to be seen whether new technologies and a sharper focus on 
emerging nuclear weapons programs will be able to prevent future covert 
proliferation.   The international community's lack of access to information 
regarding the real state of affairs within proliferation-risk countries, whether 
due to limitations of intelligence capabilities, or the unwillingness of states to 
share their information, is a serious shortcoming that will not be easily 
resolved. The resulting lack of transparency excludes the possibility of making 
the non-proliferation regime adequate for the real threat.40 
The regime also has no effective means of enforcement.  Direct 
sanctions for violators consist largely of withholding materials and technical 
assistance and of publicizing the violation to the world community.4i 
UNSCOM's dismantling of the Iraqi nuclear infrastructure, may well be only 
an anomaly, rather than a model for dealing with future regime violators. 
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was the justification for the harsh treatment 
its weapons programs have received. By contrast, the delicate handling of 
North Korea, despite its intransigence, may well be the more likely approach 
to enforcing the regime in the future. North Korea has been far more subtle 
and cautious in its behavior. It seems likely that future suspected violators 
will be treated commensurate with their pattern of behavior. The past record 
of Security Council inaction in dealing with the nuclear programs of South 
Africa, Israel, India, and Pakistan is a strong testimony to a global lack of will 
to seriously censure new nuclear states, although there is likely to be more 
40 Sergei Kortunov, "Non-proliferation and Counterproliferation:  Russian 
Perspective," paper presented at the National Defense University Topical 
Symposium, Washington, DC (16-17 November 1994), 9. 
41 Julie Dahlitz, Nuclear Arms Control (London:  George Allen and Unwin, 
LTD., 1983), 180. 
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interest as the NPT approaches closer to universal acceptance. 
Despite its inherent flaws and obvious failures, the regime nonetheless 
must be regarded as successful. It was responsible for turning back many 
would-be proliferators including such advanced threshold states as Argentina 
and Brazil, and the so-called "born proliferator" states of Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan, although Ukraine's compliance is not yet a completed act. It 
stopped many states from acquiring nuclear weapons by putting the economic 
and political costs out of their reach, effectively lengthening and steepening 
the approach to the threshold.42   The few gaps that remain in the regime 
must be closed by new initiatives supported by the bulk of the international 
community whose cooperation made the regime possible in the first place.43 
The regime must improve upon its cold war roots and limitations to be viable 
in the next millennium. 
B. THE IAEA STATUTE 
1. Its Role and Function: 
Predating the NPT by more than ten years, the IAEA Statute is the 
oldest regime component. It charters the IAEA as an autonomous United 
Nations agency. The statute was a compromise achieved by twelve 
negotiating states in response to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" 
proposal and was widely praised at the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA 
which endorsed it with some amendments in 1956.44 The IAEA was to assist 
42 Davis, 7. 
43
 Council on Foreign Relations, 6. 
44
 Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and 
World Nuclear Order (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987), 70. 
Chapter Two of this book has a detailed description of the Eisenhower's complex 
motivations for the speech, the initial criticism by the Soviet Union, and the 
multilateral approach which ultimately produced the statute. 
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states with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear 
assistance was to be provided to any country willing to abide by an IAEA 
safeguards agreement. The IAEA thus became the custodian and guarantor of 
safeguards agreements, ensuring the integrity of declared nuclear materials 
and facilities through its inspection program. 
2. The Nature of the IAEA Statute: 
The IAEA statute established a system of nuclear safeguards to allow 
technology transfers to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was at 
best an incentive program by which states could purchase equipment and 
assistance from nuclear capable states as long as they promised it would not be 
used to develop nuclear weapons. The safeguards were weak in that they 
were not a "full scope" program encompassing a state's entire nuclear 
infrastructure.  They were much more like a licensing system for individual 
construction contracts and purchase orders. There was no requirement to 
place already existing facilities under safeguards. As it turned out, some 
countries including India acquired both safeguarded and unsafeguarded 
facilities, which allowed a significant proliferation loophole. India's 1974 
"peaceful nuclear experiment" was made from plutonium produced in a 
loosely safeguarded reactor, an indigenously built copy of a safeguarded reactor 
provided by Canada. 
3. Legal Ramifications of the IAEA Statute: 
The IAEA Statute requires very little of its members which currently 
number over 120.45 Membership is open to all states, but a state need not 
negotiate a safeguards agreement to be a member of the IAEA. The most 
interesting legal aspect of this statute is the lack of obligations upon its 
members. Most ostensibly it "does not require any member of the Agency to 
submit to safeguards except insofar as the state requests and receives nuclear 
45 U.S. Department of State, Treaties In Force, Tanuary 1st 1994 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1994), 298-99. 
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assistance from or through the Agency."46 This is a built-in conflict of 
interest, because threshold states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan may serve 
on the Board of Governors, the entity responsible for negotiating and 
approving safeguards agreements, while maintaining unsafeguarded facilities 
themselves.  There are no provisions to punish proven safeguards violators. 
4. Effectiveness of the IAEA Statute: 
The Statute's goals were "to promote the peaceful use of the atom and, 
at the same time, to guard against the products of this use being diverted to 
any military purpose."47 It failed to do this in several key areas, most notably 
in its failures to restrain the threshold states, and in the widespread deception 
evident in Iraq. But the blame lies in the weaknesses of the statute, not a lack 
of skill or determination by agency personnel. Some blame may also be cast 
upon the IAEA budget, which was frozen at the same rate from 1982 until 1992 
despite ever expanding obligations.48 The IAEA as originally conceived was a 
disinterested middleman which brokered safeguards agreements and 
conducted inspections to verify that diversion of declared nuclear materials 
had not occurred. As long as the letter of safeguards agreements was backed 
with the proper paperwork, seals, and monitoring devices, the IAEA paid little 
attention to the spirit with which states complied with their safeguards 
agreements. The problem was not one of deliberate disinterest, but rather a 
function of its very limited charter. It was not chartered to collect intelligence, 
or conduct intrusive inspections.   Within the scope of its charter, it 
46 Paul C. Szasz, "International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards," in 
Mason Willrich, ed., International Safeguards And Nuclear Industry (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 75. 
47 George Bunn, Arms Control By Committee:  Managing Negotiations with 
the Russians (Stanford, California: Stanford Press, 1992), 85. 
48 Center for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations Disarmament 
Yearbook, volume 17:  1992 (United Nations: New York, 1993) 
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performed flawlessly. Prior to the revelations of the clandestine Iraqi 
program, IAEA inspections had never turned up a bona fide violation of 
safeguards. But the IAEA was inadequate for the threat of clandestine 
proliferation occurring within the shroud of legitimacy provided by fuel 
accountancy at declared facilities. 
5. Future Viability of the IAEA: 
Despite its inability to unearth the clandestine nuclear program in Iraq, 
and the repeated frustration of its inspectors by North Korea, no one is 
seriously calling for the IAEA to be disbanded or superseded. The Council on 
Foreign Relations recommends that the United States assume a leadership 
role in expanding IAEA funding which should then allow it to "expand the 
envelope of its activities under the existing safeguards agreements at locations 
where it suspects undeclared nuclear activity might be going on" and perform 
so-called " 'challenge inspections' . . . upon a complaint from an aggrieved 
state."49 Some changes have already been implemented, including more 
intrusive inspection procedures, and the establishment of a liaison office to 
receive intelligence information on undeclared nuclear activities.50 Despite 
embarrassment over Iraq and North Korea, the IAEA retains a reputation as 
perhaps the most professional and efficient of all United Nations agencies. 
6. Vulnerability of the IAEA: 
The IAEA's open membership policy allows non-NPT countries to keep 
the agency's safeguards "as weak as possible."5i These same members have 
49  Council on Foreign Relations, xi. 
so Davis, 3-4. 
51  Paul L. Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why 
Bother?" Orbis, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 177. 
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resisted the idea of challenge inspections as too extensive and too intrusive.52 
Changing the policy or the authority of the Board would be difficult since it 
would involve changing the statute.  Removing non-NPT countries from the 
Board through a vote of the General Council might be possible, however, and 
should be pursued. 
7. How the CPI Could Enhance the IAEA: 
A credible counterproliferation capability, regardless of who controlled 
it, could enhance the IAEA by deterring states from stonewalling IAEA 
inspections, especially challenge inspections ordered by the UN Security 
Council. It could also enhance the safeguards process by deterring cheating in 
two ways. First it would lower the potential military value of nuclear 
weapons by sending a signal that the United States and its allies have a 
credible military capability to prevent these weapons from being used. If a 
threshold state perceived that its use of such weapons could be denied, 
particularly by nonnuclear means, then it might be dissuaded from acquiring 
them in the first place. A credible counterproliferation capability would also 
confront such a state with the real possibility of punishment beyond economic 
sanctions if it couples its violations of safeguards agreements with hostile 
intent. 
8. How the CPI Could Undermine the IAEA: 
There has been a tendency to link the CPI to Israel's air strike against 
Iraq's Osiraq reactor complex in 1981. While the linkage is artificial in many 
elements, Osiraq is instructive as a worst case reminder of the political 
damage which could ensue if the United States were to conduct 
counterproliferation operations without broad-based international support or 
sound after the fact legal justification. The director-general of the IAEA, 
Sigvard Eklund, portrayed the Osiraq strike as "an attack on the Agency's 
52 Ibid. 
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safeguards."53 Israel had, after all, attacked a reactor under IAEA safeguards in 
an NPT signatory state.  "From the IAEA perspective, Iraq enjoyed the 
presumption of innocence as long as the IAEA had not determined 
otherwise." The UN Security Council, with the United States abstaining, 
censured Israel for the attack calling it "a serious threat to the entire IAEA 
safeguards regime."54 Although the Osiraq strike probably allowed the 1991 
Gulf War to be fought without the fear of an Iraqi nuclear threat, the United 
States can ill afford to follow the Israeli example in future scenarios. The 
United States as one of the IAEA's leading advocates must insure that 
counterproliferation operations be conducted along sound principles of 
international law. Failure to do so would badly discredit both 
counterproliferation and the IAEA. 
C THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
1. Its role and function: 
The NPT is without doubt the flagship of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. McGeorge Bundy recently called it "the cornerstone of an 
international regime that has had much more success than its founding 
father, Lyndon Johnson, would have dared to predict/^ with 174 members 
it is the most broadly supported agreement in history, other than the UN 
Charter .56 it developed from a 1961 UN General Assembly resolution, called 
informally "the Irish Formula," which called for an agreement by which states 
which had nuclear weapons would refrain from relinquishing control of 
53 Cohen, 89. 
54 Ibid. 
55 McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Trap," The Washington Post (25 January 1995). 
56 Council on Foreign Relations, vii. 
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them and from transmitting the information for their manufacture to states 
not possessing such weapons. It also called upon states which did not have 
nuclear weapons to refrain from acquiring them.57 But nearly thirty five years 
later, despite the unanimous vote on the resolution, universal consensus for 
the actual treaty has not yet been achieved. 
2. The Nature of the NPT: 
Even though it was negotiated within the forum of the ongoing United 
Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the NPT was largely the 
work of the two Cold War superpowers. The treaty is discriminatory in that it 
establishes two legal categories of states, nuclear weapon states, and non- 
nuclear weapon states, and bids all but the five states which had completed 
nuclear weapons tests prior to 1 January 1967 to sign-up in the latter category. 
In order to induce states to sign the treaty, the two superpowers and the 
United Kingdom made a series of compromises, including a long term 
commitment in both the preamble and Article VI to stop the nuclear arms 
race at the earliest possible date and work towards eventual disarmament. 
Although it has been alleged that "a discriminatory basis of partnership 
in a treaty is a most inappropriate form of association,"58 the NPT has been 
tremendously popular. Its popularity is likely attributable to its overarching 
purpose of preventing nuclear proliferation. The treaty's business is the 
containment of a "dreadful threat," not the laudable but necessarily lesser 
57 Bunn, 64-65. There were four "Irish Resolutions" between 1958 and 1961. 
After much negotiating over the terminology, the fourth finally met the approval of 
both the United States and the Soviet Union and was adopted unanimously. All 
four enjoyed broad support among the non-nuclear weapons states. 
58 Ambassador I. E. Ayewah, of Nigeria, prepared remarks distributed at The 
Conference on The Non-Proliferation Treaty, The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington DC (30 January 1995), 3. 
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goals of equality of nations and international civil rights.59 The 
discriminatory mechanism of the treaty is a necessary evil which the states 
party to the treaty accept for the foreseeable future as the price of a viable non- 
proliferation treaty. It is useful to note that nearly all newly independent 
nations in the past thirty years, including those which once made up the 
former Soviet Union, have joined the NPT in relatively short order after 
achieving their independence.  Even the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru, 
which has refused to join the United Nations, promptly joined the NPT upon 
achieving independence in 1982.60 Membership in the NPT is both a status 
symbol of sovereignty and an important element of national security despite 
the discriminatory implications. 
3. Legal Ramifications of the NPT: 
The NPT is binding upon its parties as "treaty law" under the precepts 
of international law. In addition to obligations incumbent upon its parties, it 
also creates an expectation of the same sort of behavior upon non-parties. 
This "double source of obligation," inherent in all treaties, is applicable even if 
a party formally withdraws from the treaty.6i   Under this tenet of treaty law, 
which has been upheld repeatedly in international legal cases, parties which 
remain outside of a treaty, or which withdraw, can not disestablish or 
undermine the law established by the treaty. An expectation develops that 
they must behave like the parties of the treaty. Had North Korea withdrawn 
from the NPT, it would have remained under obligation to observe the 
attending norm of non-proliferation created by the treaty. The NPT's double 
59
 Jessica Matthews, "Nuclear Weapons: The Iran Question," The 
Washington Post (22 January 1995), C7. 
60
 Council of Foreign Relations, 85. 
61 Anthony D'Amato, The Concept Of Custom In International Law (Ithaca, 
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source of obligation is responsible for the ambiguous dedarations of the 
threshold states regarding their weapons programs and intentions. It is also 
responsible for India's vehement and almost apologetic declaration that its 
1974 test was a "peaceful nuclear explosion," and its insistence that it 
maintains no arsenal, but merely a "nuclear option/' 
4. Effectiveness of the NPT: 
Most scholars and parliamentarians agree that the treaty has been 
largely successful. Perhaps the best measure of its success is the fact that "most 
of the states that were viewed as potential proliferation candidates in the 1960s 
- the industrialized states of Europe and Asia - clearly have the potential to 
develop nuclear weapons but have to date seemed content not to do so."62 
The NPT played a major role in accomplishing this record, in conjunction 
with the relative stability of the Cold War bipolar alliance structure.   Coupled 
with the various security assurances given by the nuclear weapons states, it 
met the security needs of most sovereign countries, and reduced the demand 
for WMD. Former ACDA Director Paul Warnke recently referred to the NPT 
as "the strongest inhibition on nuclear proliferation.'^ Although it has 
fallen short of creating an absolute norm of nonproliferation, it has neverthe- 
less created a form of interstate peer pressure whereby most states comply with 
the non-proliferation expectations of their peers, although a few can be 
expected to buck the peer pressure at the risk of some degree of ostracism. 
5. Future Viability of the NPT: 
Although the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, 
it remains subject to review and dependent upon broad consensus to be 
effective in the future. A proposal approved at the recently concluded NPT 
62
 Council on Foreign Relations, 1. 
63 Paul C. Warnke, "Strategic Nuclear Policy and Non-proliferation," Arms 
Control Today, vol. 15, no. 11 (May 1994), 3. 
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Review and Extension Conference requires an annual review commencing in 
1997. The annual requirement will likely keep the issue of consensus at the 
forefront of the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. It will also create 
a strong pressure for the approximately one dozen-plus remaining hold-out 
states to sign the treaty and make it universal. Since it will be the bulwark 
upon which further nuclear arms reductions and ultimate disarmament must 
hang, there will also be strong pressures to ensure that states abide by their 
obligations, and do not withdraw.  The norm of nuclear nonproliferation will 
be even further enhanced. 
There has been much talk of a strengthened NPT. It would be difficult 
to achieve the consensus necessary for a formal amendment because of the 
political diversity of the post-Cold War world. The East and West blocs which 
were somewhat easy to coopt have given way to a much more diverse 
international community whose members in exchange for their support will 
insist upon concessions that are unacceptable or at best highly problematic. 
The best hope for a strengthened NPT lies in improving cooperation among 
the parties in sharing intelligence and airing potential threats within the UN 
Security Council. The use of IAEA challenge inspections would also give the 
NPT more clout.  Both of these enhancements are already possible within the 
terms of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. 
6. Vulnerability of the NPT: 
The NPT is vulnerable to deception, and allegations that it only serves 
to keep honest states honest. There is no formal procedure to search out 
clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities, to ensure that violators are 
punished, or to force compliance. Except for the inspection and safeguards 
procedures, there is also no system to ensure that honest parties stay honest. It 
is a voluntary and cooperative treaty, by which 174 non-nuclear weapons 
states willingly renounce nuclear weapons in good faith that the other parties 
will all abide by the same obligation. The NPT, like the functioning of a 
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community, depends on the "voluntary obeyance of the vast majority/' of its 
parties, notwithstanding the ability to police the treaty.64 
7. How the CPI Could Enhance the NPT: 
The real issue in enhancing the NPT is to develop the means to deal 
with the handful of countries likely to cheat on their NPT obligations while 
maintaining the broader consensus of the treaty. In a recently released report 
by its Independent Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, The Council on 
Foreign Relations notes that 
Pursuit of a carefully chosen program of counterproliferation measures 
need not contradict, but could support the non-proliferation efforts of 
the United States and other responsible states. Such measures not only 
could enhance the U.S. ability to defend itself, they also could augment 
the international community's capacity to respond to threats to the 
peace.65 
This recommendation is in concert with current Department of Defense 
thought. Mitchell Wallerstein, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Counterproliferation Policy, has stated that preventing proliferation "remains 
the paramount objective of our policy."66 He further stated "I want to 
emphasize that, in no way, have we given up on preventing proliferation, nor 
do we see counterproliferation as an alternative course of action to non- 
proliferation/^ His immediate superior, Ashton Carter, echoes this theme 
64 Harald Müller, "Counterproliferation and the Non-proliferation Regime: 
A View From Germany," in Reiss and Müller, International Perspectives On 
Counterproliferation, 26. 
65
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66 Mitchell Wallerstein, "Counterproliferation:  An Update On Progress in 
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Defense Planning Symposium, Oberammergau, Germany (18 January 1995), 7. 
67 Ibid, 8. 
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often. In testimony last year before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he 
stated that "prevention is our first choice and our highest priority."68 The 
intent of the CPI as explained by its leading proponents is one of preparation 
by the Department of Defense in the form of prevention through the existing 
non-proliferation regime and protection when needed to reinforce the 
regime.69 If the CPI can be developed into policy supported by legitimate 
political organizations such as NATO and the UN Security Council it could 
strengthen the NPT so long as it is not perceived as illegitimate or in violation 
of the consensus upon which the NPT depends. 
8. How the CPI Could Undermine the NPT: 
Although it is binding by international law upon its parties, and has 
created an expectation of non-proliferation even among the non-party states, 
the NPT by its very nature depends upon the cooperation and goodwill of its 
parties to insure its legitimacy.   Any initiative which is perceived as operating 
outside of the envelope of cooperation and goodwill could undermine the 
treaty. One problem with the CPI which must be dealt with to keep the NPT 
consensus intact is the acknowledgement that the CPI is aimed at the small 
number of potential "bad actors" who are, nevertheless, ostensibly good 
citizens within the requirements of their treaty obligations. The difficulty is in 
labeling bad actors. 
The current situation regarding Iran's desire to complete its Bushehr 
nuclear power complex may well be illustrative of how the CPI could 
undermine the NPT. The United States claims to have strong evidence that 
Iran is violating the spirit of its obligations, but in all measurable ways it is in 
compliance. As a member of the NPT in good standing, Iran has a right to 
insist on free access to peaceful nuclear technology under the terms of 
68 Carter, 4. 
69 Wallerstein, 7. 
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Article IV. Iran is legally entitled to such assistance until a violation can be 
proven. It claims harassment to bolster its argument against indefinite 
extension of the NPT among the developing states. If the current intelligence 
on Iranian nuclear intentions can not be shared with the UN Security- 
Council, the United States would be wise to keep quiet until it has 
information that is appropriate for that forum.  Divulgence of sensitive 
intelligence when the case is less than convincing, even to key partners such 
as Germany and Russia, risks the compromise of intelligence sources, which if 
exposed could preclude U.S. ability to monitor additional violations or hostile 
intent. There is a long history that U.S. partners and allies are far less willing 
to admit the proliferation potential of threshold states™ The current dialogue 
in the media, only gives Iran greater opportunity to protest its innocence, and 
to assert its legal rights, thus undermining the U.S. case. 
The CPI could undermine the NPT if its proponents fail to disassociate 
it from the notion of preemptive military strikes. In his 1994 testimony to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Ashton Carter challenged this association 
claiming that "some commentators have misinterpreted the 
counterproliferation initiative to be focused on "preemptive' attacks on 
weapons of mass destruction facilities," an obvious reference to the 1981 
Israeli air strike on Osiraq.7i He also stated that "our focus is on the danger 
that WMD will be used against U.S. citizens, forces, or allies in the course of a 
70
 The most obvious example is the wanton disregard by members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group to police exports of nuclear and dual-use technology until 
after the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was exposed. In the case of Iran, Russia is 
willing to overlook the long stream of hostile rhetoric towards the West and Israel, 
while asserting that it is merely providing the same sort of technology to Iran that 
the U.S. and South Korea are willing to provide to North Korea. 
71 Carter, 4. 
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regional conflict."72  Evolving counterproliferation policy must continue to 
make this message clear. 
Another way the CPI could undermine the NPT is in the development 
of a new generation of nuclear weapons. Although so-called "tiny nukes" and 
"micro nukes" might prove useful to penetrate underground facilities, 
developing new nuclear weapons would be discomforting amid the broad 
based calls for further nuclear arms reductions and eventual disarmament.73 
To develop new nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with current political 
trends, including the drive for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and the call 
from some camps to speed the arms reduction and disarmament processes. 
Admiral H. G. Chiles, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic 
Command, recently testified before the Senate that no new nuclear warheads 
are currently in developments But such assurances have yet to be 
convincingly put forward by the Defense Department. Perhaps this will be 
confirmed officially once the Comprehensive Test Ban is concluded. 
D. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES 
1. Their Role and Function: 
The Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) established 
72 Ibid. 
73 Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, Changing Targets: Nuclear 
Doctrine from the Cold War to the Third World (Washington D.C.:  Greenpeace 
International, 1995), Appendix B, as quoted from U.S. Navy, "STRATPLAN 2010," 
Phase II, June 1992, 93. STRATPLAN 2010 has since been superseded. 
74 Admiral H. G. Chiles, statement before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (23 February 1995), 8. 
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by the Treaty of Tlatelolco actually predates the NPT by more than a year.75 
The other NWFZ at the present is in the South Pacific, and was established by 
the Treaty of Rarotonga which entered into force in 1986. The agreement 
signed between North and South Korea in 1992 to negotiate a treaty to 
"denuclearize" the Korean Peninsula promised to ban not only nuclear 
weapons, but also uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, 
although the negotiations have been repeatedly delayed by the North.76 
Negotiations are in progress to establish an African NWFZ/7 and the idea of 
a NWFZ in the Middle East remains active, having been most recently aired 
by President Clinton during the visit of Egyptian President Mubarak in April 
of 1995.78 
The advantage of NWFZs is that they express a strong regional 
consensus against nuclear proliferation by banning nuclear weapons from an 
entire region. They may prove successful in rolling back or reversing nuclear 
weapons development programs where other efforts have failed.  The Latin 
American NWFZ helped influence Argentina and Brazil to stop their nuclear 
weapons research, to conclude a mutual safeguards agreement with the IAEA, 
and to join the Treaty of Tlatelolco itself. Argentina has since joined the NPT, 
and Brazil is also exploring the issue. Israel supports a Middle East NWFZ, 
75
 The Treaty of Tlatelolco entered into force in 1968, several months before 
the NPT negotiations were concluded. 
76 Jon Brook Wolfsthal, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:  Coming of Age?" 
Arms Control Today, vol. 13, no. 9 (March 1993), 3-4. 
77 David Fischer, "Reversing Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa," Security 
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but continues to insist on regional peace must be a prerequisite.79 As early as 
November 1972, the Pakistani prime minister called for a South Asian 
NWFZ.80 Pakistan has repeatedly tendered this offer, but India continues to 
insist that it needs to keep its "nuclear option" because of broader problems. 
Future NWFZs offer a useful tool to keep the three most notorious NPT 
holdouts, Israel, India, and Pakistan engaged in the non-proliferation 
dialogue, and given the right political prerequisites might allow these 
countries to ultimately step back from the nuclear threshold without the loss 
of face that would be inherent in capitulating to the NPT. They are highly 
compatible with counterproliferation since they create areas in which U.S. or 
U.S.-led coalition forces would be unlikely to encounter nuclear weapons. 
2. The Nature of NWFZs: 
NWFZs are less threatening to the NPT holdout states, and are not 
discriminatory. The defining element of a NWFZ is regional consensus on a 
common declaration of non-proliferation and nuclear security issues. Unlike 
the NPT, they have a broader objective which demands the total absence of 
nuclear weapons from a specified region, and which compels commitments 
from the nuclear weapons states.si In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 
obligations are more stringent than the NPT. All states must submit to full 
scope safeguards, provide semi-annual reports by members certifying no 
79 Wolfsthal, 7.  Israel abstained from a 1974 vote in the UN General 
Assembly calling for the creation of a NWFZ, but voted in favor of a resolution by 
consensus in 1980. 
80
 Munir A. Kahn, "Problems of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South 
Asia," paper presented at the International Conference on Promoting Nuclear 
Disarmament of the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament, Castogliancello, 
Italy (5-8 October 1991), 13-15. 
81 Helen Leigh-Phippard, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: Problems and 
Prospects" Arms Control, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1993), 93. 
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activity prohibited by the treaty has occurred within its territory, provide 
special reports if requested by the General Secretary, and submit to challenge 
inspections.8? The Treaty of Rarotonga also allows challenge inspections, in 
sharp contrast to NPT procedures.83 These treaties point the way for a 
strengthened NPT. 
3. Legal Ramifications of NWFZs: 
a. The Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone: 
There are three sets of legal obligations.   The first requires regional 
parties to keep the zone free of nuclear weapons. There are only two apparent 
loopholes in this agreement:  the treaty allows peaceful nuclear explosives, 
and it allows by interpretation the right of each party "to grant or deny 
permission for the transit of nuclear weapons through its territory, territorial 
waters, and ports,"84 The issue of peaceful nuclear explosives over time has 
become a non-issue owing to their questionable utility, and the corresponding 
decline in interest. The right to grant or deny transit is increasingly a non- 
issue since the navies of nuclear weapons states, most notably the United 
States Navy, withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from ships. 
The second set of legal obligations is framed within Additional Protocol 
I and compels non-Latin American states exercising jurisdiction over territory 
within the zone to abide by the same obligations as the treaty parties. Four 
non-regional states have acceded to this protocol, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands.  This protocol further 
strengthens the legitimacy of the treaty by preventing the basing of extra- 
regional nuclear weapons in these territories. 
82 Ibid, 98-9. 
83 Wolfsthal, 3. 
84 Leigh-Phippard, 96. 
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The third set of legal obligations is contained within Additional 
Protocol II which compels all five nuclear weapons states to respect the treaty 
regime, agree not to act in ways to violate it, and not to use or threaten use of 
nuclear weapons against any of the parties to the treaty. Only China has 
accepted this protocol without reservation, consistent with its declared policy 
of "no first use."   France retained its right to self-defense under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, and the remaining three nuclear weapons states reserved a 
right to reconsider their obligations under the protocol if attacked by a party of 
the treaty assisted by another nuclear weapons state.   But despite these 
qualifications, the treaty "represents the first and only instrument of its kind 
under which the nuclear weapon states have formally undertaken to 
guarantee the nuclear security of certain non-nuclear weapon states."85 
b. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: 
The Treaty of Rarotonga does not prohibit all peaceful nuclear activity, 
so the zone is really a NWFZ despite its name. It bars its parties from the 
same sorts of activity as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with one important addition, 
a ban on the export of nuclear materials except "in accordance with strict non- 
proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non- 
explosive use "86 This wording allows Australia to continue to operate its 
uranium export industry which was already under strict export controls before 
the treaty was negotiated. The treaty also contains three additional protocols 
for non-regional parties, the first two of which are similar to the protocols of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
Protocol 1 seeks to obligate France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States to observe the same prohibitions on manufacturing, possessing, 
stationing, and testing nuclear weapons within the zone to which the parties 
85 Ibid, 98. 
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must adhere. It remains unsigned, owing to a number of concerns over 
sovereignty and security including positive security assurances provided to 
key allies to protect them against nuclear attack. Protocol 2 obligates the 
nuclear weapons states not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against 
states within the zone.   Protocol 3 proscribes the testing of nuclear weapons 
within the zone. 
To date, China and Russia have signed Protocols 2 and 3, but both 
reserve the right to reconsider if attacked by a party that is backed by a nuclear 
weapons state. France rejects the protocols as an infringement upon its 
sovereignty over its territories in the region, which include its nuclear test site 
in French Polynesia.    Both the United Kingdom and the United States have 
stated that signing the protocols would be contrary to their national interests, 
although both noted that their activities in the region are not inconsistent 
with the requested behavior.87 There is an inconsistency in the behavior of 
both the United Kingdom and the United States in their willingness to abide 
by the additional protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco while rejecting those of 
the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
4. Effectiveness of NWFZs: 
The Latin American NWFZ was not initially effective.   It was 
hamstrung by the nuclear rivalry of Argentina and Brazil. The rivalry also 
embroiled Chile, which feared Argentine nuclear potential, but which lacked 
the infrastructure and resources to proliferate. When all three countries 
joined the treaty in 1992 it allowed the zone to be brought into force for the 
entire landmass of South and Central America and most of the Caribbean 
islands.  The only holdout is Cuba, which has nonetheless announced its 
87 Leigh-Phippard, 103-04. 
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intentions to abide by the terms of the treaty.»» The support of the Additional 
Protocols I and II by the nuclear weapons states and the Netherlands gives the 
treaty additional strength of consensus. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
is undermined to a degree by the unwillingness of France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States to sign Protocols 1, 2, and 3. 
5. Future Viability of NWFZs: 
NWFZs have a bright future. The two existing zones are strong and can 
be made stronger. The prospects for other NWFZs are good. The United 
States has contributed positively to the process by listing seven conditions for 
its support of such zones.89 These conditions will be useful to regional 
negotiators as they work the details of future zones. It is constructive to note 
that "the very process of working to create one can have a beneficial effect. . . 
(and) can help allay suspicions, increase transparency, and build confidence 
among neighbors."90 The rapprochement of Argentina and Brazil, their 
accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and Argentina's accession to the NPT 
have greatly improved the political situation and security of all of Latin 
America.  Perhaps similar results can eventually be realized in such trouble 
88
 Wolfsthal, 5.  The seven conditions include the following:  1. initiatives 
to create a NWFZ must come from the states int he region concerned, 2. all states 
whose participation is deemed "important" should be included, 3. the zone 
arrangement should provide "adequate" verification of compliance with the zone's 
provisions, 4. the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security 
arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security, 5. The zone 
arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or otherwise 
possessing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose, 6. the zone should 
not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under 
international law, particularly the principle of freedom of navigation, and 7. the 
establishment of a zone should not affect the existing rights of parties to grant to 
other states transit privileges, including port calls and overflights. 
89 Ibid, 4. 
90 Ibid, 4. 
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spots as the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and South Asia. 
6. Vulnerability of NWFZs: 
As with the NPT, a clandestine nuclear program could develop inside a 
NWFZ, but two things work against such programs. One is the challenge 
inspection system, and the other is the element of regional peer pressure 
inherent in such agreements. In both cases of existing NWFZs the states in 
these areas are already closely dependent upon each other for their economic 
livelihood, which further enhances the sense of peer pressure in the realm of 
nuclear non-proliferation and security. In a relative sense NWFZs are 
somewhat less vulnerable to cheating than the NPT, owing to a stricter system 
and the strength of regional ties. 
7. How the CPI Could Enhance NWFZs: 
The CPI has little to offer to the existing NWFZs, and potentially little 
to offer to future zones. Dedicated as they are to strong consensus on regional 
nuclear non-proliferation, NWFZs have a stronger base of consensus, and less 
likelihood that a member state would defect by proliferating. Like the NPT, 
these treaties create a dual source of obligation for non-parties and those that 
might withdraw to comply with the norm of the treaty . Once a state enters 
into such a treaty it has a great deal to lose by cheating or quitting. The CPI 
could provide a deterrent to prevent cheating, but it would be secondary to the 
heightened deterrence inherent in an egalitarian agreement among neighbors 
who are all subject to the same requirements. Improved passive and 
defensive options provided they were shared equally throughout a NWFZ 
could prove useful. 
8. How the CPI Could Undermine NWFZs: 
There is little likelihood that the CPI will undermine NWFZs since the 
potential adversaries against whom it would be employed both offensively 
and defensively would likely not be member states of a NWFZ treaty. In the 
unlikely event of a member of a NWFZ pursuing a clandestine nuclear 
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proliferation program counterproliferation could be employed with the 
consensus of the other members without undermining the political 
consensus. 
E. EXPORT CONTROLS 
1. Their Role and Function: 
Nuclear export controls, notably the Zangger Committee list of the IAEA and 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group export cartel (also known as "the London Club") 
are based on the idea that nuclear proliferation can be delayed or set back, if 
not prevented outright, by the denial of key technologies and equipment. 
These controls are an attempt by nuclear suppliers to backfill a loophole in the 
NPT which "does not require specifically that the export of nuclear facilities 
should trigger safeguards, even though it would seem logical that control over 
materials and equipment would imply control over facilities as well."9i Some 
countries used this loophole liberally, including Italy which sold hot cells and 
a fuel fabrication plant to Iraq in the late 1970s without informing the IAEA or 
requiring safeguards.92 Export controls have been further tightened since the 
revelation of the extensive Iraqi deception and its use of front companies and 
other deceptive schemes. 
2. The Nature of Export Controls: 
Export controls have long been derided by the developing countries as 
another example of discrimination.  Munir A. Kahn, former director of the 
Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission has publicly charged that "the overall 
effect was a set-back for development of peaceful nuclear energy programs 
91 Bailey, 18. 
92 Ibid. Attributed to David Fischer, 'The London Club and the Zangger 
Committee: How Effective?" in Bailey and Rudney, eds., Proliferation And Export 
Controls (New York: University Press of America, 1993), 42. 
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throughout the world."93 But an even greater discrimination is made by the 
suppliers between NPT signatories and the NPT holdouts in favor of the 
holdouts.  Suppliers have favored non-parties "whenever economic 
conditions favor the non-party."94 The most embarrassing evidence is the 
"failure to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as an invariable condition of 
supply on the inconsistent and spurious ground that the requirement would 
constitute unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of sovereign 
states."95 But despite the inconsistencies and abuses in implementing them, 
export controls have steepened the approach to the nuclear threshold by 
cutting off legitimate access and raising the costs of proliferation. 
3. Legal Ramifications of Export Controls: 
Export controls are not legally binding as treaty law, because they are not 
treaties.  They are gentlemen's agreements which, however inconsistently 
applied over the course of time, are nonetheless becoming customary law. It 
remains to be seen if export controls will be codified as a treaty among the 
suppliers. Until the revelation of Iraq's elaborate deception, there was little 
interest in strengthening these agreements. They were taken merely as 
recommendations or suggestions which sovereign states were free to 
implement to the degree they felt appropriate. Export controls remain the 
purview of national customs authorities and have a force of law only to the 
degree that the individual nations are willing to apply them. All countries 
seriously interested in furthering nuclear non-proliferation should ensure 
that export controls are enforced to a strong universal standard because they 
play the leading role in establishing a distinction between legitimate and 
93 Kahn, 14. 
94 Dahlitz, 141. 
95 Ibid. 
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illegitimate trade, which is important in separating proliferation risks from 
legitimate peaceful nuclear activities.96 
4. Effectiveness of Export Controls: 
Export controls have been only marginally effective owing to the 
unwillingness of supplier states to enforce them consistently. Although they 
may not always succeed in preventing proliferation they play a large role in 
influencing events and political decisions, and in buying time for the other 
elements of non-proliferation policy to work.97 By branding particular exports 
as illegal, export controls label both the exporter and the importer which can 
be useful in the political and legal processes of building nonproliferation 
consensus. One final measure of effectiveness is the idea of the "trigger lists" 
used by both the Zangger Committee and the NSG as a means of triggering the 
application of safeguards, and of providing an early warning of new nuclear 
activity which should be closely monitored to be sure of its legitimacy. 
5. Future Viability of Export Controls: 
One of the great advocates of export controls, Senator John Glenn, 
maintains that "(w)arts and all, export controls are still better than their 
laissez faire alternative as a foundation of world order."98 A lively debate 
continues on several issues, including standardized customs procedures, the 
addition of "dual-use" items to the trigger lists, and the easing of controls to 
avoid hurting national commercial interests.    Some argue that further 
tightening of controls will deepen the North-South divide far out of 
96 Henry D. Sokolski, "Proliferation: The Case for Export Controls," The 
Heritage Letters. No. 491 (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1994), 4. 
97 Ibid. 
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proportion to any benefits.99 Others argue that further efforts to "tweak 
supply-side policies ... are unlikely to be worth the resources they will require 
. . . and may actually distract valuable energies and resources from non- 
proliferation policies that could be more constructive."ioo The original 
invitation made by the United States to the original partners in the fall of 1974 
"singled out enrichment and reprocessing technologies as being particularly 
sensitive and in need of control/'ioi No one with a serious interest in nuclear 
non-proliferation is calling for the weakening of export controls on these two 
capabilities. In 1992, the NSG voted to require full-scope safeguards as a 
prerequisite for any exports, a move long advocated and practiced by the 
United States.102 
6. Vulnerability of Export Controls: 
Some groups say that the controls are hypocritical in allowing 
European states and Japan to reprocess plutonium while denying this 
capability to South Korea and Iran.103 Greenpeace International has gone a 
step further, in alleging that U.S. exports of reprocessing technology to Japan 
violate U.S. law (the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978).i04 At issue are 
99 Leventhal, 168. 
100 Bailey, 25. 
101 M. J. Wilmshurst,  'The Development of Current Non-proliferation 
Policies" in eds., John Simpson, and Anthony G. McGrew, The International Non- 
Proliferation System (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 28. 
102 Bailey, 18. 
103 Paul Leventhal, and Daniel Horner/Teaceful Plutonium?  No Such 
Thing," The New York Times (25 January 1995). 
104 Greenpeace International, "Illegal Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear 
Technology: U.S. to Japan," report pamphlet (8 September 1994). 
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confidential guidelines adopted by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1986 that 
may have skirted the law by allowing transfers of sensitive technology to 
states with advanced nuclear programs. The U.S. Congress is considering 
legislation to direct the Department of Energy to rescind these guidelines. 105 
Inconsistency gives the NSG the reputation of being a "white man's club" 
which also has good relationships with the Japanese. Export controls are also 
vulnerable to being gradually made insignificant due to advances in 
indigenous production and the development of second tier suppliers which 
are increasingly capable of providing the requested materials and equipment. 
Some of these countries sell restricted technology not only for profit, but to 
spite the discriminatory nature of the NSG. But despite these tensions the 
NSG has expanded from its original membership from seven to twenty- 
eight.106 
7. How the CPI Could Enhance Export Controls: 
Counterproliferation is compatible with export controls since their 
advocates are the developed states which all share a common vision of 
preventing nuclear proliferation to unreliable states. CPI policy must be 
shaped to take advantage of this already existing tool of the advanced 
countries. The use of export controls to label a potential proliferator is a 
useful political tool which a credible counterproliferation capability may be 
able to enhance. Countries to which counterproliferation policy would likely 
be applied are also of interest to the NSG. 
8. How the CPI Could Undermine Export Controls: 
As long as counterproliferation is consistent with the group consensus 
of the NSG, it is unlikely that it would undermine export controls.  Unilateral 
105 Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-proliferation, PPNN Newsbrief. 
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106 Center for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations Disarmament 
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or multilateral action which seemingly lacked legitimacy could, however, 
undermine export controls. 
F. SECURITY ASSURANCES 
1. Their Role and Function: 
Security assurances are the promises made in the form of declarations, 
treaties, and UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use of nuclear 
weapons. Positive assurances are commitments by the nuclear weapons states 
to support and defend a non-nuclear weapon state if it is attacked with nuclear 
weapons. Negative assurances are pledges made by the nuclear weapons states 
that they will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons 
states. Security assurances are given by the nuclear weapons states as an 
inducement or compensation for non-nuclear weapons states to commit 
themselves to non-proliferation agreements.  The only one positive security 
assurance is UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 225 sponsored by the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States when the NPT was 
opened for signature in 1968.   It pledged immediate assistance to any victim of 
a nuclear attack or threat of nuclear aggression. UNSCR 984, approved on 11 
April 1995, provides the strongest negative security assurance yet tendered, in 
which the five nuclear weapons states vowed not to use nuclear weapons 
against nonnuclear weapons states except when such a state is allied with a 
nuclear weapons state.107 
2. The Nature of Security Assurances: 
These pledges are one-sided compensatory concessions for the 
discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime.  They help reduce the 
fears and criticisms of the non-nuclear weapons states. In the case of NWFZs, 
they are useful tools to strengthen regional consensus. There have been 
107 Barbara Crossette, "Discord Is Rising Over Pact on Spread of Nuclear 
Arms," The New York Times (17 April 1995), Al and A4. 
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many calls to strengthen and standardize the assurances among the five 
nuclear weapons states. China has long argued that the only truly effective 
negative security assurance is its policy of "no first use," but the other nuclear 
weapons states have been unwilling to accept this position. In fact, Russia 
recently abandoned the no first use policy of the Soviet regime. States are only 
willing to give assurances that are consistent with their security needs. 
Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provided a negative 
assurance like the April 1995 Security Council Resolution, but only to the 
members of the Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.  Although a 
similar assurance is provided in Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Rarotonga, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States have refused to sign it.   George 
Bunn describes U.S. refusal to sign Protocol 2 as "a discrepancy hard to 
explain," indicating that U.S. resistance is not based on security issues.108 
France, however, has security needs tied to its sovereignty over French 
Polynesia and the use of its nuclear testing facility there. 
3. Legal Ramifications of Security Assurances: 
Legal ramifications differ depending on the nature of the particular 
assurance. China's no-first use policy is a moral tool by which China bridges 
the gap between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons 
states. It has created a norm of Chinese behavior which is unlikely to be 
reversed, especially since China lacks a credible second strike capability. The 
negative security assurances provided by the Western nuclear weapons states 
at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 1978 have become customary 
law. They are now strengthened and codified by UNSCR 984, which has the 
force of international law.   The negative assurance provided in Additional 
1°8 Ibid. U.S. resistance to Protocol 2 seems to be based on a political struggle 
with ANZUS partner New Zealand over its refusal to allow the port visit of the USS 
Buchanan after U.S. Navy officials refused to confer or deny the presence of nuclear 
weapons on board. After the withdrawal of shipboard tactical nuclear weapons 
ordered by President Bush in September 1991, this issue seems obsolete. 
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Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as the positive assurance given in 
UNSCR 225 also have this force of law. There is also a nearly fifty year old 
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons which is developing the force of 
customary law. 
4. Effectiveness and Stability of Security Assurances: 
Assurances that are binding under international law are the most 
effective and stable.   States have difficulty reversing themselves once they 
have a legal commitment through a treaty or Security Council Resolution. 
The negative assurances UNSCR 984 and in the Treaty of Tlatelolco are the 
most convincing, because of their uniformity. The positive assurance of 
UNSCR 255 is somewhat less convincing, because it is vaguely worded and is 
reactive not preventive. There is also the broader question of whether 
positive security assurances are even credible in world with nuclear weapons. 
NATO allies often questioned U.S. resolve to use nuclear weapons to protect 
Europe, and the assurance had to be backed by a massive U.S. conventional 
forces presence. Back when the Security Council was split on East-West lines 
any attempt to implement it would have run the risk of a veto. Other 
assurances are less effective because they lack the force of treaty law. 
5. Future Viability of Security Assurances: 
The new cooperation among the five permanent members of the 
Security Council (nuclear weapon states), as expressed in UNSCR 984 is a 
hopeful indicator of stronger assurances in the future.   China's "no first use" 
negative security assurance is convincing, and gives it the high moral ground. 
From many angles, the call comes for the U.S. to strengthen its negative 
assurance by agreeing to no first use, and to deny use except in retaliation for a 
nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. David Fischer proposes that 
the nuclear weapons states adopt a uniform negative assurance with the 
qualification that a treaty violator should not be regarded in the same light as 
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a state that is meeting its treaty obligations.^ For the foreseeable future, less 
developed states will push for stronger assurances as a just compensation by 
nuclear weapons states to the non-nuclear weapons states in exchange for 
their willing participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
6. Vulnerability of Security Assurances: 
The positive assurance of UNSCR 225 is weak because it is reactive. 
While the Security Council would be unlikely to allow a state threatened by 
nuclear weapons "to take the first hit" there are nonetheless no assurances 
that the Council or its member would take preventive measures.  Some 
would argue that 225 and the fear of global condemnation is deterrent 
enough, but others view it as a paper tiger, especially because of its vague 
wording, and the lack of clear consequences. It could be interpreted as 
demonstrative of a lack of resolve among the five permanent members. 
Hopefully this will be resolved soon with a strengthened resolution.  The 
negative assurances are clearer in stating the intentions of the nuclear 
weapons states not to use nuclear weapons, even with the various 
reservations. 
7. How the CPI Could Enhance Security Assurances: 
UNSCR 255 has often been criticized as too general and too limited in 
scope.  The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) claims 
that it is of questionable value, noting that "it provides for action only when a 
threat of nuclear attack has been made or an attack has already occurred ... 
(and) it does not offer assurance for the prevention of the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons."no The combination of a strengthened Security Council 
resolution offering uniform positive assurances backed by a credible 
109 Fischer, Towards 1995.167. 
no Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Control. 
A Study and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements (London: Taylor and Francis, 
LTD., 1978), 16. 
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counterproliferation capability and a common consensus for 
counterproliferation policy would offer a considerable deterrent to a would-be 
proliferator, while adding a strong measure of legitimacy to both the assurance 
and to counterproliferation. The CPI does not offer any additional strength or 
credibility to negative security assurances, unless it specifically uses only non- 
nuclear means. 
8. How the CPI Could Undermine Security Assurances: 
Offensive counterproliferation using nuclear weapons would badly 
undermine negative security assurances. It would not only break the norm of 
non-use of nuclear weapons, but would also underscore the perception 
among the developing countries that the nuclear weapons states were 
insincere all along in their assurances. Default on a negative assurance would 
strain the credibility of other negative assurances, which could in turn 
undermine the NWFZ treaties.   Offensive counterproliferation by non- 
nuclear means would probably have little direct effect on either negative or 
positive assurances. If it were successful and perceived as legitimate, it would 
be cheered. 
G. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE CPI'S IMPACT ON THE NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Despite its limitations and failures, the regime is viable for the future 
and enjoys strong international support.  Its discriminatory nature will 
continue to be a focus of Third World rhetoric and political posturing, but the 
regime will nonetheless be strengthened because the alternatives for even the 
most vociferous critics are far worse in terms of both security and economy. 
This analysis largely supports the claims of the CPI's advocates that 
counterproliferation complements the nonproliferation regime.   The key will 
be properly managing counterproliferation so that it does not undermine the 
sense of international consensus upon which the nonproliferation regime 
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will continue to be based. Many observers continue to see in the CPI the 
possibility of unilateral preventive strikes and the possible use of nuclear 
weapons.   Both of these possibilities undermine the sense of international 
trust and cooperation embodied in the IAEA, the NPT, and the security 
assurances. 
The components of the regime likely to be affected by the CPI are the 
components most dependent upon solid international trust:  the IAEA and 
the NPT. The NPT is the most important to the regime, and damaging the 
spirit of consensus must be avoided. However, the NPT could be 
strengthened by counterproliferation if properly managed and applied (as 
suggested by the Council on Foreign Relations task force study). It is 
compatible with export controls. NWFZ's are unlikely to be undermined or 
strengthened by the CPI. As long as nuclear weapons are not used in 
counterproliferation, it will not undermine security assurances.  The question 
which this study of the nonproliferation regime now begs, is how should 
counterproliferation be managed and applied? 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 
A. A CONTROVERSIAL ANNOUNCEMENT BEGETS CONFUSION 
When he first announced the CPI, former Secretary of Defense Aspin 
claimed that it "will allow us to deal with the number one threat identified in 
the Bottom-up Review, and it will provide the real strength America needs to 
meet the dangers we face "Hi He insisted that it was not meant to replace or 
lessen U.S. nonproliferation efforts.    It would strengthen the preventive 
aspects of nonproliferation, while also providing protection in the cases where 
proliferation occurs.112 Aspin realistically admitted that some proliferation 
was inevitable despite the most determined nonproliferation efforts. The CPI 
offered the possibility of dealing with these selected cases on the implied 
assumption that such states would be hostile towards the United States and its 
allies. To Aspin, it seemed a natural response to such a threat. 
Aspin implied that the CPI was a new direction for U.S. 
nonproliferation policy.  First, he used the new term "counterproliferation," a 
word which was invented within the Department of Defense, and which was 
virtually unknown prior to his announcement.!^ Second, he called his 
proposal an "initiative," implying that the Department of Defense was 
embarking upon a new venture of its own making. He stated that the 
initiative was "a drive to develop new military capabilities."!^ Finally, he 
stated that the first of the CPI's five elements was "the creation of the new 
111 Aspin, 3. 
112 Ibid, 2. 
113 The term has been attributed by multiple sources to Captain Larry 
Sequist, USN (retired). 
114 Ibid. 
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mission by the president."1^ But the "newness" of the CPI brought with it 
many problems. 
The most immediate problem was confusion over the meaning of the 
new term. It caused confusion in the State Department and at ACDA, as well 
as with foreign governments and political analysts. Although Aspin outlined 
five points to meet the post-Cold War proliferation threat, he did not explain 
the new term.  He announced a major new policy initiative without 
explaining the principle behind it.  Although the principle seems to make 
good sense by providing some additional options, the lack of detail in the 
explanation spawned confusion and criticism. It was apparent from the 
interagency debate that ensued that the Defense Department had not clarified 
its position with the other agencies prior to the announcement.  One 
Department of Defense official has since stated that the CPI means the five 
points in Aspin's announcement.! 16 Benjamin Sanders states that: 
searching through the literature I did not come upon one agreed 
definition that covers both its purpose and its nature .. . few of the 
descriptions pass as clear definitions ... it seems to promote the 
conduct of lively and increasingly heated discussions on the subject 
which in consequence tend to confuse the issues and tend not to be 
very productive.117 
Over time, and with repetition by key Defense officials, it has become more 
clear that counterproliferation means an expansion of military options to deal 
with the cases of WMD proliferation where diplomatic efforts fail. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Interview with the author, 1 February 1995. 
117 Benjamin Sanders, "Counterproliferation: How Does It Play on the 
International Stage?" in Reiss and Müller, International Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation, 1-2. 
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The packaging of the CPI as a Defense Department initiative embodying 
a new mission and new technologies implied a new direction which might 
eventually produce new behavior.  Some critics immediately feared the worst. 
The most vocal linked it to Israel's Osiraq air strike and condemned the idea of 
preventive strikes or raids.  Reenforcing this linkage, Israeli proliferation 
scholar Avner Cohen, recently called it "an ideological sibling of the Begin 
Doctrine."1^ The Washington Post has referred to Osiraq as "the best-known 
example of counterproliferation."U9 Others have questioned its "newness." 
David Fischer notes that at first glance 
one is tempted to ask what U.S. forces have been doing during the 
last forty-five years if not preparing themselves to do battle against an 
adversary that was ready to use weapons of mass destruction ... on a 
far greater scale than any that U.S. forces are likely to encounter now.120 
Joseph Pilat notes that the United States has responded to proliferation in the 
past, by new strategies, tactics, and capabilities to deter use in the cases of the 
Soviet Union and China, by cut-offs of nuclear assistance to India, and by 
118 Cohen, 74-75 and 95. Cohen asserts that the Osiraq strike publicly 
established the "Begin Doctrine." See also Jed Snyder, 'The Road to Osiraq: 
Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb," Middle East Tournal, vol. 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1983), 
581-2, in which Snyder quotes an Israeli government statement declaring that 
"under no circumstances would it 'allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass 
destruction against our nation; we will defend Israel's citizens with all the means at 
our disposal" (taken from FBIS report dated 9 June 1981). See also Dan McKinnon, 
Bullseye One Reactor (San Diego, California: House of Hits Publishing, 1987) 4-5 and 
185-189, provides excerpts of Begin's 9 June 1981 press conference. McKinnon quotes 
Begin as saying 'Tell your friends, tell anybody you meet, we shall defend our 
people with all the means at our disposal." 
119 Ibid, as quoted from Thomas Lippman, "If Nonproliferation Fails, 
Pentagon Wants 'Counterproliferation' in Place," The Washington Post (15 May 
1994). 
120 Fischer, "Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?," 11. 
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cutting economic and military assistance to Pakistan (though there was little 
open response to Israel). He concedes that past counterproliferation was an 
"ad hoc reaction to proliferation" not part of a grand strategy.121 Aspin's 
vision was to make it a part of grand strategy.122 
Aspin stated that the Defense Department was "adding the task of 
protection to prevention/' and "adding protection as a major policy goal."i23 
He said that it would supplement existing nonproliferation efforts.  The 
initiative would provide protection through deterrence, by developing a 
credible military capability to counter the use and effects of WMD with the 
hope of ultimately preventing their use on future battle fields. Zachary Davis 
of the Congressional Research Service asserts that a primary objective of the 
CPI is "to articulate a credible deterrent posture to dissuade acquisition, 
transfer, or use of WMD. This aspect of counterproliferation builds on 
classical deterrence theory."124 Michele Flournoy cautions that "conditions 
conducive to credible deterrence may not always be present," and that the 
requirements for deterrence may differ from case to case.125 The new 
capabilities Aspin called are meant to provide such deterrence. 
The Department of Defense Annual Report (January 1994) contained a 
diagram entitled "Responding to the Proliferation Threat" which showed 
121 Pilat,4-5. 
122 1 equate grand strategy to national security strategy as articulated 
approximately annually by the White House in the president's National Security 
Strategy. 
123 Aspin, 2. 
124 Davis, 7-8 
125 Michele Flournoy, "Implications for U.S. Military Strategy," in Blackwill 
and Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations. 141-142. 
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Aspin's vision of an expanded spectrum of nonproliferation policy options 
including deterrence (figure 1). Eight responses are shown, four under the 
heading Prevention and four under the heading Protection.  The four 
Protection responses were tagged with the label "Special DoD Responsibility" 
while all eight responses were tagged with "DoD Shares Interagency 
Responsibility."^ The diagram was consistent with the text of Aspin's 
speech, but did not show which of the eight responses were actually 
considered to be counterproliferation.  One month later the Daniel Poneman 
memorandum stated that counterproliferation 
refers to the activities of the Department of Defense across the full 
range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, 
arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis 
with particular responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests 
can be should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass 
destruction or missiles. 127 
Comparing the memo with the diagram, would imply that all eight of the 
responses fall under counterproliferation, since Defense claims to share 
interagency responsibility for all of them, and no one has rebutted the 
diagram. 
Ashton Carter repeated Poneman's counterproliferation definition 
verbatim during his 28 April 1994 presentation to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. 128 He also stated that "in placing new emphasis on countering 
the effects of proliferation in regional conflicts, we are in no way de- 
emphasizing our efforts to prevent proliferation in the first place. Prevention 
126 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report (Washington:   Government 
Printing Office, January 1994), 37. 
127 Poneman. 
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is our first choice and our highest priority."i29 He expounded upon the same 
five areas covered by Aspin six months earlier. He also pointed out ways in 
which the Defense Department supports other nonproliferation activities. 
But he did not say how such improved support under the CPI might enhance 
these activities.   The Defense Department has not yet publicly explained how 
the CPI will enhance nonproliferation activities, and it has yet to admit that 
there is a risk of undermining them as well. 
In May 1994, the Defense Department issued its Report on 
Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs (the 
Deutch Report). It was the result of a study chaired by Deputy Secretary of 
Defense John Deutch.  The report repeated the Poneman definition of 
counterproliferation, and discussed the same eight responses to proliferation 
presented in the January report.130 The report calls these responses a 
"balanced program" but fails to explain why it is balanced, nor how 
counterproliferation can coexist with traditional nonproliferation 
activities.131  The broad representation from thirteen government 
departments and agencies, give this report significant credibility, but the lack 
of explanations of how the policy might actually work indicated that this issue 
needed further study. 
The Deutch Report identifies two National Security Council 
committees.  The Principals Committee is "the senior interagency forum for 
consideration of issues affecting national security" and the Deputies 
Committee is "the senior sub-cabinet interagency forum for review and 
129 Ibid. 
13° John M. Deutch, Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation 
Activities and Programs (Washington: Department of Defense, 1994), 1 and 4. 
131 Ibid. 
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monitoring the work of the interagency process."132 It also mentions two 
special assistants to the President, one for Defense Policy and Arms Control, 
and one for Nonproliferation and Export Controls. Each assistant chairs an 
Interagency Working Group "to address issues in these areas."i33 The report 
provides a consensus of how interagency tasking and coordination on both 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation is to be accomplished. 134 
The newly released National Security Strategy and National Military 
Strategy, both dated February 1995, do not specifically mention the CPL 
Although countering WMD is mentioned briefly, this is a significant change 
from previous editions of these documents.  Traditionally these documents 
describe U.S. strategy in only the most general terms, leaving the details to 
more detailed documents, many of which are classified. Although it may be 
tempting to view the light treatment of counterproliferation in these 
documents as evidence that there is little clear support for 
counterproliferation outside of Ashton Carter's office, it is probably more 
accurate to say that what is mentioned is an important step towards 
developing the idea of counterproliferation into national security policy. 
Although the policy is still being worked out at both classified and 
unclassified levels, countering WMD is now clearly established as an element 
of national strategy. 
The introduction to the National Security Strategy lists the 
administration's accomplishments and briefly mentions that "the President 
launched a comprehensive policy to combat the proliferation of weapons of 
132 Ibid, 7. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid, Appendix B. This Appendix contains a complete list of both 
principals and working level officials who participated in the review. 
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mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them."i35 A few pages later, 
under the heading "Enhancing Our Security" it mentions that "we are 
developing integrated approaches for dealing with threats arising from the 
development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by other 
nations."i36 A sentence under the subheading "Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction" mentions that 
we are devoting greater efforts to stemming the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, but at the 
same time we must improve our capabilities to deter and prevent 
the use of such weapons and protect ourselves against their effects.137 
Under the subheading "Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation" two 
additional sentences state 
A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their 
missile delivery systems. Countries' weapons programs, and their 
levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among 
our most important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral 
relations.138 
At the conclusion of this section is a statement which captures the essence of 
the CPI, which calls for the capability not only to deter the use of WMD 
"against either ourselves or our allies and friends, but also, where necessary 
and feasible, to prevent it." The idea of preventing the use of WMD by an 
adversary is a major new direction when compared to previous versions 
135 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement. 3. This is clearly a reference to the CPI. 
136 Ibid, 8. 
137 Ibid, 9. 
138 ibid, 13. 
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which focused on deterring their use. Deterrence accepts the fact that an 
adversary already has WMD, whereas prevention embodies the intent to 
prevent an adversary from acquiring or deploying WMD in the first place. 
The conclusion also called for placing "a high priority on improving our 
ability to locate, identify and disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, 
production and storage facilities for such weapons, and their delivery 
systems."139 Such improvements must be realized in order to support a 
strategy of prevention. 
The National Military Strategy has three sentences on the subject of 
"Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction" which also clearly show the new 
direction. 
(1) adversaries should recognize our capability to dominate any 
escalation of conflict should weapons of mass destruction be 
employed against us. 
(2) we will maintain and strengthen our defensive capabilities 
against such weapons. 
and 
(3) we continue efforts to prevent the use of mass destruction 
weapons and make preparations to operate effectively in 
environments marked by biological, chemical, or radioactive 
contamination.140 
By comparison, the 1992 version mentioned only the deterrence of an 
139 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement, 14-15. 
140 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States 
of America (Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1995), 15. 
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adversary's WMD with U.S. nuclear weapons.i« It also discussed shifting the 
Strategic Defense Initiative to the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 
(GPALS) program as a response to ballistic missile proliferation.142 But just 
three years ago, the spread of WMD had yet to be labeled by the Bottom-up 
Review as the nation's number one security threat. Accordingly its strategy 
documents were not yet as sharply focused on the proliferation issue. 
One notable trend is that key officials responsible for national security 
do not use the term "counterproüferation," nor do they mention the CPI. 
President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, and National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake do not routinely refer specifically to the CPI or 
counterproüferation in public forums.143 Doing so would give both the 
initiative and the principle behind it greater legitimacy. But it also seems 
possible that due to political sensitivities these officials have relegated the 
141 See the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1992) 3-4, 6-7 and 13. 
This document does not mention WMD under the heading 'The Threat."  It does 
say that in light of the large nuclear arsenal and instability in the former Soviet 
Union "and the threat posed by the increasing number of potentially hostile states 
developing weapons of mass destruction, maintenance of a modern, fully capable, 
and reliable strategic deterrent remains the number one defense priority of the 
United States." It also reiterates that one of the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons is 
to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction. 
142 Ibid. 
143 President Clinton did not use the word counterproüferation or mention 
the CPI in his January 1994 NATO Summit address, in either the 1994 or 1995 State 
of the Union Address, or in any other significant public speech. Secretary Perry also 
has not used referred to either, although both the word and the initiative are staffed 
in his department.  General Shalikashvili did not even mention WMD, let alone 
counterproüferation or the CPI in his 10 February 1995 posture statement before the 
Senate Budget Committee. Anthony Lake has spoken pubücly about non- 
proliferation and the importance of a comprehensive test ban, but has yet to discuss 
counterproüferation or the CPI publicly. 
69 
terminology to Ashton Carter at the "think tank" level to conduct the studies 
and negotiations necessary to develop a policy. Counterproliferation and 
nonproliferation are not issues which generally interest the public.  Both may 
be best served by keeping the CPI out of the spotlight at the cabinet level while 
allowing Carter's office to explore the possibilities and forge the working 
relationships both domestically and with allies. 
Only one of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the Defense 
Department's nine unified  commands addressed counterproliferation in their 
February 1995 statements before key Congressional committees. General 
Wayne Dowding, Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations 
Command stated that special operations forces would play a significant role in 
the complex mission of counterproliferation, and that it would require 
continuous detailed planning and coordination from the NSC1** The silence 
144 Statements of General Wayne A. Dowding, Commander in Chief, United 
States Special Operations Command, before the Committee on Armed Services, 
United States Senate (undated), 33-34; Admiral H. G. Chiles, Jr., Commander in 
Chief, United States Strategic Command, before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (23 February 1995); General Joseph W. Ashy, Commander in Chief, 
North American Aerospace Defense Command and Commander in Chief, United 
States Space Command, before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (23 
February 1995); Admiral Richard C. Macke, Commander in Chief, United States 
Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee Posture Hearing 
(16 February 1995); General John J. Sheehan, Commander in Chief, United States 
Atlantic Command, before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate 
(14 February 1995); General Barry R. McCaffrey, Commander in Chief, United States 
Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee (16 February 
1995); General J. H. Binford Peay, III, Commander in Chief, United States Central 
Command, before the House National Security Committee (23 February 1995); 
General George A. Joulwan, Commander in Chief, United States European 
Command, before the House Appropriations Committee, National Security 
Subcommittee (16 February 1995); and General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in 
Chief, United States Transportation Command, before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (23 February 1995). General Ashy did make several points on how Space 
Command will be able to provide support for improved theater ballistic missile 
defenses when new systems are brought on line. Admiral Macke discussed the 
Agreed Framework capping North Korea's nuclear program. General Peay 
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of the CINCs is somewhat disconcerting, but it may be due to the fact that at 
the time of their testimony, a classified Joint Staff study defining the CINCs 
roles and Services' functions in counterproliferation was still in progress. It is 
also possible that the Defense Department as a whole was deliberately 
downplaying counterproliferation during the sensitive preparations for the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
B. THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
The intellectual history of counterproliferation goes back to before the 
advent of the first nuclear weapons.  Avner Cohen notes that the Manhattan 
Project had, in addition to its task of producing nuclear weapons, "the task of 
monitoring and, if possible, denying German nuclear weapons activities."i45 
From the fall of 1943 until October 1945 an extensive intelligence collection 
program under the code-word "Alsos" focused on Italian, French, and 
German nuclear research.146 in response to a Manhattan Project request, 
saboteurs attacked the heavy water facility at Vemork, Norway in February 
1943 temporarily disrupting Germany's only heavy water supply.147 After the 
facility returned to operation it was bombed in a massive raid in November 
1943. This source was never restored, and shortages of heavy water severely 
identified theater ballistic missile defense as a "key requirement." General Joulwan 
expressed his support for extending the NPT and for funding improved theater 
ballistic missile defenses. 
145 Cohen, 73, as described in Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The 
Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), 185-223 and 
230-252. 
146 Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told:  The Story of the Manhattan 
Project (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), 185-198,207-223, and 230-249. 
147 ibid, 188-189. Groves calls the location Rjukan, but most scholars call it 
Vemork. 
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limited further German nuclear research.  Norwegian commandos caused 
additional damage as the Germans attempted to move surviving components 
back to Germany.!48 
By the Fall of 1944, the Alsos program had determined that most of the 
German nuclear scientists were concentrated in the Black Forest towns of 
Hechingen and Bisengen, and that construction of large industrial facilities 
was proceeding at a feverish pace. The status of German research was not 
then known, but it was feared that a "German Oakridge" was fast developing. 
General Leslie Groves, the Manhattan Project's director hesitated to request 
the bombing of these facilities "since that would only drive the project 
underground and we would run the risk of not finding it again in time."i49 
His concerns offered a prescient view of the current dilemma on the possible 
effectiveness of military strikes as counterproliferation tool. 
In the closing months of the war, Groves and others became 
increasingly concerned that German nuclear scientists, fissile materials, and 
facilities would fall into the hands of advancing French and Soviet forces. 
Alsos sources confirmed the presence of a facility for the manufacture of 
thorium and uranium components at Oranienburg, near Berlin, which lay in 
the path of the Soviet advance. Groves requested that the target be bombed, 
and on 15 March 1945 it was destroyed by a massive bombing raid.iso In 
another operation on 22 April, U.S. forces cued by Alsos information seized a 
uranium stockpile in the town of Stassfurt, a town caught in between the 
advancing U.S. and Soviet armies. This seizure constituted the bulk of the 
148 Ibid, 189 and 231. 
149 Ibid, 218. 
150 Ibid, 230-231. 
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refined uranium ore captured from Belgium in 1940.151 
The final counterproliferation stroke of the Manhattan Project occurred 
from 23 to 26 April under the name Operation Harborage. The goal was to 
prevent the capture of German nuclear scientists and technology in the 
Hechingen-Bisengen area by the advancing French Army. Acting on Alsos 
intelligence, and directed by one of Groves' operatives, U.S. forces were 
diverted into the French zone several days ahead of the French forces and 
quickly rounded up German scientists, seized their equipment, and 
dismantled their laboratories.^ On the final day, the U.S. force also captured 
the German stocks of heavy water and uranium oxide.153 
Cohen also notes that in the early post-war period when the United 
States still had its nuclear monopoly, some intellectuals urged the use of 
military force to block the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
One was the renowned British socialist and pacifist philosopher Bertrand 
Russell.i54 Russell developed a strong hostility towards the Soviet Union in 
response to its domination of Eastern Europe. Deeply concerned with the 
prospect of a nuclear arms race, he suggested in 1948 that the U.S. use the 
strength of its nuclear monopoly to threaten war in order to force the Soviets 
to accept nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union, he argued, was weak and 
would "very likely yield to the demands of the West."i55 He justified his 
151 Ibid, 236-239. 
152 Ibid, 241. 
153 Ibid, 242. 
154 ibid. 
155 Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell:  1944-1967. 
volume III (London: George Allen and Unwin, LTD., 1969), 18. 
73 
position on the basis that "some wars, a very few, are justified, even necessary. 
They are usually necessary because matters have been permitted to drag on 
their obviously evil way till no peaceful means can stop them."i56 Many 
prominent American "doves" ultimately agreed with Russell.  A similar 
rationale might be applied to the use of force in counterproliferation. 
Both the Soviet Union and the United States considered using military 
force to stop the Chinese nuclear weapons program. The Soviets considered 
using military force on two occasions, and at one point consulted with the 
U.S. Government about the possibility of joint action.157 A conventional 
strike against China's gaseous diffusion plant was studied in the Department 
of Defense in 1965, but was ultimately rejected.158 Even though the strikes 
were not conducted, the intelligence collection, staff planning, and 
intergovernmental consultation which transpired are all elements of 
counterproliferation. 
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy's Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm) considered 
conventional air strikes against the Soviet medium and intermediate range 
ballistic missile sites before finally arriving at the decision to impose a naval 
quarantine instead. This action, had it been carried out, leans more in the 
direction of preemption than prevention, but it is nonetheless akin to possible 
counterproliferation missions, especially when the intelligence and targeting 
support for such a mission is considered. It may well be illustrative of the 
156 rbid. 
157
 Cohen, 73. Cohen does not elaborate on a primary source, but it was 
confirmed in an oral interview with Professor Patrick J. Parker of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, who was an official in the Department of 
Defense at the time. 
158 Ibid. 
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enormity, and hence the difficulty of conducting air strikes in some 
counterproliferation scenarios.  Because of the large number of launcher sites 
and the requirement to strike Cuban air force airfields as well, the U.S. Air 
Force predicted it would need some 500 aircraft sorties to accomplish the 
mission and could not guarantee that all the missiles would be destroyed.159 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that such a strike "should only 
be considered 'on the assumption that we can carry it off before these 
(missiles) become operational."i60 Although the less provocative quarantine 
option carried the day, a preventive strike was staffed and seriously 
considered. I argue that the naval quarantine option is also an example 
applicable to counterproliferation, although it was aimed at a state which 
already had nuclear weapons, and not at rolling back a nascent nuclear 
weapons state. 
More recently, Coalition forces bombed various Iraqi WMD facilities in 
the 1991 Gulf War. Although it was not specifically directed under the 
mandate of the UN Security Council, Coalition commanders realized an 
opportunity to disable these facilities even before the war started and took 
action. It was clearly within the broader context of disabling Iraq's ability to 
wage war. There was little international criticism of this effort. In hindsight, 
this set of strikes revealed the limitations of Coalition intelligence, targeting, 
and strike capabilities.1*! From the outset, the war itself took on a preventive 
159 Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1989), 49-50. 
160 ibid, 50, quoted from "White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis," International Security, vol. 10 (Summer 1985), 176. 
161 See David A. Brown, "Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Capability Still Intact," 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 134, no. 26 (1 July 1991), 23. In this 
account, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Horner, commander of the 
coalition air forces, concedes that "possibly eighty percent of all Iraqi nuclear 
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coloration that is much in the spirit of counterproliferation. 
It is clear from this evidence that counterproliferation is not a new 
concept. 162 The United States has a long history of counterproliferation-like 
activity including intelligence collection, analysis, planning, and even using 
military force when needed to protect against WMD proliferation. Using 
Russell's logic, counterproliferation can be justified on moral grounds which 
would be consistent with the American tradition of morality in its foreign 
affairs, including the use of force. In peacetime, it would seem prudent to 
develop and engage wholeheartedly in the full range of counterproliferation 
activities short of actually using force, in anticipation of using force if ever it 
should be required. 
C CHARACTERIZING THE FIVE POINTS OF THE CPI 
Lacking more precise definitions, the Defense Department's definition 
of counterproliferation has defaulted to Poneman's definition:  the actions by 
the Defense Department across the full spectrum of WMD proliferation 
responses. It is therefore crucial to understand Aspin's five original points, 
facilities were hit" over the course of the forty three day air campaign. See also 
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary 
Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 78-79. This account 
is an in depth critical study of the entire air campaign. It concludes that "the Iraqi 
nuclear program was massive . . . and less vulnerable to destruction by precision 
bombing than Coalition air commanders and planners or U.S. intelligence specialist 
realized before Desert Storm." It also notes that at the start of the air campaign, the 
target list contained two nuclear targets, but that UNSCOM inspections ultimately 
revealed more than twenty sites including sixteen key facilities. 
162 in September 1807, long before the nuclear era, the Royal Navy 
bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet in anticipation of an impending 
alliance between Denmark and France. The British goal was to prevent the Danish 
navy from aiding the French before Denmark actually joined the conflict. See 
William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, fifth edition, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 642. 
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which remain the department's road map for developing policy. Aspin's 
original five points were: (1) the new mission, (2) what we buy, (3) how we 
fight wars, (4) intelligence, and (5) international cooperation. The first three 
have evolved into (1) policy, (2) acquisition, and (3) military planning. The 
final two remain the same.163 The points have become more sharply defined 
over time and with further study.   I use Aspin's original labels for the 
following sections, while tracing their development in the open sources from 
the CPI announcement to the present. 
1. The New Mission: 
Aspin stated that "President Clinton not only recognized the danger of 
the new threat, he gave us this new mission to cope with it."16* He said then 
defense planning guidance was being issued to the services "to make sure 
everyone understands what the president wants."i65 But the question must 
be asked why the presidenf s desires were not made clear to the other agencies 
before Aspin's announcement. Much of the strife and confusion could have 
been avoided. The most vexing issue of the CPI is the ongoing effort to clarify 
its purposes without having to justify it or apologize for it. As an example, 
Carter and Wallerstein continually emphasize that it does not portend 
preemptive strikes or the use of nuclear weapons. 
In his April 1994 speech, Carter explained that "the Secretary of Defense 
has amended - and continues to amend - those standard guidance documents 
that direct the CINCs, Services, Agencies and the acquisition community 
163 The comparison is made between Aspin's 7 December 1993 speech and 
Wallerstein's January 1995 NATO brief. The changes are subtle concessions that 
better define the original points and are less controversial. 
164 Aspin, 2. 
165 Ibid. 
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toward this key priority." 166 Carter also reported that thirty people were 
assigned to work on policy under a deputy assistant secretary for 
counterproliferation policy. In his January 1995 briefing to the NATO Defense 
Planning Symposium, Wallerstein reported that "as we began to formulate 
our thinking about counterproliferation, we realized that a well-articulated 
policy statement was essential to direct the myriad of relevant Defense 
Department activities,"^ Both Carter's speech and Wallerstein's briefing 
make a clear linkage that the new mission is to develop a 
counterproliferation policy. 
Aspin created the new position of assistant secretary of defense for 
nuclear security and counterproliferation "to reflect the importance of the 
new mission."i68 This title subsequently changed to assistant secretary of 
defense for international security policy, the position held by Carter. The 
creation of this position and its staff is tantamount to creating a think tank 
dedicated solely to policy issues. It is a normal bureaucratic reaction. It is 
interesting to note that Carter's CPI think tank has a larger budget for one 
issue, than many prominent civilian think tanks have for their entire 
operations.169 
It remains to be seen whether a high profile announcement of a new 
mission, and the creation of a think tank was the right approach. The 
declaration of a new military mission created widespread confusion within 
the departments and agencies that are interested in WMD proliferation. By 
166 Carter, 4. 
167 Wallerstein, 10. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Budget authority for counterproliferation in the FY 1995 Federal Budget 
was $60 million. 
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announcing a new mission, Aspin subjected counterproliferation to 
unwarranted scrutiny and put the Defense Department in the position of 
defending a new mission not only among its bureaucratic rivals, but in the 
highly politicized arena of public opinion as well. The actions of General 
Groves in the closing days of World War II never needed justification.   The 
current initiative could have easily been linked to those actions. Aspin 
missed the opportunity to assert that counterproliferation is clearly supported 
by a long record of intelligence collection and planning, and the occasional use 
of force when appropriate. This tradition should be rediscovered and grafted 
into the current thinking. 
A final criticism of the "initiative" approach to counterproliferation is 
that the timing and high profile nature of Aspin's announcement were 
inappropriate in view of the proximity to the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. 
The confusion over a new mission, and accusations that the CPI is aimed at 
the Third World could have undermined traditional U.S. leadership in the 
NPT movement. It is significant that despite this potential strain, 
counterproliferation was not raised during the four weeks of the 
conference.170 Perhaps this is due to skillful behind the scenes work by 
Clinton Administration staff, and self-imposed silence within the Department 
of Defense over the past six months. 
2. What We Buy: 
Aspin stated that the department was reviewing its programs "to see 
what we can do better."i7i He briefly mentioned the possibilities of advanced 
170 i rely here upon the experiences of various staff and associates of the 
Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) who attended the conference, 
which were conveyed at an informal seminar discussion led by Bill Potter held on 
19 May 1995. MIIS staff members attended the conference in various official and 
unofficial capacities, some as staff workers on the various committees, some as part 
of the Kirgiz and Armenian delegations, and some in an NGO capacity. 
171 Aspin, 3. 
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nonnuclear penetrating munitions, hunting mobile missiles, and theater 
ballistic missile defenses.172 Carter relabeled this point "Acquisition and 
Technology Base," and emphasized defenses against chemical and biological 
weapons.173 The Deutch Report, produced a preliminary list of "high priority 
capability shortfalls," grouped into eight functional areas.174 The study 
participants included both policy level and working level officials from the 
various departments and agencies involved in nonproliferation.   The 
Department of Defense was represented by both civilians and uniformed 
personnel.175 This list of shortfalls is extensive and appears to be a significant 
interagency step towards Aspin's second point, as well as toward broader 
nonproliferation goals. Wallerstein's January 1995 NATO briefing credited 
the study as a catalyst for action, and with garnering funding support in the 
Fiscal Year 1995 budget. He also stressed the need to achieve savings by 
adapting existing systems and platforms wherever possible. He admonished 
against relying upon a single solution to the proliferation problem.176 it 
seems that this point of the CPI is maturing with a substantial degree of 
interagency cooperation. 
172 ibid. 
173 Carter, 4. 
174 Deutch, 28-29. The eight functional areas include intelligence, battlefield 
surveillance, passive defense, active defense, counterforce capabilities, inspection 
support, support for export control programs, and counterterrorism. 
175 ibid, Appendix B. Fourteen principals were listed representing thirteen 
different departments or agencies. Twenty two working level officials were listed 
from nine different organizations. 
176 Wallerstein, 15-16. 
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3. How We Fight Wars: 
Aspin stated that his department was developing guidance for dealing 
with the new threat, and that he had directed the services to tell him how 
prepared they were for it. He also mentioned that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the CINCs "are developing a military planning process for dealing with 
adversaries who have weapons of mass destruction."i77 Carter relabeled this 
point "Military Planning and Doctrine/' perhaps to reflect the reality that this 
point encompasses not only fighting battles and campaigns, but day-to-day 
contingency planning as well. He stressed that a conflict involving WMD "is 
a different kind of war/' and focused on the potential impact of chemical and 
biological weapons on all aspects of military operations, including logistics, 
doctrine, planning, and tactics.178 
Wallerstein refined the labeling of this point further, calling it simply 
"Military Planning." He stated that a Joint Staff study of the CINCs missions 
and service functions was forthcoming which would "determine how best to 
respond to proliferation and to implement counterproliferation."i79   He also 
stressed the need to improve modeling of WMD effects in wargames as a tool 
for planners. His last comment on this point highlighted the need for 
curricula development at service colleges and development of doctrine in 
response to the lessons learned from wargames.iso The value of wargames as 
both "an educational device, and also as a tool to help explore new ideas, and 
to create and evaluate new concepts and plans" is well documented, 
particularly in the experience of the U.S. Navy and the Naval War College at 
177 Aspin, 3. 
178 Aspin, 5. 
179 Wallerstein, 11. 
180 Ibid, 12. 
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Newport, Rhode Island, Mi This point of the CPI also seems to be making 
progress towards Aspin's stated objective. 
4. Intelligence: 
Aspin introduced this point by briefly discussing the post-Gulf War 
discovery of the extent of Saddam Hussein's WMD programs, as well as the 
U.S. failure to destroy some of the facilities that had been discovered and 
targeted.  He highlighted the establishment of the intelligence community's 
Nonproliferation Center under the Director of Central Intelligence, and noted 
that a deputy director for military support had been created. The number of 
Defense Department experts assigned to the center was to be tripled, he added. 
The goal of the department's involvement in this effort was to get 
"intelligence that is useful militarily, not only diplomatically."^ 
Carter's speech went beyond Aspin's call for militarily useful 
intelligence, to say that military planners 
must know how many weapons exist, what infrastructure supports 
them, where that infrastructure is, what the consequences are of 
striking that infrastructure, and what indications would signal a 
proliferator is most likely to use those weapons. 183 
He also explained that commanders in the field as well as the National 
Command Authority "need a better understanding of a proliferator's strategic 
181 Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 103. Pages 61 to 103 lay out an exhaustive history of Naval 
War College war gaming, with a thorough explanations of its advantages and 
limitations, the evolution of modeling, and the rival schools of thought concerning 
its value. 
182 Aspin, 3. 
183 Carter, 5. 
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and operational personality."184 This seems appropriate, although the 
elements of information Carter alludes to most likely can not ever be known 
with great certainty. There will always be a risk that the information is not 
correct, or only partially correct, a risk that may very likely preclude military 
action in view of the high stakes of counterproliferation.  Carter's final 
comment was that "intelligence will need additional equipment support."i85 
This comment is somewhat disturbing, because it implies that the answer to 
the intelligence problem lies solely in a yet to be discovered technical solution. 
If this is what Carter intended, it is an incomplete approach, one which 
considers only hightech intelligence capabilities, while neglecting more 
traditional human intelligence (HUMINT) and open source intelligence 
(OSINT). It would seem that this was more likely an oversight. 
The Deutch Report included intelligence as the top category in its list of 
high priority capability shortfalls. The list of intelligence shortfalls was 
extensive, and although it did not address specific intelligence capabilities, 
only elements of information which must be obtained, the implication is clear 
that the intelligence capabilities required go beyond mere improvements in 
technology. The lead item on the intelligence list was a "reliable methodology 
for detecting WMD programs early in their development including 
motivations, plans, and intentions of policy makers."i86 One can not 
184 Ibid. 
185 ibid. 
186 Deutch, 28. The other intelligence capability shortfalls listed in the report 
include the following: 
1. Effective methods to understand and counter diverse concealment, denial, 
and deception practices, particularly the identification and characterization of 
underground facilities and dual use facilities. 
2. Non-optimal exploitation of collected information because of lack of 
intelligence community connectivity and effective processing and analytical tools. 
3. Ability to locate and identify nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
83 
envision a technology to assess the motivations and intentions of policy 
makers. While artificial intelligence may one day help categorize massive 
amounts of information, identify significant clues to a particular intelligence 
puzzle, and provide threat warnings, assessing an adversary's motivations 
and intentions can only be done by human analysts.*87 
There is a serious question as to whether such analysis can be done with 
a high degree of certainty, and it will be done only with great difficulty when 
examining a closed society with reclusive leadership and a clandestine 
weapons program, as is to be expected in future states likely to proliferate. 
Forming an accurate intelligence picture of such a state's motivations and 
intentions may well be in the category of too hard.   The U.S. experience with 
North Korea illustrates the problem.  North Korean motives and actions in 
the on-again, off-again bilateral negotiations over the future of its nuclear 
weapons program defy explanation. U.S. intelligence officials seem unable to 
understand and affect North Korean motives with any degree of accuracy.i88 
Wallerstein's NATO briefing offers no additional insights on 
activities. 
4. Identification and characterization of technology transfer networks 
supporting the development of WMD. 
5. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, including characterization of 
WMD forces and infrastructure, identification and targeting or WMD and their 
missile delivery systems, bomb damage assessment, and fusion of WMD related 
sensor / signature data. 
6. Real-time intelligence to the war fighter including sensor-to-shooter 
linkage in operational command-control. 
187 See Albert Clarkson, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis: New 
Applications of Information Technology (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981) 
for a detailed explanation of the potential and limitations of artificial intelligence in 
strategic analysis. 
188 See for example the preface by Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in North Korea, The Foundations for 
Military Strength (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, undated). 
84 
intelligence. It reiterates the importance of the operational utility of 
intelligence on WMD proliferation, and the role the Nonproliferation Center 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency will play to ensure that military 
counterproliferation intelligence requirements will be met.189 Like those 
before him, he did not say how these requirements would be met, or even 
defined. Although intelligence collection and analysis is being refocused, the 
intelligence community has a long way to go to be able to meet the shortfalls 
listed in the Deutch Report. 
There is a wishful quality to the intelligence element of the CPI that 
places great hope in establishing a perfect intelligence picture that will be 
militarily actionable. Intelligence is clearly its proverbial Achilles heel, and 
the stakes are far higher than in any previous military endeavor in history. 
One need not read too many books to develop the picture that military 
intelligence, even at its functional best, has never succeeded in removing the 
element of uncertainty from military operations.i90 Carter himself 
acknowledged the difficulty in determining when a state crosses the nuclear 
threshold, and that covert nuclear weapons programs and arsenals are 
difficult intelligence targets. He also cautions that the Cold War style of threat 
assessment which was largely successful with the Soviets will not likely work 
189  Wallerstein, 13-14. 
190 A useful starting point is the collection of essays edited by Michael I. 
Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 
1990). Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's Military Misfortunes (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990) takes a broader look at failure in war due to an array of factors 
including intelligence failure, equipment failure, and human factors in combat. 
Both are sobering accounts which accurately characterize the element of uncertainty 
in warfare. 
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against other states.191 The intelligence point of the CPI will be the most 
difficult to resolve, will require the greatest allocation of resources, and over 
the long term will be the most controversial even if accurate intelligence 
assessments can be developed. While accurate intelligence supports a variety 
of options short of the use of military force, including diplomacy, sanctions, 
export controls, and IAEA inspections, there will always be the nagging 
question of whether a good enough assessment can be developed to support 
military action when it is needed. 
5. International Cooperation; 
Aspin's final point of the CPI was that U.S. allies and security partners 
have as much at stake as the United States. He mentioned a NATO initiative 
against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation with 
Japan on deployment and possible joint development of theater ballistic 
missile defenses. He then gives a brief overview of the Nunn-Lugar program 
to improve fissile material security in the former Soviet Union, and attempts 
to reorient sensitive technology export controls to help prevent 
proliferation.192 Carter's April speech parallels Aspin's announcement. He 
said he was "heartened by the favorable international response to these 
initiatives," and looked "forward to a strong counterproliferation 
environment that builds on and reinforces non-proliferation norms and 
agreements that are the foundation of U.S. and international efforts to combat 
191 Robert Blackwill and Ashton B. Carter, 'The Role of Intelligence," in 
Blackwill and Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations. 230-233. Cold War threat 
assessment will not work because, unlike the Soviets, which did not conceal their 
facilities, which openly paraded their weapons, and which referred to them in the 
press as signs of progress, prestige, and military might, states with clandestine 
nuclear programs keep their programs under tight security controls which are far 




Wallerstein's January 1995 NATO briefing provides a significant update 
and clarification on the international cooperation point. He says that this 
point "recognizes that, in future conflicts where (WMD) may be involved, in 
all likelihood   ... we will be engaging along with allies or coalition partners, 
and most likely will be operating from the homelands of regional partners." 
He then explains the function of the newly created NATO Senior Defense 
Group on Proliferation (DGP), co-chaired by Ashton Carter and French 
Minister of Defense Jean-Claude Mallet. Wallerstein outlined the DGP's three 
phase plan to assess the risk, its impact on NATO capabilities, and necessary 
improvements.194 
Wallerstein also noted that the Defense Department had presented a 
counterproliferation conceptual framework briefing to the Russian General 
Staff which resulted in a constructive dialogue, and that the Russians had 
offered to meet again to present their views. As a possible precursor of future 
Russian interest Russian Federation arms control ambassador Gennady 
Evstafiev recently stated that counterproliferation "is a positive idea," because 
of the balance of prevention and protection.195  Wallerstein also mentioned 
that the United States was "striving to work with key friends and allies in the 
Pacific on these important issues," and he also mentioned the ongoing 
discussion with Japan.196 
193 Carter, 6. 
194 Wallerstein, 17-18. 
195 Exclusive interview by the Center for East-West Trade Policy at the 




The cooperation envisioned by Aspin appears to be proceeding forward, 
albeit cautiously. In response to President Clinton's proposal at the January 
1994 NATO summit, the NATO Heads of State and Government issued a 
declaration which included a statement that the organization would 
"intensify and expand (its) political and defense efforts against proliferation, 
taking into account the work already underway in other international fora 
and institutions."  The statement also directed the alliance to develop an 
overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce prevention efforts, 
reduce proliferation, and protect against it.197 This statement represents a 
small step towards consensus among fifteen U.S. allies to move forward with 
the development of a NATO counterproliferation doctrine.  But so far, all 
NATO press releases and articles in NATO Review, its publicity magazine, 
have referred only to the defensive aspects of counterproliferation, and have 
not used the word "counterproliferation." It can be safely stated that, NATO is 
interested in continuing to study the issue through the DGP's three phase 
plan, and appears to be supportive of at least the defensive aspects of the CPI, 
though it appears to be keeping its options open for the present by not 
associating itself directly with the CPI or the term counterproliferation. 
D. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 
1. Department of Defense Claims: 
The CPI is the Defense Department's response to the number one threat 
to the United States and its allies as identified in the Bottom-up Review of 
1993. But it has the potential of promising more than it can deliver. 
Optimism is useful but it can also breed a sense of false security. While the 
CPI seems to be a reasonable approach to identifying the path to a 
197 NATO Press Communique M-l (94)3, "Declaration of the Heads of State 
and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at 
NATO Headquarters, brussels, on 10-11 January 1994 (11 January 1994), 6. 
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counterproliferation policy, it must also be viewed as a tool to identify 
additional problems which it can not solve. It therefore must not be viewed 
as a silver bullet-type solution, but rather as another useful step in the 
ongoing proliferation problem. Joseph Pilat cautions that 
"counterproliferation is a potentially important, but limited, instrument . . . 
(and that) it is no substitute for the existing regime of treaties, institutions and 
arrangements designed to prevent proliferation."^ He adds that since "there 
may be no choice but to counter a proliferanf s actions, it would be desirable to 
have genuine options."i99 The spectrum diagram of the eight responses to 
proliferation in figure 1 seems a reasonable way to show that the CPI merely 
adds more options. It must be tempered by the reality that other problems 
may arise. While it seems reasonable that the CPI may provide some solutions 
for dealing with future nuclear states, it is uncertain that it can provide 
adequate protection against a non-state terrorist organization using a hidden 
nuclear weapon for blackmail. 
The declaration of a new mission with new military capabilities to 
follow, implies the possibility of new behavior from the Department of 
Defense. This uncertainty creates tension between the United States, its allies, 
and other states. It appears that the long legacy of U.S. counterproliferation- 
like activities has been overlooked. The Defense Department needs to 
rediscover this legacy as a justification for future counterproliferation if and 
when diplomatic efforts fail. This will help clarify U.S. resolve to undertake 
counterproliferation.   It will also help break the linkage to Osiraq. 
U.S. leadership across the spectrum of WMD proliferation responses 
must be asserted. The complementary role of counterproliferation must be 
asserted.  Diplomatic efforts to slow or reverse proliferation in North Korea 
198 Pilat, 1. 
199 Ibid. 
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and Iran must continue to receive wide publicity. Caution has always been 
the norm in past U.S. responses to proliferation.   Zachary Davis notes that 
"whether friend or foe, the United States has been extremely cautious about 
threatening military action to combat nuclear proliferation."200 This caution 
must continue to guide the development of counterproliferation policy. 
2. Progress Towards the Five Points: 
Some real progress has been made towards developing Aspin's five 
points. Although the interagency review which produced the Deutch report 
was directed by Congress before the CPI was even announced, Deutch 
nonetheless used it to help institutionalize and legitimize 
counterproliferation. The report laid out the process by which the National 
Security Council tasks the various agencies and departments for both 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities.   This is an important 
step, since it helps set aside interagency strife, and established a clear headship 
over all proliferation activities. The report's list of capability shortfalls points 
the direction for future research, development, and acquisition of intelligence 
and battlefield equipment. 
The forthcoming Joint Staff study which includes the CINC and Service 
staffs is also a positive development. It will likely forge a consensus among 
the uniformed services of their current capabilities and limitations, as well as 
provide recommendations for doctrine, strategy, tactics, logistics, and 
acquisitions.  The input of the professional military who must implement the 
policy is an important part of developing a policy that will work. This study 
also forces the issue of counterproliferation through the inertia of military 
bureaucracy by requiring each of the key commanders and staffs to tender an 
opinion. 
The NATO DGP's three phase study will also likely be useful. The first 
phase is already complete, and the second is now in progress. Like the Joint 
200 Davis, 3. 
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Staff study, it requires the participants to address the issue and provide an 
opinion.   Although NATO seems more cautious about counterproliferation, 
the study is a mechanism by which consensus can be reached among key U.S. 
allies. Even if NATO only develops the intelligence and defensive aspects of 
counterproliferation, it will nonetheless be a positive contribution since it will 
create more response options. 
Modeling and wargaming may prove a useful tool in developing 
doctrine. The past success of these tools in showing the strengths and 
limitations of doctrine, strategy, tactics, and logistics must be considered and 
applied to counterproliferation. They will also be useful to test new 
approaches to counterproliferation.  Their limitations as tools and not 
outright solutions must, however, not be overlooked.  Modeling and 
wargaming will also be useful for teaching commanders and staffs how to 
plan, operate, and fight in the face of the WMD threat. 
3. Big Hurdles: 
The intelligence problem appears to be the most difficult hurdle. There 
may be scenarios for which an accurate intelligence picture can not be 
developed.  Refocusing intelligence collection and improving sensors are 
logical steps. But improving the human intelligence process must also be part 
of the effort. There is also a tendency to be overly optimistic about our ability 
to develop intelligence estimates. Past experience shows that sophisticated 
intelligence can be wrong and can even be deceived. And yet 
counterproliferation will demand a high degree of accuracy because of the 
high stakes involved. It may be that some aspects of the intelligence problem, 
especially the accurate assessment of motivation and intentions, can not ever 
be solved. 
There is also a disturbing tendency to trust hightech solutions. This is a 
problem endemic in both the U.S. military culture and the society as a whole. 
High technology often implies ease, but there is a great danger to this sort of 
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complacency. The search for hightech answers must be filtered through the 
experience of human error and reason. High technology may well deliver 
some useful systems and adaptations, but it must be regarded cautiously. 
A final hurdle is public opinion. Counterproliferation is perceived to 
run contrary to the growing momentum of arms control. There is also the 
perception that its focus is on preventive strikes, not just protection. The CPI 
will have to be marketed as a rational approach to a serious threat that is fully 
within the spirit of nonproliferation. Thus far it appears to be moving in that 
direction.  Clarifying the terminology and continued dialogue will help this 
effort. In the end, it is likely that when given the range of options, the public 
in the United States and most countries will not tolerate the idea of taking the 
first blow from an adversary armed with WMD, and therefore it will support a 
strong counterproliferation policy. 
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IV. THE TENSIONS OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
Models are useful tools for applying theory to help explain real world 
situations.  This section uses three-tiered prism consisting of three models to 
provide insight into the different factors that affect how states form policies. 
The prism helps sort and analyze the various tensions which the CPI has 
created. Each model used in this analysis covers a different aspect of 
government interaction which can influence policy formation.  The three 
different perspectives provided by the models help provide insights into the 
character, strength, and potential impact of each tension, and will help 
determine how tensions are likely to impact on policy. The insights derived 
from using these models will ultimately contribute to specific findings and 
policy recommendations. Two of the models are attributable to Graham 
Allison, and the third I construct myself. 
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLISON'S MODELS 
In his classic Essence of Decision, Graham Allison analyzed the 
decision-making processes of the U.S. and Soviet governments during the 
thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison used three models to 
explain how both sides thought through and acted out their respective 
policies. They have since been adapted to explain a wide variety of decision- 
making and policy process scenarios. I have adapted Model I and Model IE as 
two of the three facets of a theoretical prism to view the tensions created by 
counterproliferation. 
Model IE, also called the Governmental Politics or "Bureaucratic" 
Model helps explain the decision-making process from an intragovernmental 
perspective by examining "mechanisms from which governmental actions 
emerge."20i it "focuses on the politics of a government" and explains policy 
201   Allison, 6. 
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"not as choices or outputs, (but) rather ... as a resultant of various bargaining 
games among players in the national government "202 As Allison himself 
explains, an analyst using Model III has "explained" an event "when he has 
discovered who did what to whom that yielded the action in question."203 He 
also explained the Model III perspective as a chess variant involving "a 
number of players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, 
. . . determining the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining."204 The 
interagency tensions which the CPI created are the outward manifestations of 
bargains and political power plays between entrenched bureaucracies and 
powerful political figures.  The most prominent of the bureaucracies involved 
in counterproliferation policy are the Defense Department, State Department, 
and ACDA. 
Allison's Model I is often called the Rational Actor or "Classical" 
Model. It explains events and decisions as "the more or less purposive acts of 
unified national governments/'205 The focus of analysis using this model is 
on key individuals acting for the government, or on a sequence of known or 
expected logic such as cost/benefit analysis. Allison explained it as a chess 
scenario in which "an individual player was moving the pieces with reference 
to plans and tactics toward the goal of winning."206 Model I is probably the 
best way to explain the tensions created between the U.S. government and 
other governments (including allies).  Carter and Wallerstein are presenting 
202 ibid. 
203 Ibid, 7. 
204 ibid. 
205 ibid, 5. 
206 Ibid, 7. 
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the CPI with monolithic perspective through a variety of international 
forums including the NATO DGP, and various bilateral ventures as well. As 
shown in Figure 1 in the last chapter, they have sole responsibility within the 
government for counterproliferation policy. This was also affirmed by the 
Deutch Report. Carter's organization behaves outwardly as a Model I unitary 
actor, unchallenged publicly by rival agencies and departments, and free to 
engage representatives of foreign governments in an official capacity. 
To explain the tensions between nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation, as well as tensions which counterproliferation uniquely 
creates, I used an angle Allison overlooked, the impact of public and expert 
opinion on decision-making. This angle might best be labeled the "State- 
Societal Model/7 These tensions have been consistently expressed by the NGO 
community through a variety of media, including books, journals, papers, 
conferences, and speeches.207 These organizations and individual analysts are 
the CPI's most vocal and continuing critics. Depending upon the weight of 
their arguments, they may play a role in shaping policy. Some analysts will 
obviously carry more weight than others based upon their expertise or their 
ability to manipulate public opinion. 
The chess analogy which describes this perspective is of a committee of 
players representing U.S. government agencies and the executive who must 
achieve consensus before moving the pieces as in Model III, but who in 
addition are receiving loud, often conflicting information from a grandstand 
full of spectators, obviously interested in the game, but not responsible for its 
outcome. This analogy best explains the possible impact upon 
counterproliferation policy-making of the plethora of opinions being tendered 
from the NGO community. Like a noisy crowd at a sporting event, this 
207 These include NGOs and individuals which concentrate on the 
disarmament issue, as well as those which address the broader spectrum of 
environmentalism and world peace. 
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gallery of proliferation connoisseurs will produce a high level of general 
noise, with occasionally coherent shouts from individuals or a group.  These 
shouts may ultimately influence the game, but they also might be ignored in 
favor of the existing game plan. Each player must weigh a suggestion and 
criticism before he acts to determine whether or not it will have an impact on 
his next move. NGO analysts contribute an important input to the debate 
because they discuss issues which government officials must consider, but are 
sometimes reluctant to acknowledge. 
B. INTERAGENCY TENSIONS 
1. The Bureaucratic Response to the President's Call: 
In his address to the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1993, 
President Clinton articulated three major principles that would guide his 
administration's nonproliferation and export control policy: 
(1) making nonproliferation "an integral element of our relations with 
other countries," 
(2) to expand "trade and technology exchange with nations .. . that 
abide by global nonproliferation norms," and 
(3) to "build a new consensus ... to promote effective nonproliferation 
efforts and to integrate our nonproliferation and economic goals."208 
208 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet - 
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy (27 September 1993), 1. In the actual 
speech, reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, the president stated that "one of our 
most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction," but his subsequent comments indicated that he would do this by 
controlling fissile materials, ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
strengthening the Convention of Biological Weapons, and codifying the Missile 
Technology Control Regime into "a set of rules that can command universal 
adherence." This speech seems to have been heavily influenced by ACDA, because 
of its emphasis on the whole spectrum of current diplomatic arms control and 
disarmament issues. 
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He also stated that his administration would "give proliferation a higher 
profile in our intelligence collection and analysis, and defense planning."209 
The President reiterated his commitment to WMD nonproliferation treaties 
and agreements, but he did not declare any new missions or otherwise change 
the focus of any government organization.  Joseph Pilat noted that the 
vagueness of this announcement "may be a result of the serious interagency 
infighting now occurring over counterproliferation."2io Carter's staff was at 
that time newly formed, and was only just beginning its work. The speech 
may also have been the cause of some of the infighting, since it was made 
more than two months before Aspin announced the CPI. 
If the president intended for the Defense Department to move out with 
a new mission, he could have pointed the way by publicly outlining specific 
objectives.  This would have removed much of the confusion and would 
have prevented much of the bureaucratic infighting.  Merely sharpening the 
focus of the Department of Defense's efforts on the WMD threat, and 
expanding its resources to update and improve its capabilities might have 
accomplished the same thing without creating the controversy of a new 
mission. 
Aspin's CPI announcement seems to have caught the government 
arms control community by surprise.  The ensuing confusion over definitions 
and turf gives the appearance that prior dialogue with the State Department 
and ACDA was ineffective. The new military mission appeared to be in direct 
competition with the diplomatic approach, and precipitated a behind the 
scenes bureaucratic turf battle over its compatibility with existing treaties and 
agreements. Aspin's disclaimers that the new mission would not replace 
diplomacy and would not lessen nonproliferation efforts were not altogether 
209 Ibid, 4. 
210 Pilat, 1. 
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convincing, and implied a possible conflict of interests. When a policy 
initiative cuts across cabinet boundaries, as it clearly did in this case, the least 
controversial approach is for the president or his national security advisor to 
announce it. This approach would clarify that it is the president's initiative, 
and not that of one of the competing bureaucracies.   The CPI clearly had the 
label "defense," and thus it was destined to create bureaucratic tension, 
particularly because its critics inferred that the use of force might replace 
diplomacy. 
2. Interagency Bureaucratic Tensions: 
When Aspin announced the CPI, he said that "President Clinton not 
only recognized the danger of the new threat, he gave us this new mission to 
cope with it."2ii But the five points Aspin announced, and the spectrum of 
new proliferation response options they created were not clearly understood 
within the competing agencies. If they had been, there would have been little 
need for Daniel Poneman's well-known memorandum explaining the 
difference between counterproliferation and nonproliferation.  The 
counterproliferation debate became unnecessarily "complicated by divergent 
bureaucratic interests and the absence of a widely accepted definition of the 
term."2i2 Policy initiatives should help clarify what an administration wants 
to do, not create additional confusion within its own ranks. The CPI seems to 
have backfired in this regard. The fact that there has been little direct 
evidence of this tension in government documents or speeches by key officials 
speaks well of the American system of political discourse, the relative 
efficiency of U.S. government bureaucracy, and the discretion of key officials 
and their staffs. But the tension is clearly evident among secondary sources, 
including working level officials and the private analysts who regularly 
211 Aspin, 1. 
212 Pilat,3. 
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interact with them. 
Aspin's strong unilateral approach created new tensions between 
inherently competitive bureaucracies, particularly between Defense, State, and 
ACDA.  The impression that the Defense Department was encroaching on 
diplomatic turf was furthered by the inability of Defense Department officials 
at both the senior and working levels to clarify what they intended.213 Carter 
even admitted in his April 1994 testimony to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, that "frankly, I don't think we have done a very good job of 
explaining what we mean by counterproliferation."2i4 These bureaucracies all 
have long traditions of independence, assertiveness, and rivalry. The 
individual egos of both senior and working level officials also play a part as in 
any contest between organizations. Those experienced in the staff 
environment of a government or corporate organization understand the 
contempt with which a rival staff is occasionally held when they do not 
appear to be well organized, or are advancing a contrary position. Carter's 
office initially faltered on both accounts, and the result was bureaucratic 
tension which has only just now faded with time, clarification, and 
experience. 
Counterproliferation must not envelop nonproliferation.215 The long 
213 This perception is a synthesis based on office interviews with various 
working level officials and private analysts. A primary cause of this tension was 
that the working level officials under Ashton Carter had little prior experience with 
WMD proliferation.  They were proven analysts from other areas of the Department 
of Defense, but initial confusion was inevitable. After the first year, the Carter's staff 
had developed effective working relations with their counterparts at State and 
ACDA, and had gained an in depth knowledge of WMD proliferation issues. 
214 Carter, 2. 
215 Davis, 6. Zachary Davis raised the balance question this way: "would 
(counterproliferation) be expansive and essentially absorb nonproliferation, or 
would it be limited to improving the uniquely military aspects of nonproliferation 
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tradition of American bureaucracy and of constitutional checks and balances 
contributes to maintaining the status quo. This is one of the great hallmarks 
of the U.S. government. New initiatives sponsored by one bureaucracy are 
always weighed in the balance by others. Rapid shifts in policy are thus 
generally avoided. The CPI fits this pattern also. Although it produced lively 
debate and fears of irresponsible behavior, it has not actually produced a 
radical new direction or behavior within the Department of Defense. The 
most significant outward manifestation of the CPI across the various 
departments and agencies interested in WMD proliferation turned out to be 
the flurry of activity to conduct studies, publish reports, and stake out a 
budget. The reports have been helpful in better understanding the CPI's 
strengths and limitations. 
3. Tensions Within the Department of Defense: 
The CPI also created some tensions within the Department of Defense. 
One of these involved the U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM's) Silver 
Book initiative. STRATCOM proposed to use its unique strategic intelligence 
and targeting expertise to develop regional WMD target plans.   According to 
an unclassified official source, the plans included 
a compilation of planning assumptions, tasks, policies, targets and 
strike options with regard to countries, organizations or groups posing 
a significant proliferation threat.. . and would include several military 
options for the president and Secretary of Defense to exercise if they 
deemed a response necessary.216 
The set of targets for each region would comprise a "Silver Book'' to support a 
policy?" In reality, the answer is shaping up somewhere between these two 
extremes. Counterproperation's advocates stress that it reinforces traditional 
nonproliferation measures.  NSC management of proliferation responses should 
prevent counterproliferation from displacing nonproliferation. 
216
 U.S. Strategic Command, Command Briefing. (June 1994), 77. This 
briefing was unclassified and widely distributed. 
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regional CINC.   The concept received international attention when it was 
reported in Tane's Defense Weekly. The article reveals that "the regional 
CINCs are cautious about the plan and concerned it infringes on their own 
intelligence and targeting capabilities," though it did not divulge specific 
sources.217 The article also says that critics claim that the Silver Book concept 
is of questionable value because STRATCOM's plans may not contain the 
proper "implementation and deconfliction plans" that a regional CINC would 
require in order to properly conduct operations in his theater.218 They argue 
that the regional CINCs know their own targeting requirements best. The 
Silver Book issue outlines a bureaucratic tension between a supporting CINC 
(STRATCOM) and a supported CINC (regional) that is not untypical of joint 
military operations. It is likely that as counterproliferation policy is further 
developed, that similar bureaucratic conflicts will emerge over the roles and 
functions of the CINCs and various subordinate commands.  These tensions 
are characteristically minor, and are generally resolved through discussion 
and compromise. 
The potential for rivalry between STRATCOM, which has arguably the 
world's most capable targeting cell, and the regional CINCs is high. With the 
declining number of nuclear warheads, STRATCOM's targeting operation 
may be a vulnerable target for budget cutters. The Silver Book project appears 
to be a bureaucratic response to help justify STRATCOM's retention of a 
robust targeting capability amid the reality of fiscal constraints. It suggests that 
STRATCOM views itself as the premier targeting cell, and that it should 
therefore assume the WMD targeting role in support of the regional CINCs. 
For their own bureaucratic reasons, the staffs of each of the regional CINCs 
217 Barbara Starr, "STRATCOM Sees New Role in WMD Targeting," Jane's 
Defense Weekly, vol. 22, no. 28 (14 January 1995), 3. 
218 Ibid. 
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feel compelled to protect their own organizations.   Each regional CINC would 
be understandably cool to a STRATCOM proposal to take over targeting issues 
in his theater. The Silver Book label was recently changed to Theater 
Planning Support Document, probably to emphasize STRATCOM's support 
role for the regional CINCs and to defuze the perception of encroachment. 
This tension is a natural outgrowth of the joint warfare process. 
The adequacy of intelligence support for counterproliferation may 
become a source of tension among the intelligence community, commanders, 
and planners. There is nothing in the official open source literature to suggest 
that it is currently a problem, but it has been a typical problem in past military 
operations.  Many outside of the defense community have questioned 
whether present or future intelligence capabilities will be able to provide the 
precise targeting data needed to conduct counterproliferation air strikes or 
commando raids. After the 1981 Israeli air strike on the Osiraq reactor, the 
Iraqi nuclear weapons program was dispersed and duplicated. The focus was 
also changed from plutonium production to uranium enrichment, which 
allowed further decentralization from a single site production reactor. Many 
of these facilities were not identified by Coalition intelligence until after the 
1991 Gulf War.219 North Korea with its maze of tunnels poses a similarly 
formidable intelligence target. 
Even though counterproliferation intelligence collection may only 
have to focus on a few target countries, identifying WMD production and 
storage facilities may prove difficult, if not impossible. There will never be a 
guarantee that intelligence can locate all of the weapons or facilities. 
Accordingly, the Osiraq strike may well be a unique event unlikely ever to be 
repeated. As Cohen aptly puts it, "even overwhelming air power cannot 
219 Cohen, 92-93. He also notes that Israeli intelligence had failed to identify 
many of these new facilities. The Iraqis had, in Cohen's words, learned from Osiraq 
and "immunized" their program from future precision strikes. 
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destroy what it cannot find."220 This tension will be a part of the planning 
process each time military options are considered. It is a useful tension which 
can serve to keep planning honest and realistic, by pointing out the limits of 
intelligence. 
There is a strong desire to avoid the appearance that the CPI is another 
program out of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) mold. The primary 
concern is that like the SDI, the CPI could become a major technology 
acquisition program "outside of normal acquisition channels."22i The SDI 
was criticized because of the unorthodox way in which it spent large sums of 
money. 
Unlike SDI, the CPI has been criticized not over fiscal matters, but over 
policy, because of the confusion created when it was not clearly defined or 
explained.222 This confusion has died away over time, particularly as Carter's 
staff acquired greater proficiency in dealing with WMD proliferation issues, 
and the definition of counterproliferation defaulted to the concept of 
additional responses to proliferation when nonproliferation efforts are 
exhausted. There is presently little interdepartmental or interagency criticism 
of the CPI. Also, unlike the SDI, counterproliferation projects do not yet draw 
budget dollars away from other capabilities the services would rather have. 
The Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program, a first generation 
counterproliferation capability, enjoys broad support from the services and in 
the Congress. The services and Congress also clearly see the value of 
220 ibid, 96. 
221 Pilat,!. 
222 ibid. Although he does not identify who is involved, Pilat claims that 
there is "a desire by the services and by some officials to avoid another strategic 
defense initiative, i.e., a major technology program undertaken outside of normal 
acquisition channels, which also serves as a lightening rod for criticism . . ." 
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improved passive defense measures, intelligence capabilities, and multilateral 
cooperation in counterproliferation. Thus far, this tension has been managed 
well, although there is a potential for sticker shock when the price tag for new 
technologies is known. 
4. NSC Management Reduces Tensions: 
The NSC hierarchy for managing the full spectrum of proliferation 
responses as formalized in the Deutch Report helps reduce bureaucratic 
tensions.  Tasking originates in the NSC principals and working level 
committees, and is disseminated to the proper agency for action. This process 
legitimizes tasking, helps minimize interagency bickering, and allows the 
NSC to be the conduit of the president's authority in defining the national 
interest and security policy. The NSC is ultimately the arbiter of the delicate 
balance between nonproliferation and counterproliferation, and the crucial 
link from both sides of proliferation policy back to the president. Clarification 
of the NSC's role as the manager over all counterproliferation and 
nonproliferation issues was a very positive step towards defusing interagency 
tension. 
C INTERGOVERNMENTAL TENSIONS 
1. The Defense Department as a Unitary Actor: 
The CPI is championed by two advocates, each of whom presents a 
united front approximating the behavior of a unitary actor. Ashton Carter 
and Mitchell Wallerstein thus far are the two Clinton Administration officials 
who speak openly about the CPI and who use the term "counterproliferation." 
It is unclear whether the term is reserved solely for their use by an executive 
order or other policy directive, or whether they are the mantle bearers by 
default because higher officials have distanced themselves from it. Which 
ever the case, they have staked ownership of both the term and the broader 
issue with no visible opposition. Their office is the single point of contact for 
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international dialogue on the subject. 
2. Official Foreign Perspectives: 
Foreign governments have been remarkably reserved in their response 
to the CPL This is not completely unanticipated, since governments tend to be 
cautious in their handling of controversial foreign policy issues. It is also 
likely that some government-to-government exchanges on this issue will be 
in the forum of closely guarded exchanges between ambassadors and key 
officials, and are likely never to be aired in public. There are several other 
possible explanations as well. 
One possibility is that many states, particularly the developing states 
and those belonging to the Non-aligned Movement, simply do not have the 
resources to focus on more than one or two WMD proliferation issues at a 
time.  States in this position will work on the issues of most immediate 
concern to their national interests.  Until now, many have been riveted on the 
NPT extension process. Others are interested in nuclear weapons free zone 
negotiations such as in Africa and the Middle East. Still others are more 
interested in easing export controls and clarifying dual-use technology issues. 
Few probably took more than a passing notice, if any at all, of an initiative 
designed to target the few states that might be likely to break their NPT 
obligations. Harald Müller summarized the non-reaction of most states 
declaring that he is "not sure whether the counterproliferation concept and its 
corollaries have been noticed beyond the rather narrow group of specialists - 
mainly from the West - and expert government officials involved in NATO 
discussions."223 Although there was significant latitude for developing states 
to allege that the CPI was part of the discriminatory regime of the nuclear 
states over the non-nuclear states, this issue has not been raised officially. It is 
particularly interesting that the issue has not inflamed a North-South debate, 
223  Müller, 28. 
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except among a handful of private political analysts.224 
Some states greeted the CPI with what appeared to be a "wait and see" 
attitude. Japan and South Korea, for example, while being very much 
concerned about the implications of the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program, appear to have neither welcomed nor condemned it. There has 
been little said in public by either officials or private citizens. Most likely, this 
is because they are understandably unwilling to provoke North Korea.225 in 
Japan, it may also be a reflection of reluctance to be mired in controversial 
foreign politico-military issues while they struggle with the stability of their 
own government and economic recession.  Another key ally, Australia, has 
also been notably quiet.   Australia is less directly threatened by nuclear 
weapons and is part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The CPI might 
upstage its own initiatives in chemical and biological nonproliferation, so its 
has much to gain by waiting to see what develops from the CPI, while 
continuing its own efforts. 
Some U.S. allies welcomed the initiative, but are not comfortable with 
either the vagueness with which it was presented, are reluctant to 
wholeheartedly follow U.S. leadership, or are merely interested in studying 
the issue further. This appears to be the case among the NATO allies. The 
Declaration of the Heads of State and Government following the 10-11 
January 1994 NATO Summit cautiously stated that "we have decided to 
224 There have been no official allegations of North-South discriminations 
from developing or non-aligned states. 
225 See Seongwhun Cheon, "A South Korean View of the U.S. 
Counterproliferation Initiative," in Reiss and Müller, International Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. 110 -112.   Cheon states that "the South Korean government 
and public have expressed consistent opposition to any measure that might increase 
tensions on the Korean peninsula." He also notes that the vast majority of the 
Korean population opposed an April 1991 statement made by South Korean Defense 
Minister, Lee Jong-ku, that the North's suspicious Yongbyon nuclear complex 
should be struck by a commando raid. 
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intensify and expand NATO's political and defense efforts against 
proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other 
international fora and institutions."226 it also called for "work to begin 
immediately ... to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and 
how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it."227 These two 
sentences are the only commentary on counterproliferation contained in the 
summit declaration, although it was one of three primary summit issues 
presented by the United States.228 ft is typical of NATO's caution that the 
statement mentioned only political and defensive efforts and the need to 
protect against proliferation. The term counterproliferation was not used, 
specific mention of the U.S. CPI was avoided, and none of its five points were 
addressed. 
NATO appears to be content to study the issue methodically under the 
auspices of its Defense Group on Proliferation. This in the end works to the 
advantage of all by creating a broad consensus in a forum of sixteen coequal 
partners, each of whom will consider the CPI from its own unitary perspective 
as it considers its own national interests. It is also helpful to remember that 
key allies have not always viewed proliferation with the same urgency as the 
United States.  Disagreements over export controls and control of dual-use 
226 NATO Press Communique M-l (94)3, Declaration of the Heads of State 
and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels (11 January 1994), 6, para 17. 
227 rbid. 
228 ibid. The other two issues were the Partnership for Peace program which 
dominated the summit, and the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces. The 
statement contained an additional paragraph calling for the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the NPT, and for the implementation of the 
Convention on Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, a 
universal Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and ensuring the integrity of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. 
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technologies are clear evidence that the allies are slow to develop consensus 
on proliferation issues.  From an international relations theory perspective, 
NATO allies have the luxury of "free riding" on the U.S. initiative, while 
maintaining cautious or ambivalent stances in the public forum. 
NATO progress on counterproliferation can be expected to proceed 
slowly. The formation of the NATO DGP and its study of counterproliferation 
issues is, as Mitchell Wallerstein states, "the first step of many that will be 
necessary."229 it is auspicious that the late NATO Secretary General, Manfred 
Wörner, stated after Aspin's December 1993 briefing to NATO's Defence 
Planning Committee (comprising the defense ministers of NATO member 
countries) that it was NATO's duty to prevent rogue or terrorist states from 
obtaining WMD.230 One year later, Wörner's successor, Willy Claes, 
cautiously reported that "NATO has adopted a policy framework which sets 
the stage for its consideration of political and defense-related steps if 
nonproliferation efforts fail. A task of the Alliance is the further active 
development of this initiative now under study."231 NATO can be expected 
to make further progress, but at a cautious pace to ensure a thorough study of 
229 Wallerstein, 20. An important parallel may be drawn by looking at 
NATO's response to President Kennedy's doctrine of "flexible response," the 
strategic doctrine which evolved once mutually assured destruction became a 
reality. Under this doctrine, Kennedy launched a build-up of conventional and 
special operations forces so that U.S. capabilities would not be limited to an 
overwhelming nuclear response. It took six years for NATO to finally adopt the 
doctrine for its own use, as documented in Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's 
Doctrinal Dilemma," Orbis, vol. 19, no. 3 (Summer 1975), 462. 
230 Barbara Starr, "NATO Ministers Back Aspin on Proliferation," Jane's 
Defence Weekly, vol. 20, no. 25 (18 December 1993), 7. 
231 willy Claes, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security 
Architecture," NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 1995), 7. 
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the issues in order to reach a broad consensus.232 It remains to be seen, 
however, if NATO will ultimately adopt the offensive aspect of 
counterproliferation, the most controversial part. 
Two of the strongest U.S. allies have welcomed the initiative with 
considerable enthusiasm.   One week after the January 1994 NATO Summit 
while presenting a statement on "UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role 
For Nuclear Weapons?" the British Defense Minister gave his approval for 
the CPI. He said that "the American administration has made countering 
proliferation a major policy priority. We warmly welcome this, and we are 
looking forward to discussions with our NATO allies on this important 
subject over the coming months."233 The French Defense White Paper - Livre 
Blanc sur La Defense 1994 - issued in March 1994 devoted six pages to the need 
to improve deterrence against WMD. It calls for a new strategy using 
conventional military capabilities emphasizing action, prevention, and 
protection of military forces from WMD.234 France also showed its 
enthusiasm and staked its claim in counterproliferation by insisting that it 
provide the first European co-chairman of the NATO DGP. This move also 
helped NATO solidify counterproliferation as a political issue, and not just a 
232 An article dealing with the DGP's study appeared in the June 1994 edition 
of NATO Review, The words "assess, consult, and examine" were prominent. The 
article did not embrace the full scope of the CPI, but emphasized only diplomacy, 
discouraging use of WMD, and protecting territory, populations, and forces. There 
was no admission that current NATO military capabilities, including intelligence 
might be inadequate for the task. See "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction," NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 3 (June 1994), 28-29. 
233 Statement of the UK Minister of Defence, "UK Defense Strategy: A 
Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?" (18 January 1994), chapter 45. 
234 French Ministry of Defense, Livre Blanc Sur La Defense 1994, 77. 
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military one.235  British and French interest in counterproliferation gives the 
concept far greater legitimacy not only within NATO, but also within the 
broader international forum.236 Consensus building with these and other 
allies helps reduce government-to-government tensions. 
NATO members have historically exercised great discretion when 
debating issues. In a rare public display of potential allied tensions over 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation, German Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel issued his Ten Point Nonproliferation Initiative on 15 December 1993, 
eight days after Aspin announced the CPI. Based on the timing of its release 
and its content, it seems clear that it was intended to counter or at least to 
balance the CPI. The final point appears to be a direct slap at any U.S. 
intention to conduct counterproliferation unilaterally.  It says that 
Military enforcement measures against proliferators, pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can only be conceived of as 
ultima ratio in case of a threat to international security and peace. 
Military measures necessitate - except in the case of defense 
against armed attack - always the legitimization by the UN 
235 France does not participate in the NATO Military Committee. French 
involvement in counterproliferation necessitates that it be conducted on the 
political side of NATO. This rendering of counterproliferation as a political issue 
parallels the U.S. Department of Defense assertion that it is a set of additional 
response options subordinate to diplomacy.  By placing counterproliferation under 
its political structure rather than under its military structure, NATO avoids the 
perception of a conflict of interest inherent in the U.S. Defense Department's 
management of the CPI as a competitor to diplomatic means. 
236 in contrast to the normal criticism that the CPI was too vague, and did 
not provide clear definition, Virginia S. I. Gamba believes that the lack of 
definitions "seemed to have worked as a stimulant rather than a hindrance . . . (and) 
that months before the U.S. administration had a firm idea of what its own 
initiative meant and what it entailed, major NATO partners were already busily 
interpreting Aspin's words on counterproliferation."  See Virginia S. I. Gamba, 
"Counterproliferation:  Harmony or Contradiction?" in Reiss and Müller, 
International Perspectives on Counterproliferation. 58. 
110 
Security Council.237 
Harald Müller notes that prior to the January 1994 NATO Summit, various 
Europeans insisted that NATO deal not only with the military ramifications 
of counterproliferation, but the political ones as well. A compromise was 
reached in which two committees were formed. One, the DGP was to explore 
the military issues of counterproliferation under the leadership of Carter 
(United States) and Mallet (France). A second committee was formed to 
examine the political issues chaired by NATO Deputy Secretary General Von 
Moltke of Germany.238 
The decision paper produced at the follow-on NATO Summit in June 
1994 at Istanbul emphasized the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime, and 
discussed how NATO could better support traditional nonproliferation policy. 
It paid only fleeting attention to counterproliferation, calling for a threat 
assessment (completed in December 1994), a study on the implications for 
defense planning and capabilities, improvements in NATO defensive 
capabilities to protect territory from the threat of WMD, and for possible 
diplomatic efforts making use of its defense posture to prevent or rollback 
proliferation. Müller says that the document reads "much like a European 
victory," but this view does not take into account NATO's traditionally 
cautious approach to new policies and doctrines.239 To the contrary, the 
Department of Defense views NATO progress on counterproliferation to date 
as a very encouraging trend. Although there is some tension evident between 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation in the NATO sphere, this tension 
237 Müller, 29-30 and n.9, attributed to FRG Foreign Office, "Deutsche 10- 
Punkte-Erklärung zur NichtverbreitungspoHtik" (Bonn:  15 December 1993), 4. 
238 ibid, 30. 
239 ibid. 
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does not appear to be harmful, and appears to be producing a healthy debate 
which will probably eventually lead to greater consensus as it has so often in 
the past. 
D. STATE-SOCIETAL TENSIONS - THE NON-GOVERNMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Non-government Organizations and Public Opinion: 
The opinions of non-government organizations (NGOs) are an 
important part of the counterproliferation debate. Although the general 
public is largely uninformed and unaware of the CPI and evolving 
counterproliferation policy, the more narrowly defined "informed public," 
including private analysts and researchers, and environmental and 
disarmament groups, has a loud voice on the issue which can not be ignored. 
I liken this voice to that of a crowd at a sporting event, or for the sake of 
Allison's chess allegories, to a crowd anticipating and responding to moves by 
chess masters. They can not themselves affect the game by moving the pieces, 
but they may occasionally through their cheering or disapproval influence the 
next move. Often, however, the crowd merely produces noise of little 
consequence to the game. 
Freed of the constraints of government protocol, NGOs and private 
analysts have been far more vocal and are more broadly published than 
government officials.  They have become the conduit through which many 
tensions reach the public forum. The NGO input is important to consider, 
particularly with regard to the fundamental tensions between the very natures 
of counterproliferation and nonproliferation, as well as the tensions which 
surround the possible use of force. These tensions are largely scenario driven, 
and will in all likelihood have to be dealt with if and when military force is 
used. Therefore, they must be considered in the contingency planning 
process. 
112 
2. Tensions Between Counterproliferation and Nonproliferation: 
The NGO community has articulated many tensions which exist 
directly between the concepts of counterproliferation and nonproliferation. 
Some of these tensions have no doubt surfaced as interagency tensions and 
intergovernmental tensions as well, but only the NGOs have stated them in 
the public fora of the news media, journals, books, and speeches. These 
tensions are all operative regardless of where government officials take their 
stands. Many of these tensions hinge upon varying interpretations of 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation principles.  They can not be ignored 
The most apparent tension is the fear that the United States or a U.S.- 
led Coalition will undermine the nonproliferation regime by substituting 
counterproliferation for nonproliferation whenever it sees fit to do so, 
without concern for broader international consensus.  Brazilian Paulo Wrobel 
cautions that it took both time and persuasion to develop this consensus. He 
claims that the ongoing success of nonproliferation requires the continuing 
harmonization of many competing interests, and the willingness of each state 
involved to give up some of its national autonomy in decision-making.   Since 
counterproliferation is a unilateral U.S. national policy, it carries with it a 
high risk of disrupting this multilateral harmony, which may have a 
devastating effect on the regime's further development.240 
Another aspect of this tension has been developed by David 
Mussington, a Canadian analyst, who says that counterproliferation implies 
that the United States will address proliferation problems based on a country's 
technical capabilities rather than its legal status relative to the 
nonproliferation regime.  This would further imply that United States 
participation in the nonproliferation regime from a strictly legal sense might 
be conditional with the option of substituting counterproliferation when it 
240 Wrobel, 47-49. 
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saw fit.24i   Zachary Davis adds a further element to this tension by asserting 
that "even those countries that would welcome the elimination of WMD 
threats may balk at having the United States act as self-appointed 'judge, jury, 
and executioner/ " implying that if the United States makes the judgment call 
unilaterally that nonproliferation has failed, it risks harming the consensus of 
the nonproliferation regime.242 After all, it may be logical to infer that since 
the regime operates on consensus, then consensus should also determine 
when the regime has failed. 
On the other side of this tension, it may be difficult to achieve broad 
consensus on national, regional, and global security issues. Aspin himself 
said that the U.S. would seek to develop counterproliferation along with its 
allies, but he never said that it should become the tool of the UN Security 
Council, regional collective defense regimes, or other international security 
forum.243 in a broader context, President Clinton recently stated that "when 
our national security interests are threatened, we will act with others when 
we can, but alone if we must. We will use diplomacy when we can, but force 
if we must."244 it can and should be inferred that the president intends to 
apply this logic to the spectrum of security issues, including 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation, making it possible that the United 
241 David Mussington, "The Shape of U.S. Counterproliferation Policy," in 
Mutimer, David, ed. Control But Verify (York, Canada: Center for International and 
Strategic Studies, 1994), 127-128. 
242 Davis, 17. 
243 Aspin, 2-3. 
244 Bill Clinton, "We Must Secure Peace:  A Struggle Between Freedom and 
Tyranny," delivered before the 49th Session of the UN General Assembly, New 
York, 26 September 1994, as quoted in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 61, no. 1 (15 
October 1994), 2-5. 
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States reserves for itself the option to decide when to act without consensus, 
and whether it does so unilaterally or in concert with close allies. The 
ambiguity of this position forces a regional adversary state to carefully weigh 
the consequences of acquiring, possessing, and threatening the use of WMD. 
It may not be able to enjoy the privilege of a presumption of innocence merely 
because its affairs appear to be in order with the IAEA. 
A related tension is found in the notion that by embracing 
counterproliferation, the United States is sending a signal that it no longer has 
confidence in the nonproliferation regime just at the time that it is having its 
greatest effectiveness. Brahma Chellaney, an Indian, asserts that the Defense 
Department is effectively telling the world that the United States cannot rely 
upon the nonproliferation regime to protect its national security interests.245 
The implication is that other countries will also decide that they cannot rely 
upon it either. This could produce a chain reaction of degraded confidence in 
the regime which would damage the consensus. 
On the other side of this tension, is the belief shared by a growing 
number of staunch nonproliferation advocates that there may be no option 
but to rely upon counterproliferation advocates. For example, Leonard 
Spector has recently suggested that the only way to ensure that North Korea 
negotiates in good faith toward implementing the Agreed Framework is for 
the United States to "carry a bigger stick," in the form of being prepared to 
strike the Yongbyon plutonium reprocessing plant in the event that talks fail 
and the North unfreezes its nuclear program.246 Specter's perspective 
245 Brahma Chellaney, "International Implications of the U.S. 
Counterproliferation Initiative:  A View From India," in eds. Reiss and Müller, 
International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, 121. 
246 Leonard S. Spector, "Dealing With North Korea: Speak Softly and Carry a 
Bigger Stick," in William H. Lewis and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Weapons of Mass 
Destruction:  New Perspectives on Proliferation (Washington, D.C.:  National 
Defense University Press, 1995), 116. 
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embraces the reality that nonproliferation efforts cannot solve certain 
aggravated cases of proliferation, particularly when the suspect state is 
patently dishonest, violates its treaty obligations, and deliberately impedes 
negotiations and safeguards inspections. This tension will likely give way to 
pragmatism among all but the staunchest idealists. 
There is a strong tension between counterproliferation and 
nonproliferation because of the stark difference in the operative principles 
undergirding each.  The nonproliferation regime relies upon a spirit of 
community, volunteerism, and cooperation.247 it assumes that its parties are 
in conformity with the regime unless proven otherwise by IAEA inspections. 
It operates based on an established set of norms and expectations, and 
engenders certain obligations towards the other members of the 
community.248 The operative principle of counterproliferation on the other 
hand is the assumption that nonproliferation has failed in a given case. This 
is antithetical to cooperation.  It assumes guilt rather than compliance. This 
tension is not necessarily bad. Zachary Davis points out that the threat of 
unilateral American military action could actually render such an action 
unnecessary.  It could galvanize the international community to adopt stricter 
measures other than force, including economic sanctions. It might also 
motivate a multinational coalition to mount its own military operation 
instead.249 
247
 The NPT, NWFZs, and security assurances rely upon the trust and 
cooperation of all parties involved, including both the nuclear weapons states and 
the nonnuclear weapons states. Export controls, however, rely upon the 
cooperation of the technically advanced states with the aim of preventing the spread 
of nuclear materials and technologies to states which don't yet have them unless 
they provide adequate assurances of peaceful use. 
248 Müller, 26. 
249 Davis, 17-18. 
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Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated that "the threat of 
military force should be sufficient to obviate the need to use it if the right 
military and political conditions are met, (and that) the threat will be 
maximally effective when political conditions permit the military force to be a 
broadly based coalition."250 perry envisions that the threat of unilateral U.S. 
military action might in the end help to build consensus for a broadly 
supported military action under the aegis of the United Nations. This tension 
could therefore end up being a positive force if the possibility of unilateral 
U.S. military action is always kept open. 
Many analysts fear that traditional U.S. leadership in nonproliferation 
issues may be compromised by counterproliferation. Harald Müller, who is 
uncomfortable with the possibility that counterproliferation will be a 
unilateral affair, asserts that there is a clear distinction between leadership, 
imposing new rules, and blatant disregard for the nonproliferation 
community's views.25i He argues that when a state makes policy decisions or 
undertakes an initiative concerning the substance of the nonproliferation 
regime, it should only be done with consideration of the views and interests 
of the whole community.252 By his reasoning, the United States must remain 
consistent with its historical leadership role in establishing the consensus 
upon which the regime was built. 
Benjamin Sanders believes that unless counterproliferation receives 
the cooperation of other nations, it cannot succeed as a primary policy tool to 
protect U.S. interests, and that without such support it will be "more likely to 
250 William J. Perry, "Military Action: When to Use It and How to Ensure Its 
Effectiveness," in Janne E. Nolan, ed., Global Engagement (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1994), 236. 
251 Müller, 27. 
252 Ibid, 26. 
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harm the purposes of the United States than to meet them "253 By his view 
U.S. leadership in nonproliferation would be seriously called into question if 
it acted unilaterally in counterproliferation. In reality consensus is often hard 
to come by, as is illustrated by China's steadfast refusal to support UN Security 
Council sanctions against North Korea for its refusal to comply with its 
safeguards obligations under the NPT. Counterproliferation, although a 
unilateral approach being developed under U.S. leadership, offers the 
possibility of driving a wayward state back to the diplomatic process by posing 
the possibility of punishment for willful nonproliferation violations.   Müller 
and Sanders offer no alternative solutions to this problem. It seems that they 
would allow nonproliferation to be held hostage by a rogue state, rather than 
take action. 
Leadership in the international arena is not static. Like conning a large 
ship in a narrow passage, it demands more than just the will to stay the course 
on nonproliferation. It must also entail the ability to discern when course 
corrections are required. Counterproliferation is such a correction. It may be 
needed only occasionally, but someone will have to exercise judgment and 
make the decision to use it. Lewis Dunn concedes that counterproliferation 
may prove operationally difficult, technically complex, costly, and in some 
instances not fully feasible. But he asserts that blind adherence to 
nonproliferation alone, something he calls "nonproliferation traditionalism," 
will not be sufficient to face future challenges.254 Since counterproliferation 
may not solve all future proliferation challenges, he calls for more "out of the 
box" thinking about additional initiatives. 
Nonproliferation traditionalism suffers from several debilitating 
253 Sanders, 9. 
254 Lewis A. Dunn, "Proliferation Prevention:  Beyond Traditionalism," in 
eds. Lewis and Johnson, Weapons of Mass Destruction. 27. 
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weaknesses: (1) its inability "to take advantage of potential synergies among 
global, regional, and national nonproliferation efforts," (2) its lack of a 
credible response to violations of nonproliferation norms and obligations, 
and (3) the lack of a viable solution to deal with countries acquiring WMD . . . 
for hegemonic purposes or to pose a direct threat to the United States.255 in 
Dunn's view, U.S. leadership beyond nonproliferation traditionalism is 
timely and necessary to correct the weaknesses of the nonproliferation regime. 
In the chaotic world system described by realist theory, U.S. leadership beyond 
nonproliferation traditionalism and the development of the self-serving 
policy of counterproliferation is a strong example of the principle of self-help. 
Future WMD proliferation threats will evoke a wide spectrum of 
opinions from various governments, rather than the broad consensus that 
would be required for effective peer pressure. This phenomenon will likely be 
seen in both counterproliferation and nonproliferation spheres, depending on 
the nature of the threat, and may also polarize the two camps.   The decision 
over which response to pursue in a given situation will always be a judgment 
call, and will always be vulnerable to being reassessed by outside critics. 
Zachary Davis notes that 
many other countries do not share the Clinton Administration's 
evaluation of the WMD threat as is evidenced by: (1) disagreements 
over export controls on dual-use technologies, (2) the inability of the 
United States to prevent the sale of nuclear reactors and other 
technologies to Iran, and (3) the debate over how to redress North 
Korea's nuclear activities.256 
Decisions to use military options will likely have to stand up to the same 
spectrum of opinions. Broad consensus may be elusive. 
Joseph Pilat points out that "unless military responses to proliferation 
255 Ibid, 51. 
256 Davis, 16. 
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are undertaken in unequivocal self-defense or are sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council, they constitute challenges to national sovereignty and raise 
questions of international law."257 But even in clear-cut cases of self-defense, 
or when action is taken under a Security Council Resolution these issues will 
still be debated, because they are part and parcel political issues, and will 
always be the subject of judgment calls and political debates. Consensus will 
often be difficult to come by, will be valuable when achieved, but must not be 
a handicap to taking action, especially if the stakes are national survival. 
Although it would be desirable, it seems unrealistic to require international 
consensus as a prerequisite to taking action in every conceivable case.258 it 
often takes years to develop such a consensus, and the luxury to develop such 
a consensus when national security interests are threatened may not be 
available in every situation. 
A final tension to consider is that counterproliferation and 
nonproliferation may work at cross purposes even if military force is never 
actually used. The fear of preventive military strikes will probably lead a 
country which acquires WMD to disperse and hide them as well as the 
production infrastructure, just as in the cases of Iraq and North Korea. The 
resulting loss of transparency and greater difficulty in collecting intelligence 
works against the purposes of the nonproliferation regime and IAEA 
inspections.  But even more importantly, dispersion of the weapons 
themselves compounds the difficulties of command and control, creating a 
greater risk of a loss of control to domestic opponents in a civil crisis, and a 
257 Pilat,9. 
258
 See Perry, 235 - 241, which presents the advantages of conducting military 
action under the broad consensus of cooperative security.   As has already been 
pointed out, President Clinton is quite candid and pragmatic on this issue, and has 
clearly established that such consensus is desirable but not a prerequisite for U.S. 
military action.  Clinton, 2-5. 
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greater risk of unauthorized use during times of crisis.259  This tension is 
likely to be unmitigated, regardless of how counterproliferation policy 
evolves. 
3. Other Related Tensions: 
Occasionally public opinion may be mobilized around a certain issue to 
shape a political outcome, but thus far counterproliferation has evoked little 
interest, let alone subject recognition among the general public.  Michele 
Flournoy notes that 
public opinion is, however, neither static nor impervious to 
persuasion, (and that) U.S. policymakers must therefore consider 
not only where public opinion stands on a particular case of 
proliferation, but also the extent to which it can be led to support 
a new U.S. military posture.260 
In some cases of WMD proliferation the public may not see its interests 
threatened, and will be unlikely to support, or at least be ambivalent towards, 
the use of force. As in all past military endeavors a portion of the public can 
be expected to protest vigorously, and to lobby heavily for restraint. Concerns 
over retaliation, accidental detonation of WMD, and environmental 
contamination are likely to temper public enthusiasm for 
counterproliferation in some cases, but in the presence of a clear and present 
danger, particularly if there is international and domestic political consensus, 
the public will likely be supportive. Public opinion often hinges upon how 
effective the case can be made via the media. A convincing case will likely 
carry the public, but one that is less than convincing could provoke its ire and 
condemnation. 
259 Dunn, "New Nuclear Threats to U.S. Security," in Blackwill and 
Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations, 34. 
260 Flournoy, 139. 
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One frequent comment by analysts in both the United States and 
foreign countries is that the use of military force must not be allowed to 
undermine international law.  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi 
Mamedov stated at the National Defense University Topical Symposium on 
counterproliferation in November 1994 that the unilateral use of force 
"without a UN Security Council decision and only on the basis of intelligence 
data . . . does not fit in with the norms of international law."26i He also 
predicted that new high-precision weapons designed "for the implementation 
of the 'counterproliferation' idea will inevitably result in a new spiral in the 
world arms race and affect the present strategic stability."262 
Others have stated that the use of force in counterproliferation is 
permissible in self-defense as allowed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. But 
there are differing interpretations of Article 51 which provoke strong 
intergovernment tensions.    The narrow interpretation favored by some UN 
apologists such as Louis Henken "permits the use of force only in a very 
narrow and clear circumstance, in self-defense if an armed attack occurs."263 
But most governments generally assert that their own right of self-defense 
must be defined by themselves alone, and not subordinated to the UN or 
other external authority. Judge Abraham Sofaer, former Reagan 
Administration State Department legal counselor, takes the view that "the 
right of self-defense is too fundamental for leaders to allow it to be 
261 Georgi Mamedov, "Counteracting the Proliferation of WMD," Unofficial 
translation of speech delivered at the National Defense University 1994 Topical 
Symposium (16-17 November 1994), 4. 
262 rbid. 
263 Louis Henken, How Nations Behave (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 1979), 141. Henken further insists that "nothing in the history of its drafting 
suggests that the framers of the charter intended something broader than the 
language implied." 
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subordinated to any scheme of world order based on theory and wishful 
thinking, however  enlightened."264 The actual practice of most states has 
been to insist that others take the narrow view, while asserting their own 
right to take the broader view. 
The broader view of self-defense espouses the doctrine of anticipatory 
self-defense, the notion that a nation need not be required to wait for the first 
blow to fall before it acts to defend itself. This issue has long been a source of 
international debate, and is without doubt the strongest single tension which 
the CPI evokes. Although Israel's air strike on the Osiraq reactor arguably 
violated the UN charter by the narrow view of self-defense, Israel justified its 
actions based on the broader view. The strike and the Begin Doctrine which 
was articulated shortly afterward are based on the notion that in rare 
circumstances a state is justified to act in anticipation of a threat. Israel was 
universally condemned at the time, but after the Gulf War revelations of the 
extent of Iraq's nuclear program, it was to a large degree vindicated. In the 
Spring of 1992 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney effectively reversed U.S. 
condemnation of the Osiraq air strike by publicly thanking Israel, and noting 
that the strike had clearly prevented Saddam Hussein from possessing nuclear 
264 Abraham Sofaer, 'International Law and the Use of Force," The 
National Interest, no. 13 (Fall 1988), 61. See also Oscar Schachter, "Self-defense and 
the Rule of Law," The American Tournal of International Law, vol. 83, no. 2 (1989) 
259-260. Schachter develops the argument for the broader view of self-defense 
drawing from Hugo Grotius' seventeenth century legal classic De Türe Belli Ac Pads 
(Of Law in War and Peace) and Hersch Lauterpachf s mid-twentieth century treatise 
The Grotian Tradition, considered to be two of the great works on international law. 
Schachter asserts that this right can not be invoked arbitrarily or for "reasons of 
state," and offers that states which exercise this right remain accountable under 
principles of positive (man-made as opposed to natural) law to the community of 
nations. The United States has long held to what Schachter describes as "the widely 
held view that the preservation of the state has precedence over positive law and 
with the practical understanding that it must be left to each state to decide what is 
necessary for its own self-defense." 
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weapons at the time of the Kuwait invasion.265 A future coalition united in 
anticipatory self-defense would probably enjoy wide public support and avoid 
the condemnation that generally accompanies unilateral action.  The difficulty 
of developing such consensus would be in providing sufficient evidence to 
make the case, without compromising sources or the element of surprise. 
Some counterproliferation scenarios would be rendered impossible to execute 
by the need for such consensus. 
There is also the potential tension raised when striking facilities in 
wartime which are otherwise safeguarded under IAEA safeguards agreements. 
The two cases of air strikes against Iraqi reactors are useful to illustrate this 
point. Both the Israeli strike in 1981 against the unfueled Osiraq reactor, and 
the Coalition air strike in 1991 against operating reactors at nearby Al- 
Tuwaitha were carried out on safeguarded facilities. The Israeli strike was 
universally condemned, while the Coalition strike received relatively little 
criticism. Although the Coalition did not have a specific UN mandate to 
strike the Iraqi facilities, it was able to justify the strike under its broader 
mandates to liberate Kuwait and to repulse the Iraqi forces. The Coalition 
strike was also masked in the public forum by a plethora of other wartime 
activity which enjoyed broad international approval, while the Israeli strike 
stood out as a singularly illegal act. This tension can be overcome, and the 
technicality of treaty compliance can be circumvented, by building a strong 
consensus for action within the UN Security Council based on solid 
intelligence that a state is willfully violating its obligations, and refusing to 
address the issue via diplomatic means. 
265 Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., "An Exchange on Proliferation," The National 
Interest, no. 27 (Spring 1992), 108. See also Cohen, 101, note 80, which refers to 
Shlomo Nakdimon's First Strike (Hebrew revision) (Tel Aviv:  Edanim Publishers, 
1993), 381-382, which reports that Vice President Quayle and Secretary of Defense 
Cheney both openly acknowledged their gratitude to Menachem Begin for his 
decision to attack Osiraq. 
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A related tension is the concern over collateral damage and 
contamination from damaged or partially detonated weapons.  Although no 
radioactive contamination was apparently released from the Al-Tuwaitha 
facility in the 1991 strike, this was a single event which may be as attributable 
to good fortune as to deliberate planning and skillful execution.266 David 
Fischer claims that this strike broke a long-standing international taboo 
against attacking operating reactors.267 This taboo dates from the Israeli 
decision to attack the Osiraq reactor before it was fueled to avoid spreading 
radioactive contamination.268 The spread of nuclear, biological, or chemical 
contamination is at best difficult to model, considering that blast effects, 
damage, containment, and environmental factors such as wind, rain, dust, 
and temperature can not be estimated with certainty. Worst case assumptions 
will probably be most useful in counterproliferation decision-making, but will 
generally be pessimistic. This tension will not easily be mitigated, particularly 
due to past public skepticism over government claims on environmental 
issues. The only way to overcome it is to build a convincing case for using 
force on legal and moral grounds to prevent the even bigger problem of 
taking the first hit when a weapon detonates over friendly forces, cities, or 
territories. This case could be made if the public became convinced that 
reasonable diplomatic possibilities are exhausted, and the danger of WMD 
266 Fischer, Towards 1995.49. He refers to the Iraqi government's report to 
the IAEA dated 26 April 1991 which reported no release of radioactivity from the 
facility. 
267 rbid. 
268 jed Snyder, 'The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb," Middle 
East Journal, vol. 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1983), 581-585. Snyder gives a detailed analysis 
of the various factors behind the timing of the Israeli strike. See also Dan 
McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor (San Diego, California: House of Hits Publishing, 
1987), 86-93, which poses the analysis through a series of questions to the reader. 
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seems clear and present. 
There is a potential for counterproliferation to further exacerbate North- 
South tension.   Virginia S. I. Gamba claims that the CPI "helps consolidate 
the links between technology and security (and) effectively hardens the 
discussion of technology transfer," an issue dear to the developing 
countries.269 And as with technology transfer and export controls, "it is easy 
to envision similar accusations of discrimination" when it comes to 
counterproliferation.270 The implicit shift in NATO's focus from eastward to 
southward in matters of WMD proliferation might be offered as evidence for 
this charge. The U.S. Strategic Command's Silver Book concept also allegedly 
targets nuclear infrastructure in the developing countries.27i Gamba also 
believes that most of the criticism of U.S. security policy has "been prompted 
by suspicions that the United States and other developing countries are 
attempting to adapt traditional doctrines of East-West deterrence to North- 
South interactions," while conceding that over time, most countries 
ultimately do "adopt and adapt" new U.S. sponsored security initiatives.272 
Broad based international consensus, when it can be achieved, will help 
defuze the potential North-South argument. 
Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler of Greenpeace International 
assert that the nuclear weapons states view Third World proliferation as a 
269 Gamba, 66. 
270 rbid. 
271 Starr, "STRATCOM Sees New Role in WMD Targeting," 3. 
272 Gamba, 60. 
126 
rationale to keep robust nuclear arsenals.273 They infer that improvements in 
strategic intelligence and rapid retargeting, combined with initiatives like 
STRATCOM's Silver Book concept, and new strategic doctrine indicate a 
fundamental shift in nuclear deterrence strategy specifically aimed at 
developing countries.274 The result, they argue, is that "the United States is 
gradually adjusting its nuclear war plans to include fighting a nuclear war 
against a Third World nation or group of nations which may acquire weapons 
of mass destruction."275 They claim that this new strategic doctrine is not 
specifically part of the CPI, but that it exists in tandem with it. 
These charges focus more on Greenpeace's traditional opposition to 
nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. They view changes in U.S. nuclear 
strategy as a sinister plot. In order to prevent the use of Third World nuclear 
weapons, U.S. nuclear forces must be able "to deter the use of WMD across the 
spectrum of potential conflict, from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons to 
limited use on a regional battlefield."276 Regardless of the extent of the threat, 
U.S. nuclear weapons "must confront an enemy with risks of unacceptable 
damage and disproportionate loss should the enemy choose to introduce 
273 Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, Changing Targets: Nuclear 
Doctrine from the Cold War to the Third World (Washington, D.C.:  Greenpeace 
International, 1995 - revised), 1. 
274 ibid, 1 and Appendix B. In the Appendix, Kristensen and Handler 
provide excerpts of Toint Publication (Toint Pub) 3-12. Doctrine For Toint Nuclear 
Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 April 1993), as 
evidence of new nuclear doctrine, as well as Barbara Starr's article "STRATCOM 
Sees New Role in WMD Targeting," 3, as evidence of STRATCOM's Silver Book 
initiative. 
275 ibid, 1-3. 
276 Toint Pub 3-12.1-2, excerpted in the appendix to Kristensen and Handler's 
report. 
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WMD in a conflict."277 
Kristensen and Handler are concerned that such a deterrence posture is 
inconsistent with the negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear 
states which are parties to the NPT.278 Their logic implies that targeting an 
NPT signatory which violates its NPT obligations by proliferating is somehow 
unethical or illegal.     Greenpeace's fundamental disagreement with 
longstanding nuclear deterrence focuses on a noble, but wishful desire for a 
nuclear weapons free world, not on the reality that more potentially hostile 
states are acquiring WMD. This tension will likely not be resolved, regardless 
of how U.S. counterproliferation policy and deterrence strategy are framed. 
A related tension raised by a private analyst is whether 
counterproliferation would entail the use of nuclear weapons, despite the 
claims of Aspin and Wallerstein that it would only involve conventional 
capabilities. Despite these assurances, Paul Warnke notes that it is 
"discouraging and alarming to read in the 1994 Annual Report of the Secretary 
of Defense that:  'since the United States has foresworn chemical and 
biological weapons, the role of U.S. nuclear forces in deterring or responding 
to such non-nuclear threats must be considered.' "279 This tension may be 
useful in the end, particularly if the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
counterproliferation were left ambiguous.  This risk might force states intent 
on acquiring WMD to recalculate the value of acquiring them. It might also 
compel the broader community of states interested in halting particular 
proliferation threats to work together for consensus for fear that if diplomacy 
failed, U.S. nuclear weapons might be used instead. 
277 ibid. 
278
 Kristensen and Handler, 25. 
279 Paul C. Warnke, "Strategic Nuclear Policy and Nonproliferation," Arms 
Control Today, vol. 15, no. 11 (May 1994), 5. 
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E. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE TENSIONS CAUSED BY THE CPI 
1. Bureaucratic Tensions are Dissipating: 
These tensions were self-inflicted, because of the lack of clear 
definitions and the "initiative" approach of introducing a new mission with a 
new agenda into an arena of competitive bureaucratic interests. These 
tensions were avoidable and unnecessary, but they have not proven 
insurmountable. Many are fast fading away. Counterproliferation has been 
established as the full range of conventional military capabilities which can be 
brought to bear if diplomatic responses to proliferation fail to protect the 
United States and its allies from WMD. The biggest bureaucratic tensions 
remaining seem to be the questions of whether or not the intelligence will be 
available to support counterproliferation, and whether military forces can 
actually accomplish missions envisioned. 
Much of the bureaucratic infighting has died down. The NSC has been 
firmly established as the arbiter of nonproliferation and counterproliferation 
issues. The President advised by the NSC will ultimately be the tasking 
conduit for counterproliferation contingency planning and execution.  The 
Defense Department after an admittedly shaky start in which it had great 
difficulty explaining what it really meant has firmly established under Carter's 
office a single point of contact think tank to study the issue, develop policy, 
and conduct dialogue with both U.S. government agencies and foreign 
governments.  The experience level of this office on WMD proliferation 
issues has developed over time, giving it greater credibility. Congress also 
took a role by commissioning the Deutch study to clarify the full range of 
activities and capabilities, including capability shortfalls and new 
requirements. The first Deutch Report of May 1994 did a great deal to solidify 
the interagency processes at work, and to legitimize the concept of 
counterproliferation within the U.S. bureaucracy. A second report is 
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anticipated in 1995. The Joint Staff, CINCs, and Services issued a report in 
May 1995 on the study they undertook beginning in January 1995, but its 
results are classified. It is likely that this study will further solidify the concept 
of counterproliferation, and forge a working consensus among the uniformed 
military of its capabilities, limitations, and anticipated requirements to fulfill 
counterproliferation missions. 
2. Intergovernmental Tensions and Emerging Consensus: 
Carter's office is clearly the single U.S. point of contact for 
counterproliferation.  Past experience with NATO shows that consensus 
among sixteen nations with similar political, security, and economic goals 
takes time to build. Progress is apparent, but patience must be the watchword, 
particularly in light of the extensive study being undertaken by the NATO 
DGP. To date NATO consensus is forming over defensive measures and 
intelligence capabilities, while mention is not even made of offensive means, 
or the actual terminology of counterproliferation. But this is good progress 
nonetheless, particularly when viewed in the light of NATO's past record of 
methodical review and debate. NATO's approach has worked remarkably 
well in building consensus for controversial new policies in the past.  The 
support and independent inquiries of key allies France and the United 
Kingdom will be helpful in forging future NATO consensus. 
Other allies are more cautious and are waiting to see what develops. 
Japan and South Korea appear reluctant to embrace the CPI concept because of 
their fears of provoking North Korea. Australia may see the CPI in 
competition with its own WMD nonproliferation initiatives in the biological 
and chemical realms. Russia will tender its own views soon, although some 
of its diplomats have expressed initial skepticism. 
Many nations have taken little or no interest in the CPI, either because 
they do not feel directly threatened by WMD, do not fear being targeted by the 
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CPI, or do not have the resources to focus on the issue and participate in the 
international debate.    Some of these states are more focused on other WMD 
proliferation issues which more directly impact upon them. Others are 
struggling with more immediate issues of national security and national 
survival. 
3. The NGOs are candid but often irrelevant: 
The NGO analysts are the most prolific and best published critics of the 
CPI. They make an important contribution to the counterproliferation - 
nonproliferation debate because they are free of the baggage of government 
policy, although they often defer to idealism instead of pragmatism. NGOs are 
not constrained by the requirement to actually develop and implement a 
policy that will meet particular needs and deliver on specific expectations. But 
they are free to express themselves as they see fit, and willingly commit 
themselves to print, whereas government officials many times will not, 
particularly in the development stage of policy, in which the CPI is currently 
managed.  This freedom is the great value of examining the tensions through 
the NGO perspective. 
Some NGO perceptions of the fundamental tensions between 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation are significant, and must not be 
lightly dismissed without detailed study. They sound the warning against 
unexamined policy development, and against potential abuses. The fear that 
the United States or a coalition it leads might wantonly substitute counterpro- 
liferation before nonproliferation actually fails is healthy, and establishes the 
benchmark that counterproliferation really is a last resort measure to be used 
only when nonproliferation can be shown to have failed decisively. 
The shift to considering potential WMD proliferators by their technical 
capabilities rather than by their legal status before the IAEA is a positive shift. 
The tensions such a shift creates will likely mitigate. Tensions created by 
allegations that the United States does not trust the regime are misplaced, 
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based on a skewing of actual priorities, which place counterproliferation 
clearly in a support role to nonproliferation for the few extreme cases when 
the latter fails, as it inevitably will. The tension raised by the fundamental 
difference in operating principles will always remain. It can be mitigated by 
developing a policy which allows flexibility to analyze each potential 
proliferation case on its own merits.  U.S. leadership in counterproliferation 
and nonproliferation is based on pragmatism not idealism.  Tensions 
concerning potential damage to U.S. leadership in nonproliferation are worth 
considering, but will probably in the end give way to pragmatism.   The cross 
purposes of counterproliferation and nonproliferation create tensions which 
may actually be harnessed to bring about broader international consensus for 
fear of unilateral U.S. action if consensus is not achieved. 
The NGOs also raise a number of tensions unique to 
counterproliferation, particularly when contemplating the use of military 
force. Some NGOs will always be in opposition to government policy based 
on fundamental differences in perception of how the world system operates. 
The NGO input is loud but often of little consequence. It might have great 
impact in several key areas such as environmental impact and war escalation 
when it can play on popular fears to pressure government action or restraint. 
In many cases, however, these tensions will fade away in the presence of a 
clear WMD threat. While many NGO analysts are skeptical of 
counterproliferation and predict its failure as policy, many of their own 
governments have shown cautious interest and are moving forward to study 
it. As consensus takes shape, however slowly it may move forward, it is 
apparent that the criticisms of various NGO analysts do not constitute a 
failure of the CPL 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Counterproliferation Initiative is compatible with the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.  It enhances nonproliferation by raising the stakes 
for states which violate regime norms and obligations. The tensions it created 
are numerous, but manageable, and will not preclude the development of 
U.S. and allied counterproliferation policy. It seems safe to assume that the 
president and his cabinet will carefully fashion counterproliferation into a set 
of options subordinate to the largely successful nonproliferation policies of 
the past.280 
Counterproliferation provides the stick, and nonproliferation the carrot 
necessary to treat future WMD proliferation attempts with the classic stick and 
carrot approach.28i The legacy of U.S. leadership in global nonproliferation 
endeavors is a mandate to continue to seek international consensus 
whenever possible to enhance the nonproliferation regime.  But it also seems 
wise to retain the option to use counterproliferation, preferably with U.S. 
allies or a U.S.-led coalition, but unilaterally if necessary, to deal with regional 
adversaries which attempt to acquire WMD, or which threaten to use WMD 
280 This research supports the statements of Aspin, Carter, and Wallerstein 
that nonproliferation remains the strategy of choice to respond to WMD 
proliferation challenges. I agree with their statements that the military options 
which counterproliferation may provide will reinforce and supplement 
nonproliferation policy when it falters or fails. 
281 In some cases, nonproliferation also uses the stick approach, but to a 
lesser degree than in counterproliferation. Export sanctions have been enacted at 
various times against India, China, and Russia. U.S. economic and military aid was 
cut off to Pakistan, a vital Cold War ally, once the Soviets withdrew from 
neighboring Afghanistan, and amid growing concerns over Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions. 
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which they may already possess.282 
President Clinton has said that WMD proliferation issues must be 
given a higher profile. He appears willing to combat WMD proliferation by 
regional adversaries with military means if diplomacy fails. This is a 
fundamental change in stated national security policy, but it does not 
undermine diplomacy.  Counterproliferation puts such an adversary on 
notice that there may be severe consequences for acquiring or threatening use 
of WMD against the United States or its allies. It may induce states to 
reconsider the cost-benefit calculus of possessing such weapons and halt 
existing WMD programs. It will help influence such a state to search for its 
security in other venues. 
A. ANCHOR POINTS FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY 
The six pairs of arguments and counterarguments presented in the 
introductory chapter have been examined over the course of this research. 
These pairs may now be resolved into clearly focused building blocks for 
counterproliferation policy. They must be viewed through the dual lenses of 
protecting U.S. security interests, while at the same time enhancing 
nonproliferation. These are the dual fundamental purposes of the CPI. By 
using both lenses, it may be possible to develop an effective counterpro- 
liferation policy which reinforces nonproliferation to the point that military 
responses to proliferation may never be required. Counterproliferation policy 
must be consistent with these elements if it is to succeed. 
282 The carrot and stick approach to WMD proliferation is consistent with 
President Clinton's speech entitled "We Must Secure Peace," delivered at the 49th 
Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 26 September 1994, Vital Speeches 
of the Day, vol. 61, no. 1 (15 October 1994), 3. In this speech, Clinton forcefully states: 
"As President of the United States, my first duty is to the citizens of my country. 
When our national security interests are threatened, we will act with others when 
we can, alone if we must. We will use diplomacy when we can, but force if we 
must." 
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1. The CPI is a proper response to the number one U.S. security threat: 
Although key friends and allies often disagree with the United States 
over the scope of particular WMD proliferation threats, there is no serious 
rebuttal on the nature of the threat. The raison d' etre of the CPI is to combat 
this threat. No other strategies to meet this threat have yet been tendered by 
U.S. allies or by other states which maintain an interest in proliferation 
issues.283  British and French military doctrines now consider this threat, and 
incorporate many of the options espoused by the CPI.284 NATO's Defense 
Group on Proliferation has completed its own threat assessment, and is 
moving forward with its counterproliferation study.285 The growing allied 
consensus over the nature of the threat helps legitimize the CPI as an 
appropriate response. 
2. Nonproliferation needs a forceful back-up: 
There are widespread calls to strengthen each component of the 
nonproliferation regime, but it seems increasingly likely that nonproliferation 
alone will not stop a state which has the will and resources to acquire WMD. 
Past difficulties involving the tightening of export controls indicate that it 
may prove even more difficult to achieve the consensus necessary to change 
283 NATO Press Communique M-l(94)3, issued by NATO following the 
January 1994 NATO Summit, stated that "we have decided to intensify and expand 
NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the 
work already underway in other international fora and institutions" (emphasis 
added). This appears to be a diplomatic acknowledgment that at that point NATO 
would study the role of U.S. leadership in counterproliferation, and the course 
charted by the CPI, and would adapt elements of the U.S. proposal rather than 
develop its own alternative. 
284 "UK Defense Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?" and 
Livre Blanc sur La Defense 1994. 
285 Wallerstein, 18. 
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the NPT or the IAEA statute.286 The military options provided by 
counterproliferation add back-up capabilities of prevention, preemption, 
deterrence, and defense, which will make the diplomatic approaches of the 
nonproliferation regime more effective than before, and which will raise the 
stakes for states who might strive to cheat on their obligations. The possibility 
of unilateral U.S. military action may prompt states to work towards greater 
consensus in nonproliferation, which may in the end obviate the need for the 
use of military force. 
3. U.S. leadership in counterproliferation is consistent with its past 
leadership in nonproliferation: 
The extension of the NPT, the flagship component of the regime, and 
the component which draws the strongest international consensus, highlights 
the long standing success of U.S. leadership in nonproliferation. Fears that 
the CPI will undermine future consensus appear to be ill-founded. 
Counterproliferation was not even brought up over the entire four weeks of 
the NPT Review and Extension Conference.287 None of the concerns raised 
286 it was not until the embarrassment caused by the acquisition successes of 
the Iraqi nuclear weapons program that members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
accepted stricter export controls. Prior to the Gulf War, various European states 
argued against U.S. efforts to tighten export rules, and expand trigger lists. When 
the NSG founders announced their formal agreement in September 1977 launching 
the so-called "London Club" they refused to agree to a U.S. proposal for an outright 
ban on the sale of sensitive technologies and equipment, and agreed only to 
"exercise restraint" in exporting plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
facilities. This failure was due largely to commercial pressures which were flimsily 
disguised as issues of national sovereignty. See Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the 
Bomb, Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, Connecticut:  Yale 
University Press, 1982), 33-34. 
287 According to statements of faculty and associates of the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies who attended the conference in a variety of official 
and unofficial capacities, the issue of counterproliferation did not surface 
throughout the entire four weeks of the conference. 
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by the NGO community were addressed.288 The Review and Extension 
Conference is a useful barometer indicating that counterproliferation. if 
judiciously managed, may have a minimal impact on the nonproliferation 
regime.  The United States should view the NPT extension as a mandate to 
continue its leadership in managing international responses to WMD 
proliferation.   This will involve maintaining proven nonproliferation efforts, 
as well as developing new responses such as counterproliferation. 
4. The CPI updates U.S. nuclear deterrence to the current threat: 
Carter and Wallerstein claim that the CPI does not portend the first use 
of U.S. nuclear weapons.289 But the possibility that they may be used in a 
preemptive strike against an adversary's WMD before they can be used against 
the United States or its allies cannot be dismissed. This possibility is implicit 
in the longstanding U.S. nuclear weapons strategy of maintaining the option 
of first use, which formed the linchpin of NATO's "flexible response" strategy 
for many years.  Credible military counterproliferation options, including the 
possible first use of nuclear weapons, will ultimately enhance U.S. nuclear 
deterrent strategy.290 The use of nuclear weapons in counterproliferation 
must therefore be left deliberately ambiguous. 
288 ibid. 
289 Carter and Wallerstein have made similar claims at recent conferences 
on WMD proliferation. 
290 LT Paul E. Espinosa's thesis titled "No-First-Use: Implications for 
Deterrence, Alliance Cohesion, and Nonproliferation" (Monterey, California: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1994) reaches similar conclusions on the benefits of an 
ambiguous no-first-use policy. He concludes that a U.S. no-first use declaration 
would be shortsighted in that it would damage relations with U.S. allies which 
depend upon U.S. positive security assurances, and would increase the likelihood of 
nuclear proliferation. 
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5. The CPI's preventive and preemptive options can provide additional 
protection for U.S. citizens, forces, and territories: 
Carter states that the CPI focuses on protection from "the danger that 
WMD will be used against U.S. citizens, forces, or allies in the course of a 
regional conflict."29i The CPI's preemptive and preventive options are its 
strong suit, and can probably provide such protection. These options will 
likely provide an impetus for regional adversaries intent on acquiring WMD 
to reassess the benefits of doing so. An adversary which may already possess 
WMD will have to carefully assess the value of threatening or actually 
attempting to use them against the United States or its allies. 
6. The CPI targets the handful of regional adversaries likely to attempt 
to acquire or threaten the use of WMD, not the broader international 
consensus of the nonprolif eration regime: 
The linkage established between nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation makes it clear that counterproliferation is focused on the 
handful of states which seem highly motivated to acquire WMD, and which 
have shown a strong record of hostile intent towards the United States and its 
allies.292 States that are not pursuing the acquisition of WMD, and those 
which possess either the weapons or the capability to produce them, but do 
not demonstrate adversarial behavior, have nothing to fear from U.S. 
291 Carter, 4. 
292 Wallerstein, 2. Slide 2 from this briefing is titled "Proliferation - The 
Danger." It states that "more than 25 countries, many hostile to the U.S. and our 
friends and allies, may have - or may be developing - nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and the means to deliver them." It may be inferred from this 
slide that all of these countries could be evaluated for possible counterproliferation 
activity, depending upon their future behavior. 
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counterproliferation.293 The national leadership of the states which are 
targeted will be able to surmise whether or not they are targets based on their 
behavior with regard to WMD they either possess or intend to acquire. 
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1. The nonproliferation regime is healthy: 
The NPT was extended both indefinitely and unconditionally, and is 
well on its way to approaching a long hoped-for goal of universality, with the 
exception that Israel, India, and Pakistan will probably remain outside for the 
foreseeable future. U.S. leadership proved crucial in obtaining the extension, 
and will be necessary to bolster international consensus for nonproliferation 
in the future.  U.S. leadership in both nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation does not appear to be a conflict of interest, but rather a 
strength, especially since the policies are inextricably linked. Strong U.S. 
leadership in nonproliferation, coupled to the possibility that the U.S. or a 
U.S.-led coalition will take military action if it deems that diplomatic means 
have failed can help stimulate consensus over nonproliferation.  Concerns 
that counterproliferation will undermine the regime and destroy the existing 
consensus appear to be exaggerated, and play on popular fears. The United 
States has earned a mandate to lead out in the new direction of 
counterproliferation by virtue of its proven record as an honest manager of 
the nonproliferation regime. 
2. The CPI is not a "fix-all" solution: 
The CPI has two inherent risks that can not be lightly dismissed, and 
which will ultimately delineate the limitations of counterproliferation. The 
first risk is that there may be overconfidence in high technology solutions. 
This is a classic American weakness and a potential Trojan Horse which could 
293 However, they might fear counterproliferation efforts by other states. 
What if for example Israel, India, and China develop their own counterproliferation 
policies with goals somewhat different from the United States and NATO? 
139 
lie dormant the day a military response is actually required. CNN video 
images of precision weapons going down ventilation shafts have now become 
part of America's public corporate memory. In future conflicts there may be 
expectations and illusions of fool proof hightech solutions to WMD 
proliferation. The fascination with high tech solutions, and the tendency to 
overlook the uncertainty of combat and the possibility of failure implicit in 
every military operation must not be allowed to cloud the judgment of policy 
makers, military planners, and commanders.  Understanding this risk is vital. 
The second risk is the possibility that intelligence support may be 
inadequate to execute required missions. It may be impossible to know how 
many, or even about how many special weapons an adversary may possess, 
where these weapons are hidden, and what defenses must be overcome to 
attack or disable them. The limitations of intelligence have often in the past 
dictated what could and could not be accomplished. It is likely that 
intelligence limitations will constrain military options in 
counterproliferation scenarios as well. 
3. Intergovernmental tensions are fading: 
Through the first year of the CPI there was much talk of tensions 
between the agencies and departments of the U.S. government which deal 
with proliferation issues.  Many analysts both within the government and 
outside of it criticized the vagueness of the terms and principles of 
counterproliferation, and there appeared to be confusion over agency 
responsibilities and authority.294 while specific interagency tensions were 
not addressed in public sources, the general tensions, particularly at the 
working staff level, were described by many observers. The Deutch Report of 
May 1994 clearly established NSC authority over all proliferation policy 
294 The various articles by private analysts in Reiss and Müller's 
International Perspectives on Counterproliferation are replete with such criticism. 
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issues.295 Interagency tensions have been eased, and the competing 
bureaucracies within the government are now achieving consensus on how 
to proceed. 
4. Alliance tensions are manageable, and other intergovernmental 
tensions are largely inconsequential: 
The initial consensus achieved within NATO and the progress to date 
in the Defense Group on Proliferation is very positive, and will likely give 
way to the formation of a NATO counterproliferation policy in the future.296 
NATO's cautious approach to this issue, and its hesitancy to embrace the 
offensive element of counterproliferation is consistent with past behavior 
when confronted with major policy shifts.297 The CPI is consistent with 
NATO's defensive mission especially since its focus is on U.S. and 
Western/G7 security interests. As some NATO countries shift their security 
concerns southward, counterproliferation may partly fill the temporary 
vacuum caused by the short term disappearance of the former Soviet threat. 
Consensus with Japan and Russia may be much further off in the 
future, if it is ever achieved at all. Preliminary discussions with both on 
theater ballistic missile defense cooperation and other aspects of 
counterproliferation have not been met with the same level of interest or 
295 Deutch, 7-8. 
296 See Wallerstein, 20, in which he expresses satisfaction in NATO progress 
to date, and optimism over future progress 
297 By comparison, the doctrine of "flexible response" took six years to be 
adopted by NATO from the time it was first articulated by President Kennedy and 
Robert McNamara.  Sinnreich, 462. 
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consensus characteristic of the January 1994 NATO Summit.298 Other 
countries outside of U.S. security relationships may be critical of 
counterproliferation's focus on U.S. and Western security, but this should be 
expected. Countries looking at American and Western security policy from 
the outside will generally be suspicious, if not critical. 
5. Tensions raised by NGOs must be filtered: 
There is much noise and little substance relevant to U.S. security policy 
in many of the tensions raised by the NGOs. Some of the international NGOs 
concentrate on refuting U.S. security policy, and always will. They also focus 
on the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation regime, and the 
potential that counterproliferation will be applied in a discriminatory way to 
bully Third World states.299 Their arguments are based on idealism, not 
pragmatism or the realities of international power distribution. 
NGOs occasionally identify tensions which must truly be considered in 
the development of counterproliferation policy. One such tension, which has 
been vociferously raised by the international NGOs (and which has been 
played down by the Defense Department) is the fear that U.S. nuclear weapons 
will be used to carry out counterproliferation actions. This tension is a good 
tension. It is a difficult tension for the U.S. government to confront 
politically, and Carter and Wallerstein have addressed it by stating that 
counterproliferation will only entail conventional means.  But it is 
incalculably useful that organizations such as Greenpeace raise this tension, 
298 Wallerstein, 17-19. Wallerstein states that "the most important of these 
multilateral efforts is here in NATO, of course." In describing overtures to Russia 
and Japan, he stated that he looked forward to a constructive exchange with Russian 
Federation officials, and that he was striving to work with key friends and allies in 
the Pacific and was continuing "to explore a possible relationship with Japan built 
around theater missile defense issues and technology sharing." 
299
 Kristensen and Handler of Greenpeace International allege that 
counterproliferation is a plot to retarget U.S. strategic weapons on the Third World. 
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because it creates the very useful ambiguity that the United States might 
actually take matters into its own hands and use its nuclear weapons if 
diplomacy cannot solve the most serious proliferation problems. 
C POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Counterprolif eration policy must stress operational aims: 
Counterproliferation policy must enable the unified CINCs to plan, 
operate, and fight under the WMD threat. The United States can not afford to 
allow a potential regional adversary to use WMD to deter U.S. or U.S.-led 
coalition military forces. Policy must prevent this scenario from ever 
occurring. It must also be able to deter a potential adversary which already has 
WMD from threatening to use them. A strong and credible 
counterproliferation policy should allow the CINCs to fight with little fear 
that a potential foe could successfully resort to WMD.  Counterproliferation 
must also develop improved defensive measures to protect troops from 
WMD effects should such weapons be employed against them deliberately or 
accidentally. 
2. Keep options for prevention and first use of U.S. nuclear weapons 
ambiguous: 
Counterproliferation policy must keep options for preventive attacks 
and first use of U.S. nuclear weapons deliberately ambiguous. As has been 
previously mentioned, this ambiguity creates a good tension which ultimately 
may serve U.S. counterproliferation policy well. The United States can not 
flaunt this ambiguity as it will cause unwanted additional tensions with the 
NGO community, but it should nonetheless become an established principle 
of policy. It could be mentioned when needed to encourage diplomatic 
solutions by pointing out the possibility of a more severe outcome. 
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3. Give nonproliferation center stage whenever possible: 
Nonproliferation options must be showcased as the response of choice. 
The U.S. legacy has been one of patience and often tolerance in pursuing 
nonproliferation.  This tradition must continue, except in obvious cases 
where diplomacy fails to reverse extended stonewalling, blatant deception, or 
hostile intent. The linkage between nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation must model the carrot and stick approach. The 
advantages and benefits of nonproliferation must be held forth to states which 
have troublesome WMD proliferation records as the desirable outcome for all 
parties concerned. 
4. The abundant historical record of previous counterproliferation 
planning and action must be rediscovered: 
The initiative approach taken by Secretary Aspin in announcing the 
CPI may have been the wrong approach. This label implied that there would 
be new (and some clearly feared irresponsible) behavior within the 
Department of Defense.   The "newness" of counterproliferation both in terms 
of poorly defined new terminology as well as new missions created many self- 
inflicted tensions.  Counterproliferation should be presented as an extension 
of a long history of using military force when it was needed to stop WMD 
proliferation. World War II left behind a long record of counterproliferation- 
like activity against the German nuclear research program. There are also 
more recent examples. It can be argued that the 1991 Gulf War was itself a 
preventive war which was fought partly to prevent Saddam Hussein from 
going forward with his WMD programs.300 It is not too late to rediscover the 
history behind U.S. counterproliferation. and use it to illustrate that 
300 Although a preventive war against Iraqi WMD capabilities was never 
specificaUy mandated by the UN Security Council, U.S. and coalition commanders 
apparently realized the opportunity to destroy Iraq's growing WMD infrastructure 
from the earliest days of the Desert Shield build-up, and began planning strikes 
against known targets. 
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counterproliferation is not a radical departure from the U.S. record. 
5. Counterproliferation should be developed into a three-fold policy 
involving strategies of prevention, deterrence, and defense: 
A preventive strategy with deliberate ambiguity with regard to first use 
of U.S. nuclear weapons and unilateral U.S. action must be the core strategy of 
counterproliferation policy. Although this may not be popular at the United 
Nations, prevention is the most important single aspect of the CPI. Without a 
credible strategy of prevention, countries determined to acquire WMD for 
hostile purposes will be free to do so with little fear of an international 
consensus being reached against them. A credible preventive strategy will 
enhance other counterproliferation strategies as well as nonproliferation 
options. 
The emerging counterproliferation policy must also have a credible 
approach to deterring the use of WMD as well as to deter their acquisition in 
the first place. A strong deterrent strategy based on credible conventional and 
nuclear capabilities may influence a state intent on acquiring WMD to 
reconsider the costs and risks versus the perceived benefits. 
Finally, it must have an effective defensive strategy to provide real 
protection to U.S.. allied, or coalition forces, as well as populations and 
territory, from the effects of WMD. The defensive strategy must be based on 
three capabilities:   (1) preemption using offensive means at the outbreak of 
hostilities in which an adversary's WMD are targeted and destroyed or 
disabled, (2) enhanced active defenses to intercept or disable the delivery of 
WMD before impact/detonation (such as theater ballistic missile defenses), 
and (3) enhanced passive defenses to improve the survivability of forces in 
the event that WMD are successfully employed. 
6. A "watch list" of suspect states should be publicly established and 
kept as short as possible. 
A watch list would be a clear indicator of U.S. resolve and leadership in 
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counterproliferation. and would serve as a warning notice. The United States 
has long subscribed to the practice of warning other states of intolerable 
actions in the hopes of prompting more serious diplomacy.  The list should 
include likely regional adversaries which have the capability to produce 
WMD, already possess WMD, or which are determined to acquire WMD. 
States which are not potential regional adversaries, but which have the 
capability to produce WMD but have not done so, as well as those which may 
already have WMD need not be listed. This second group should, however, 
be monitored. The criteria for such a list are admittedly subjective. 
7. The President and his Cabinet must begin using counterproliferation 
terminology, and must reclaim ownership of the policy in future speeches and 
documents: 
Thus far, Carter and Wallerstein are the only senior officials who 
actually use the terms and describe the policy. Officials above their level for 
some reason do not appear to be comfortable with the actual terminology, and 
seem to prefer talking in more vague terms. It may also be possible that they 
are blind to the fact that they do not use the right terms. The failure of senior 
leadership to use the right terms, regardless of its cause, makes the policy look 
like it is Carter's policy, not national policy. The President. Secretary of 
Defense, and National Security Advisor should look for opportunities to 
reclaim their ownership of the policy in future speeches and documents. 
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